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We begin the issue with Professor Chuck Weisselberg’s annual reviewof the past year’s criminal decisions of the United States SupremeCourt. This is the fifth year he’s provided the criminal-case summary
for us, having taken on this helpful task for American judges after the death of
Professor Charlie Whitebread in 2008. Professor Whitebread had provided Court
Review readers with annual reviews of the Court’s civil and criminal cases for
more than 25 years. We have been thrilled with Professor Weisselberg’s work: he
places the new decisions in context, emphasizes what’s most important for state-
court judges (most of our readership), and tells us what’s on tap for the coming
year as well.
I’m pleased to announce that we’ve signed up a well-qualified author for a
companion annual review of the Court’s civil cases, which will lead off the next
issue of Court Review. That article, by Professor Todd Pettys of the University of
Iowa College of Law, is already posted on the AJA’s website. (Go to
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/publications/court-review.html to access any of our articles
from 1998 to the present.) We’ve recently started posting articles that are espe-
cially timely—like these annual reviews of the
Court’s civil and criminal cases—on the website
as soon as they’re ready. With the combination
of Professors Weisselberg and Pettys, we now
have two top-notch scholars doing an annual
review of the cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court, prepared especially for the
needs of a judicial audience. If you ever have a
chance to do so, please thank them: these sum-
maries take a lot of work to prepare.
This issue contains three additional articles.
The first is by Texas Chief Justice Wallace
Jefferson, former California judicial administra-
tor Bill Vickrey, and California judicial staff
member Douglas Denton. They review how
state-supreme-court opinions have grown
longer and more complicated over the years; they also suggest ways that courts
might better communicate their rulings to the public so as to enhance public
perceptions that cases have been handled fairly. While their study focused on
state supreme courts, many of the authors’ suggestions would be applicable to
any judge issuing a written opinion, and many might be worth considering as
well by judges who rule orally from the bench.
The final two articles examine ways to reduce no-show rates by defendants
for criminal-court hearings. Defendants who fail to appear for hearings can clog
court calendars and, when warrants are issued, jails as well. In addition, of
course, serving warrants to those who fail to appear takes law-enforcement
resources. So finding ways to reduce the no-show rate is important to courts, to
law-enforcement officials, and to the public budget. These articles present the
results of two pilot projects that achieved some success in reducing no shows.
In Jefferson County, Colorado, telephone calls from real people greatly reduced
the no-show rate. In 14 counties in Nebraska, postcard reminders also reduced
the no-show rate. Those who conducted each test project report what worked,
what didn’t, and what merits further consideration.—Steve Leben
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
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As a newly elected trial judge in the state of Louisiana in1996, one of the most important decisions I made wasjoining the American Judges Association, the Voice of
the Judiciary®—the premier organization of judges, for judges.
That marked the beginning of my commitment to becoming
the best judge I could be, and to working to make our judiciary
the finest in the world. 
Having just celebrated Thanksgiving with my family, I feel
compelled to begin my year as president of the American
Judges Association by pointing out all the thank-yous I have for
our organization.
My first thank-you is to the founders of the AJA and all my
predecessors and fellow judges who had the
vision of how valuable such an organization
would be to each of us. Since 1959, AJA judges
have been working to make this the important
organization it is today. What makes the AJA so
special is that it provides all of us the opportu-
nity to exchange ideas with colleagues from
jurisdictions in 50 states and Canada. 
I am thankful to everyone for the very suc-
cessful annual conference held in New Orleans
in October in partnership with the Louisiana
Judicial College. The theme was innovative
judging, and the conference was definitely
innovative. Educational offerings included a
review of the recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, as
well as sessions on ethics in the Internet age, new approaches
to procedural fairness, components of veterans treatment
courts, pro se protective-order proceedings, child-custody
issues, domestic violence, multijurisdictional judging, courts
and media, using technology, and drugged driving. Thank you
to everyone who made the conference such a success. 
The Red Mass at historic St. Louis Cathedral in the French
Quarter was thought-provoking for everyone, reminding us
how important our work in the judiciary is to our country.
The centuries-old tradition celebrating the beginning of the
judicial year was attended by judges, lawyers, officials, and cit-
izens of all faiths for the purpose of invoking God’s blessing
and guidance in the administration of justice. 
A special thank-you goes to the host city and state judges
who organized special events for our members, their families,
and guests. These events were hosted by the Louisiana Supreme
Court, Conference of Court of Appeal Judges, District Judges
Association, City Judges Association, Judicial College, State Bar
Association, and Fourth and Fifth Circuit Judges. The enter-
tainment, food, and hospitality were fabulous. 
Thanks are also in order for the American Judges Foundation
and everyone who attended the fundraiser in the penthouse at
the Ritz Carlton. The Stewart Juneau family graciously allowed
us to use their home. The hard work and generosity of the vol-
unteers enable us to fund our law-school essay contest and
other special projects. The American Judges Foundation is mov-
ing forward in establishing an endowment fund to support the
future education of judges from North America. 
The National Center for State Courts staff who support the
AJA, especially Shelley Rockwell and Barry Forrest, make it
possible for all of us to keep our organization running
smoothly. Thank you for your dedication. 
Although you can see we have much to be thankful for, to
keep our organization viable, we still have work to do to make
it even better. Some of our goals are:
1. Enhancing participation and services to AJA members, and 
maintaining and increasing our membership. 
2. Developing a network with other judicial and
legal institutions to create a first-class educa-
tional program. 
3. Providing more electronic educational forums
for AJA members and producing distance-learn-
ing sessions. 
4. Partnering with other organizations to enhance
collaborative opportunities. 
5. Encouraging members to routinely produce
white papers addressing specific issues facing
judges.
6. Being the leading Voice of the Judiciary® by having greater
visibility on judicial issues, having a dialogue with the
media, and developing responses to attacks on judges,
courts, and judicial systems. 
As you can see, our work must be ongoing to maintain our
mission as the Voice of the Judiciary®. On the immediate hori-
zon are further presentations of the new AJA white paper,
Minding the Court, by Judge Kevin Burke, Judge Steve Leben,
and Pamela Casey, Ph.D—a paper prepared with support from
the State Justice Institute. We are also finalizing the domestic-
violence distance-learning project that will be free to all judges
on the AJA website. And the executive committee is hard at
work on the 2013 midyear and fall conferences. 
All judges need the American Judges Association, and the
AJA needs all you judges! We all have strengths—whether it is
presenting white papers, teaching, serving on the AJA Board of
Governors, developing specialized training, writing for our
publications, attending conferences, or simply being a dues-
paying member. 
Since we all have very demanding judicial jobs, the key to
maintaining and improving our organization is to get some par-
ticipation and work from each of our members. Is anyone will-
ing? If so, what are you willing to do? Please be in touch.
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1. Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012).
2. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
3. Agents actually obtained a warrant, but it was valid for 10 days
and authorized placing the device while the vehicle was in the
District of Columbia. Agents installed the device on the 11th day
and in Maryland.
4. Id. at 949.
5. Id.
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
8. Id. at 957-58 (Alito, J., concurring). He asked, amusingly, whether
it was possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted
himself in a coach and remained there for a period of time to mon-
itor the movements of the coach’s owner, saying that this “would
have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or
both—not to mention a constable with incredible fortitude and
patience.” Id. at 958 n.3.
The United States Supreme Court’s 2011-2012 Term wasbig. The headline on the civil side of the docket was theAffordable Care Act decision.1 The blockbuster on the
criminal side was United States v. Jones,2 the Global Positioning
System (GPS) monitoring case. In Jones, the Court showed that
some old things can be new again—the justices gave us “new”
ways of thinking about Fourth Amendment searches. There
were other key criminal-law rulings as well, including on effec-
tive assistance and plea negotiations, confrontation, juries and
criminal fines, juvenile life-without-parole sentences, and dou-
ble jeopardy. And as in the previous Term, the Court issued sev-
eral opinions emphasizing the deference to be afforded state
courts on federal habeas corpus review. This article examines
some of the most notable criminal-law-related opinions of the
Supreme Court’s 2011 Term, focusing on those decisions that
have the greatest impact upon the states. It concludes with a
brief preview of the 2012-2013 Term.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The criminal case of the year was Jones, the GPS-monitoring
decision. Jones has broad implications for how we define a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
majority gave us a trespass-based alternative to the familiar
“reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis, and even the con-
curring justices mustered five votes for a gloss on the reason-
able-expectation-of-privacy test. In other Fourth Amendment
rulings, the justices addressed jailhouse searches (rejecting a
broad challenge to visual strip searches of detainees), passed on
the Fourth Amendment aspects of the Arizona S.B. 1070 chal-
lenge, and, in two civil-rights matters, gave some guidance
about warrants and exigent circumstances.
GPS monitoring and a “new” trespass-based approach to
searches and seizures
The case began when agents suspected Antoine Jones of traf-
ficking in narcotics. Without a valid warrant,3 they installed a
GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a Jeep registered to
Jones’s wife. Agents used the device to track the vehicle’s move-
ments over the next 28 days, obtaining over 2,000 pages of
locational data, which was introduced at trial. The Court unan-
imously found that this violated the Fourth Amendment, and it
reversed Jones’s conviction, though the justices were split on
their reasoning.
The Court’s opinion was delivered by Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Sotomayor. They held that the government physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information, and
that “such a physical intrusion would have been considered a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it
was adopted.”4 Until the latter half of the twentieth century,
“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law
trespass.”5 The Court deviated from that property-based
approach beginning in Katz v. United States,6 with the develop-
ment of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” analyses.
Perhaps most significantly, the Jones majority held that the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test exists alongside (and
does not displace) a test grounded in the law of trespass.7 Thus,
the Court rejected the government’s claim that Jones had no
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment; the United States
had argued that Jones lacked a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the underbody of the Jeep and in the locations of the
Jeep on the public roads, which, after all, were visible to all.
Four justices (joined in part by a fifth) concurred on a very
different theory. They criticized the majority’s property-based
approach and would have found a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion applying the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. In
his concurrence for these justices, Justice Alito criticized the
majority for deciding the case based upon eighteenth-century
tort law, saying that “it is almost impossible to think of late-
eighteenth-century situations that are analogous to what took
place in this case.”8 He argued that the “reasonable expectation
of privacy” analysis was meant to replace a trespass-based
approach. Justice Alito wrote that the Court’s approach created
a number of difficulties and anomalies, including that it
attached great significance to placing the GPS device as
opposed to long-term monitoring using the device; it provided
no protection if the device was attached prior to the car being
turned over to a bailee for his use; the outcome may vary
according to property laws in the states; and reliance on the
law of trespass may “present particularly vexing problems in
cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making elec-
tronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be
GPS Monitoring and More:
Criminal Law Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2011-12 Term
Charles D. Weisselberg
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(Alito, J., concurring)).
13. Id. at 955-57.
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15. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
110 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS
Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v.
Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012).
16. See United States v. Luna-Santillanes, 2012 WL 1019601 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 26, 2012); United States v. Hanna, 2012 WL 279435
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012).
17. See State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490, 498-99 (S.D. 2012).
18. See Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-uptick-in-requests-to-aid-surveil-
lance.html?pagewanted=all (reporting 1.3 million demands for
subscriber information in 2011 alone).
19. See Catherine Crump, Location Tracking After United States v.
Jones: Continued Uncertainty Harms Americans’ Privacy, 91 CRIM.
L. RPTR. 577 (BNA July 11, 2012).
20. See United States v. Ortiz, 2012 WL 2951391 (E.D. Pa. July 20,
2012).
21. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 2012 WL 3156217 (9th Cir.
Aug. 6, 2012).
22. See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Off
3,000 Tracking Devices, ABC NEWS, Mar. 7, 2012, available at
http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-ruling-prompts-fbi-turn-
off-3-154046722--abc-news.html (describing comments of FBI
general counsel, Andrew Weissman).
23. 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
tracked.”9 However, the concurring justices also acknowledged
that the Katz analysis was not without problems in cases like
this. Katz depends upon the assumption that a hypothetical
reasonable person has a stable set of expectations of privacy,
and technological advances may lead to changes in those
expectations and periods where expectations may be in flux.
Also, though the use of long-term GPS monitoring in most
investigations violates expectations of privacy—“society’s
expectation” has been that agents and others could not
“secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period”—the concurring jus-
tices declined to “identify with precision the point at which the
tracking of [Jones’s] vehicle became a search, for the line was
surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”10 The concurring jus-
tices also refrained from deciding whether the same outcome
would follow “in the context of investigations involving extra-
ordinary offenses.”11
Justice Sotomayor provided the fifth vote to make Justice
Scalia’s trespass-based approach the decision of the Court, but
her concurrence revealed a willingness to reconsider basic
aspects of privacy analysis as well as general support for the
approach taken by Justice Alito. She concurred with Justice
Alito in finding that “at the very least, ‘longer term GPS moni-
toring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expecta-
tions of privacy.’”12 Justice Sotomayor also underscored that
records of a person’s public movements provide a wealth of
detail about that person’s familial, political, professional, reli-
gious, and sexual associations, which the government can store
and mine years in the future. Justice Sotomayor would take
these into account in determining whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy in one’s public movements, and she
would not find it dispositive that the government might obtain
the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional sur-
veillance techniques. She would be willing to reconsider the
notion that an individual has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in information that they voluntarily disclose to third par-
ties.13 The bottom line: there were five votes for finding a
Fourth Amendment violation based upon Justice Scalia’s tres-
pass theory and five votes for finding a violation based upon
some form of reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis.
One other important point to note: contrary to many press
reports, Jones does not hold that a
warrant is necessarily required for
GPS monitoring. The issue in the
case was whether placing and
using the device constituted a
search or seizure within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court did not reach the question
whether the search was reasonable
without a warrant, as that issue
was not raised below.14
For those who study and write
about the Fourth Amendment, Jones offered up a veritable
feast.15 For judges, lawyers, and officers who have to apply
Jones in the real world, the decision raised as many questions as
it answered. Some of the unresolved issues include: What acts
of trespass may amount to a search? Can a property interest
provide “standing” to bring a suppression motion even if the
defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the place searched or object seized?16 Just what is “long-term”
monitoring under the approach of the concurring justices?17
What is an “extraordinary” investigation? In light of the mil-
lions of requests made to cellphone carriers for subscriber
information,18 what does Jones mean for users of mobile
devices?19 Does the automobile or any other exception permit
the State to place a GPS device on a vehicle with probable cause
but without a warrant?20 Should evidence be suppressed when
officers objectively relied upon pre-Jones precedent?21 The FBI
is reportedly preparing memoranda to guide agents’ use of GPS
and other devices post-Jones.22 The FBI certainly has a lot of
issues to address.
Jail searches
It was no Jones, but another highly anticipated Fourth
Amendment case was Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of
County of Burlington,23 which addressed intrusive searches of
arrestees. The plaintiff in this civil-rights action was arrested on
an outstanding warrant for failure to pay a fine, and he was held
for six days in two different jails. He was subjected to a visual
inspection of his entire body, including his genitals. The plain-
tiff alleged that a policy of strip searching, without reasonable
Court Review - Volume 48 61
[C]ontrary to
many press
reports, Jones
does not hold
that a warrant
is necessarily
required for
GPS monitoring.
24. Id. at 1518 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85
(1984)).
25. Id. at 1521-22.
26. Id. at 1523.
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29. Id. at 1526-28.
30. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
31. Justice Kagan recused herself.
32. Given the federal government’s broad authority over immigration,
Arizona could not criminalize a non-citizen’s failure to carry an
alien registration document or a non-citizen’s unauthorized appli-
cation for employment (or the person’s actual work). Nor could
Arizona authorize officers to arrest without a warrant if there was
probable cause to believe a person has committed a removable
offense. See 132 S. Ct. at 2503, 2505, 2507.
33. Id. at 2509.
34. Id. at 2524, 2529 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Scalia concurred with the decision to uphold this
part of the statute but saw no reason to address the Fourth
Amendment issue. See id. at 2511, 2516 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas wrote separately on
the preemption question. See id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
35. 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012).
suspicion, those arrested for minor
offenses violates the Fourth
Amendment. The Court disagreed,
5-4.
Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy first stressed the difficul-
ties of operating a detention center,
though the Court acknowledged
that people arrested for minor
offenses may be among the
detainees. There are perhaps two
most notable aspects of the major-
ity’s opinion. First, the justices
emphasized that “deference must
be given to the officials in charge of
the jail unless there is ‘substantial
evidence’ demonstrating their response to the situation is exag-
gerated.”24 Second, the Court was pointedly determined to craft
a bright-line rule rather than require jail officials to decide on a
detainee-by-detainee basis whether a visual strip search is per-
mitted.25 Framed this way, the majority concluded that the
search procedures at the two jails “struck a reasonable balance
between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions.”26
Justice Alito joined the Court’s opinion but concurred to empha-
size the limits of the holding. He especially noted that the case
concerned arrestees who were committed to the general popula-
tion of the jail and whose searches did not involve physical con-
tact. He pointed out that the opinion does not hold that it is
always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee
whose detention has not yet been reviewed by a judicial officer
and who could be held apart from the general population.27
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, dissented. They underscored that a visual strip search is
a serious invasion of privacy and that people arrested for minor
offenses have been subjected to the humiliations of such a
search. While also acknowledging that managing a jail is a dif-
ficult undertaking, the dissenting justices could find “no con-
vincing reason indicating that, in the absence of reasonable sus-
picion, involuntary strip searches of those arrested for minor
offenses are necessary . . . .”28 The dissenters argued that these
procedures were sufficient to detect injuries, diseases, or gang
tattoos, and that there were no clear examples of instances in
which contraband was smuggled into the general population of
the jail during intake that could not have been discovered
under a reasonable-suspicion standard.29
Investigative detentions
Arizona v. United States,30 the S.B. 1070 decision, was a cross-
over hit: the Court touched on the Fourth Amendment in addi-
tion to its more important holding about the federal power over
immigration. A 5-3 majority of the Court31 found that several
parts of Arizona’s controversial immigration-related law (S.B.
1070) were preempted by federal law.32 But all eight participat-
ing justices agreed that Arizona might be able to implement a
statute requiring officers to make a reasonable effort to deter-
mine the immigration status of any person they stop, detain, or
arrest on some other legitimate basis, provided the officers have
reasonable suspicion that the person is a non-citizen and is not
lawfully present in the country. The justices also declined to
overturn a provision that any person arrested shall have their
immigration status determined prior to release.
The plaintiffs had claimed that determining immigration sta-
tus may unduly prolong a detention or delay a release, which
may violate the Fourth Amendment. However, the statute was
yet to be construed by the state courts or applied by officers. As
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, if the statute is construed
to require officers “to conduct a status check during the course
of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been
released, the provision would likely survive preemption—at
least absent some showing that it has other consequences that
are adverse to federal law and its objectives.”33 Justice Alito
wrote separately to emphasize that officers already had the
power to inquire about immigration status of people who are
lawfully detained, and this part of the statute does not expand
that power. He also noted that while the statute should not lead
to federal constitutional violations, “there is no denying that
enforcement . . . will multiply the occasions on which sensi-
tive Fourth Amendment issues will crop up.”34 He suggested
some ways that Arizona might mitigate that risk.
Qualified immunity, warrant searches, and exigent 
circumstances
Two civil-rights cases about qualified immunity gave the
Court an opportunity to address aspects of warrant searches
and the exigent-circumstances doctrine. 
In Messerschmidt v. Millender,35 a victim reported that her ex-
boyfriend, a reputed gang member, had attacked her and fired a
sawed-off shotgun at her car. Officers prepared arrest and search
warrants. The search warrants sought, broadly, all firearms (not
just the sawed-off shotgun) and evidence of gang membership.
Executing the warrant, officers searched the home of the sus-
62 Court Review - Volume 48  
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pect’s foster mother, where they found a shotgun and ammuni-
tion. The plaintiffs alleged that the warrants were overbroad and
not supported by probable cause. The Supreme Court ruled 6-3
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts,
notes that the same standard of objective reasonableness that
applies in the context of a suppression motion under United
States v. Leon36 is involved in determining whether an officer
should be denied qualified immunity because an affidavit is so
lacking in indicia of probable cause. The threshold for meeting
this standard is high. Under the circumstances of this case, an
officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe
that the suspect had other weapons, and that seizing the
weapons was necessary to protect the victim. Further, it would
not be unreasonable for an officer to believe that evidence
regarding gang membership would help in prosecuting the sus-
pect for the attack. Without deciding whether the circumstances
actually established probable cause, the Court found that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The majority
emphasized that the officers here “sought and obtained approval
of the warrant application from a superior and a deputy district
attorney before submitting it to the magistrate.”37
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented,
arguing that there was no basis to seek evidence of gang affili-
ation in this non-gang-related assault or reasonable basis to
search for weapons other than the gun used in the assault.
They also complained that the majority erred in giving weight
to the fact that the officers had sent the warrant application to
superiors and obtained a judge’s approval.38 Justice Kagan con-
curred in part and dissented in part, finding a middle ground
between the majority and dissenting justices. She thought that
the officers were entitled to immunity with respect to the
search for weapons, but not the search for evidence of gang
membership.39
The other case was Ryburn v. Huff,40 where the Court clari-
fied principles of qualified immunity and the exigent-circum-
stances doctrine. Four officers were investigating an allegation
that a high-school student threatened to shoot up his school.
They went to his home and knocked, but no one answered.
Eventually, the student’s mother came out of the home with her
son and stood on the front steps. The mother declined the offi-
cers’ request to interview young man inside. After she was
asked if there were any guns in the home, she turned around
and ran into the house. The officers followed. The family sued
because of the warrantless entry. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and summarily reversed the court of appeals, deter-
mining that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
In a per curiam opinion, the justices first noted that “[a] rea-
sonable police officer could read” the Court’s prior decisions to
mean that an officer may enter a residence without a warrant “if
the officer has a reasonable basis for concluding that there is an
imminent threat of violence.”41 Taking the events together
rather than in isolation, reason-
able officers could have come to
the conclusion that there was
an imminent threat to safety.
The mother ran into the home
immediately after being asked
about the presence of weapons.
While she was lawfully entitled
to enter her home, “there are
many circumstances in which
lawful conduct may portend
imminent violence.”42
FIFTH AMENDMENT—
MIRANDA
The Term gave us two
Miranda decisions, including
Howes v. Fields,43 which
addressed Miranda custody and inmates. Fields received the
most attention, but Bobby v. Dixon,44 a per curiam summary
reversal, may turn out to be more significant. Dixon has impli-
cations for situations in which a defendant makes an anticipa-
tory invocation, and it also is the first Supreme Court decision
to construe the 2004 opinions in Missouri v. Seibert.45
In the first of the two cases, Fields was serving a sentence in
a county jail. Officers wanted to question him about whether he
had earlier engaged in sex with a young boy. Fields was escorted
from his cell to a conference room in the jail, where he was ques-
tioned without Miranda warnings for five to seven hours. At the
outset, he was told that he was free to return to his cell and later
was reminded that he could leave whenever he wanted. Fields
confessed, although he allegedly said several times that he no
longer wanted to speak with the deputies. The state courts
found that his confession was admissible, ruling that he was not
in Miranda custody during the questioning. On federal habeas
corpus review, the court of appeals found this conclusion con-
trary to clearly established federal law, the standard required to
grant relief under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court of appeals determined that
Miranda custody exists per se when an individual is imprisoned
and is questioned in private about events outside of the prison.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
In an opinion for the Court, Justice Thomas wrote that prior
decisions did not establish such a categorical rule. Thus, the
state-court decisions were not contrary to clearly established fed-
eral law. Morever, even had the case been brought on direct
appeal, and not judged under the deferential AEDPA standards,
the court of appeals ruling was wrong. Custody is determined
from the objective circumstances of the interrogation and from
the point of view of a reasonable person, in light of all of the cir-
cumstances. Citing Berkemer v. McCarty,46 the Court emphasized
that not all restraints on the freedom of movement amount to
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Miranda custody. There are reasons to
believe that imprisonment alone is not
enough to create Miranda custody,
including that when someone already
imprisoned is questioned, the circum-
stances generally do not involve the
shock that often accompanies an arrest.
Moreover, an individual is not likely to
be lured into speaking by hoping for prompt release.47
Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor)
agreed that the law was not clearly established in Fields’ favor,
and thus relief could not be granted under AEDPA. But had the
case been presented on direct appeal, these three justices would
have found that the questioning was custodial. They pointed to
the definition of custody in Miranda itself and stressed that
Fields was questioned incommunicado in a police-dominated
atmosphere, in an inherently stressful way, and that his freedom
of action was significantly curtailed.48
In the Term’s other Miranda case, Bobby v. Dixon, Dixon and
a co-defendant murdered the decedent to steal and sell his car.
Dixon used the victim’s documents to obtain an ID card, and he
forged a signature to cash the check for the sale of the car.
Officers had several distinct contacts with Dixon. First, there
was a chance non-custodial encounter at a police station. A
detective gave Dixon Miranda warnings and asked him about
the victim’s disappearance, but Dixon would not answer ques-
tions without his lawyer, and he left. Then, five days later, after
arresting Dixon for the forgery, detectives interrogated him
intermittently for several hours and intentionally did not pro-
vide Miranda warnings. They urged him to cut a deal before his
co-defendant did. Dixon made some inculpatory admissions
but claimed that the decedent gave him permission to sell the
car and that he did not know where the victim was. There was
a third encounter later that day, after Dixon’s co-defendant led
police to the victim’s grave. Dixon said that he had heard police
found a body, that he talked to his attorney, and that he wanted
to tell what happened. Officers then read Dixon his rights,
obtained an express Miranda waiver, and Dixon gave a detailed
confession. The federal court of appeals granted habeas corpus
relief, finding (among other things) that officers should not
have interrogated Dixon after he had previously refused to
speak with them without his lawyer present. And relying upon
Seibert, the lower court determined that Dixon’s confession was
the product of a deliberate question-first, warn-later strategy.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed.
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the justices found that
Dixon’s refusal to speak without his lawyer present was not an
invocation of the right to counsel, which would have prevented
officers from initiating the subsequent interrogations. Dixon
was not in custody during the initial encounter. Quoting
McNeil v. Wisconsin,49 the Court said that it has “never held that
a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a con-
text other than ‘custodial interrogation.’”50 In addition, there
was no two-step interrogation technique of the type con-
demned in Seibert. In Seibert, the defendant’s first, unwarned
interrogation left little unsaid, and after receiving midstream
warnings the defendant merely repeated what she said before.
By contrast, Dixon initially denied involvement in the murder,
and his full, warned confession contradicted his unwarned ear-
lier statements. Moreover, in Seibert, the justices were con-
cerned that the midstream Miranda warnings were part of a sin-
gle interrogation and could not have effectively apprised the
suspect that she had a choice whether to speak. Given the sep-
aration of Dixon’s interrogations, that was not a concern here.51
The Court concluded that it was not clear that the state court
erred at all, much less erred so transparently that Dixon could
meet the demanding AEDPA standards.52
Dixon is a sleeper, but I think it is significant in two respects.
First, although Dixon is an AEDPA case, the Court appeared
comfortable in allowing officers to initiate an interrogation of a
suspect who previously refused to speak without counsel after
having receiving Miranda warnings in a non-custodial setting.
While the Court in McNeil had indicated that invocations can-
not be made anticipatorily, the holding of McNeil was that a
request for counsel under the Sixth Amendment at an initial
court appearance was not equivalent to an invocation under
Arizona v. Edwards.53 Dixon appears to expand McNeil, perhaps
permitting officers to ignore an unambiguous invocation of the
right to counsel for an out-of-custody suspect, even when offi-
cers actually give warnings. Second, Dixon is the first Supreme
Court case to apply Seibert. While five justices in Seibert found
that officers employing a “question-first” strategy had violated
Miranda, and Seibert’s second statement was inadmissible,
courts have struggled to extract a workable rule from the vari-
ous opinions in Seibert.54 The plurality opinion focused on
whether midstream warnings could function effectively as
Miranda requires, while Justice Kennedy—who provided the
fifth vote in Seibert—advocated a “narrower test” applicable
only where the two-step technique was used in a calculated way
to undermine the warnings.55 In Dixon, the Court cited both
opinions, but the justices appeared to apply the plurality’s test.
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SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Sixth Amendment was quite prominent this Term. In
two cases, the Court found that defendants are entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel in advising them whether to
plead guilty or not. The justices also dealt again with forensic
reports and the Confrontation Clause, addressed the applica-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause to certain mistrials, and
determined that there is a right to a jury determination of facts
that determine the maximum sentence of a fine.
Effective assistance of counsel and pleas
In Missouri v. Frye,56 the first of the two cases related to assis-
tance of counsel and pleas, Frye was charged with driving with
a revoked license. He had been convicted of the same offense on
three earlier occasions, so this time he was charged with a felony
that carried a maximum sentence of 4 years. The prosecutor
wrote Frye’s lawyer and offered two possible deals: one would
require Frye to plead to the felony, with a recommendation for a
3-year probationary sentence with 10 days in jail; the other was
a misdemeanor with a recommended sentence of 90 days. Frye’s
lawyer failed to advise his client of the offers, which expired. Just
before his preliminary hearing, Frye was arrested again on a new
charge. Frye eventually pleaded guilty to the original charge
without an agreement. The prosecutor asked for, and the court
imposed, a 3-year sentence without any probation. Frye later
sought post-conviction relief, arguing that he would have
pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor had he known about the
offer. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the
failure of Frye’s lawyer to communicate the offer was ineffective
assistance of counsel and, if so, what the remedy might be.
In a 5-4 ruling, the Court found that counsel’s performance
was deficient under the first prong of Strickland v. Washington.57
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to have counsel present
at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. Although no for-
mal court proceedings take place when a plea offer lapses or is
rejected, plea bargaining is prevalent in our justice system: 97%
of federal convictions and 94% of state convictions follow guilty
pleas. “The reality is that plea bargains have become so central
to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process,” and
these must be met to afford “the adequate assistance of counsel
that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at
critical stages.”58 The majority refrained from defining the
responsibilities of defense counsel in plea bargaining. On the
facts of this case, it was clear that counsel’s performance was
deficient. “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a
plea” on favorable terms and conditions.59 The majority
remanded for the state courts to determine whether Frye was
prejudiced by counsel’s performance. While there was a reason-
able probability that Frye would have accepted the offer had it
been communicated (as shown by
his later plea to a felony charge),
Frye must also show that the offer
would have been adhered to by
the prosecution and accepted by
the trial court.60
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito, dissented. In
their view, “[c]ounsel’s mistake
did not deprive Frye of any sub-
stantive or procedural right; only
of the opportunity to accept a plea
bargain to which he had no enti-
tlement in the first place.”61 Moreover, the focus of ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel cases is on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding—whether the defendant was deprived of his consti-
tutional right to a fair trial—and Frye’s conviction (which fol-
lowed a guilty plea) was untainted by his lawyer’s error. The
dissenters also noted that lawyers have different negotiating
styles, and they faulted the majority for not “confronting the
serious difficulties that will be created by constitutionalization
of the plea-bargaining process.”62
The other plea-bargaining case of the Term, Lafler v.
Cooper,63 explored Strickland prejudice when a plea offer is
communicated but rejected.
Cooper was charged with 4 offenses including assault with
intent to murder. The prosecutor offered to dismiss 2 of the
charges and recommend a sentence of 51 to 85 months if
Cooper pleaded guilty to the other offenses. His lawyer, how-
ever, recommended rejecting the plea offer, advising that the
prosecution could not prove intent to kill because the victim
was shot below the waist. Cooper went to trial. He was con-
victed on all counts and received a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of 185 to 360 months. On federal habeas corpus review,
the State conceded that counsel’s advice was deficient, and
Cooper could meet the first prong of Strickland. But the State
argued that because Cooper received a fair trial, he was not
prejudiced. In a 5-4 decision, with the same lineup of justices
as in Frye, the Court disagreed.
Writing again for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized
that, under Strickland, a defendant must show that but for
counsel’s errors, “‘the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’”64 In this case, Cooper would be required to show
that but for the deficient advice, there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that he would have accepted the plea, that the prosecution
would not have withdrawn it, that the court would have
accepted it, “and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under
the offer’s terms would have been less severe than [what was] in
fact . . . imposed.”65 As in Frye, the majority held that the Sixth
Amendment does more than just protect the right to a fair trial.
Thus, the Court rejected the State’s argument that “[a] fair trial
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wipes clean any deficient perfor-
mance by defense counsel during
plea bargaining. That position
ignores the reality that criminal
justice today is for the most part
a system of pleas, not a system of
trials.”66 With respect to remedy,
the majority largely left it to the
trial court’s discretion but noted a
number of important considera-
tions. If the harm is receiving a
greater sentence, the remedy
might be to give the defendant
the sentence previously offered,
the sentence given after trial, or
something in-between. In other cases, particularly where the
offer was to plead to less serious counts, the prosecution might
be required to reoffer the plea. The correct remedy here was to
order the State to reoffer the deal. That would leave Cooper the
option of accepting it and would preserve the trial court’s dis-
cretion with respect to accepting it or not.
Again taking the lead for the four dissenting justices, Justice
Scalia castigated the majority for “open[ing] a whole new field
of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.”67
He argued once more that the purpose of requiring effective
assistance of counsel is to assure a fair trial, and that requiring
the advice of competent counsel before rejecting a plea offer is
“a judicially invented right to effective plea bargaining.”68 Justice
Alito wrote an additional dissent to address the question of rem-
edy. He pointed out that where there is deficient legal advice
about a favorable plea offer, “the only logical remedy is to give
the defendant the benefit of the favorable deal. But such a rem-
edy would cause serious injustice in many instances . . . .”69
Confrontation and lab reports, revisited
The Supreme Court’s most important Confrontation Clause
decision of the past decade—Crawford v. Washington70—is the
gift that keeps on giving. Williams v. Illinois71 is the most recent
(though certainly not the last) of the Crawford line of cases. In
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts72 and Bullcoming v. New
Mexico,73 the justices held that the Confrontation Clause barred
the introduction of laboratory reports written by non-testifying
analysts. Depending upon one’s perspective, Williams may rep-
resent either an unwarranted retreat from these cases or a par-
tial return to sanity. But the Court was badly split and, whatever
one’s perspective on the outcome, Williams is simply a mess.
In Williams, a state police laboratory sent a vaginal swab
containing semen to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratories.
Cellmark produced a report with a DNA profile, which was
subsequently matched to a DNA profile obtained from a sample
of Williams’ blood. At trial, the State called an expert witness,
Sandra Lambatos, who was a forensic specialist at the state lab.
No one from Cellmark testified. While Lambatos did not quote
the Cellmark report and the report was never offered into evi-
dence, she replied “yes” to this question: “‘Was there a com-
puter match generated of the male DNA profile found in semen
from the vaginal swabs of [the victim] to a male DNA profile that
had been identified’” as Williams’?74 The Confrontation Clause
problem was that Lambatos “did not have personal knowledge
that the male DNA profile that Cellmark said was derived from
the crime victim’s vaginal swab sample was in fact correctly
derived from that sample. . . . Rather, she simply relied . . . upon
Cellmark’s report,” and Williams had no opportunity to cross-
examine its drafters.75 Five justices found no violation of the
Confrontation Clause. Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote
and possibly the controlling opinion; for ease of exposition, I
will address his opinion last.
In a plurality opinion by Justice Alito, four justices (all of
whom had dissented in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming) found
that Lambatos’ testimony was consistent with the established
rule that an expert may provide an opinion based on facts “even
if the expert lacks first-hand knowledge of those facts.”76
Although Lambatos testified that Williams’ profile matched the
DNA profile found in semen from the vaginal swabs of the vic-
tim, these four justices concluded that this testimony was not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was just
part of the premise of the prosecutor’s question to the expert.77
These justices also found that even if the testimony had been
admitted for its truth, the Cellmark report was not testimonial
because it “was not prepared for the primary purpose of accus-
ing a targeted individual.”78
Four justices dissented in an opinion written by Justice
Kagan. They disputed the suggestion that “Lambatos merely
‘assumed’ that Cellmark’s DNA profile came from [the victim’s]
vaginal swabs”; rather, she affirmed without qualification that
the source of the profile was semen from the victim, and she
“became just like the surrogate witness in Bullcoming.”79 The
dissenting justices also disagreed with the conclusion that the
report was non-testimonial, noting that the analysis was con-
ducted to identify the assailant and to serve as evidence in a
criminal trial. 
Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote to affirm. He sided
with the dissenters in finding that the testimony was indeed
offered for its truth, writing that “[t]here is no meaningful dis-
tinction between disclosing an out-of-court statement so that
the factfinder may evaluate the expert’s opinion and disclosing
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that statement for its truth.”80 He also rejected the plurality’s
“primary purpose test” for determining if a statement is testi-
monial.81 However, in his view, the Cellmark report was “not a
statement by a ‘witnes[s]’ within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause. [It] lacks the solemnity of an affidavit or
deposition, for it is neither a sworn nor a certified declaration
of fact.”82 No other justice agreed with this formulation.83
Here is the bottom line: Five justices rejected the argument
that the State may simply introduce a forensic report through the
testimony of an expert by claiming that statements forming the
basis of an expert’s opinion are not asserted for their truth. Five
justices also rejected the argument that the Cellmark report was
non-testimonial because its “primary purpose” was to identify
an unknown assailant. Justice Thomas’ opinion only arguably
provides the narrowest ground for the decision and, thus, the
controlling opinion under the Marks rule.84 Indeed, the dis-
senters cautioned that until a majority reverses or confines
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, they “would understand them as
continuing to govern, in every particular, the admission of foren-
sic evidence.”85 Jeffrey Fisher, a close observer, summed up the
case this way: post-Williams, “the Confrontation Clause contin-
ues to deem formal forensic reports testimonial. That means that
drug, blood alcohol, fingerprint, ballistics, autopsies, and related
reports that typically involve testing by one person and that are
incriminating on their face will continue to be inadmissible
without the testimony of their authors (or some other method
of satisfying the Confrontation Clause).”86 Will we see efforts to
make reports less formal? Fisher thinks not, and Justice Thomas
noted that the Confrontation Clause reaches “‘technically infor-
mal statements when used to evade the formalized process.’”87
As I’ve said, Williams is a mess. Whatever it may stand for, it cer-
tainly cannot be the last word on the application of the
Confrontation Clause to forensic reports.
Double jeopardy and form of verdicts
The Court’s Double Jeopardy Clause case, Blueford v.
Arkansas,88 may have significant implications for states, depend-
ing upon how state law provides for the receipt of verdicts. The
defendant in Blueford was charged with capital murder and three
lesser-included offenses. The jury reported that it had voted
unanimously against guilt on both capital and first-degree mur-
der, but was deadlocked on manslaughter and had not voted on
negligent homicide. The way in
which the jury deliberated was in
accordance with Arkansas law
and the trial court’s instructions,
which required the jury to delib-
erate first on the most serious
offense and only consider a
lesser-included charge if all
twelve jurors first agreed to
acquit on the more serious
offense. When the jury reported
that it remained deadlocked, the
court declared a mistrial. When
the State sought to retry Blueford
on all charges, he argued that
double jeopardy prevented his retrial for capital and first-degree
murder. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court rejected Blueford’s
claim.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice
Roberts. The majority held that there was no double jeopardy
bar to retrial because the jury had not finished its deliberations.
While the jury had voted on the two most serious charges, no
verdict was actually rendered or received. The jury was free to
reconsider what could have been a tentative or early vote on the
two most serious charges, and no final decision was reached.
Moreover, though the foreperson reported that the jury had
voted unanimously against guilt on the two most serious
charges, the Court said that it had “never required a trial court,
before declaring a mistrial because of a hung jury, to consider
any particular means of breaking the impasse—let alone to con-
sider giving the jury new options for a verdict.”89
Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Kagan. They argued that while different jurisdictions may
have different procedures with respect to announcing verdicts
and entering judgments, the diversity of procedures has no con-
stitutional significance. Under Arkansas law, the jury must
acquit the defendant of the greater offense before deliberating
on the lesser-included offense. The forewoman’s “colloquy with
the judge [left] no doubt that the jury understood the instruc-
tions . . . .”90 “There is no reason to believe that the jury’s vote
was anything other than a verdict in substance. . . . And when
that decision was announced in open court, it became entitled
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to full double jeopardy protec-
tion.”91 The dissenters would
also “hold that the Double
Jeopardy Clause requires a trial
judge, in an acquittal-first juris-
diction, to honor a defendant’s
request for a partial verdict
before declaring a mistrial on the
ground of jury deadlock.”92
Apprendi and fine-only cases
In a line of cases beginning
with Apprendi v. New Jersey,93 the
Court held that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to a jury determination of any
fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) that increases a
defendant’s maximum potential sentence of imprisonment. In
Southern Union Co. v. United States,94 the Court ruled 6-3 that
this principle also applies to sentences of criminal fines.
The defendant company was charged with violating federal
environmental statutes by illegally storing liquid mercury. The
statute provided for a fine of up to $50,000 for each day of the
violation. The indictment and the jury verdict form both stated
a range of dates, and the jury was not asked to specify the dura-
tion of the violation. At sentencing, the judge concluded that
the jury had found a violation over the entire time period, and
set the maximum potential fine at $38.1 million. This was error,
said the Supreme Court. 
The majority and dissenting opinions both contain lengthy
dissertations on the historical role of the jury, particularly in
prosecutions involving fines. For our purposes, what is most
important is the Court’s discussion of the goals of the Apprendi
line of cases and the practical implications. The majority opin-
ion, authored by Justice Sotomayor, states that Apprendi’s core
concern is to preserve the jury’s role in determining facts that
warrant punishment. The jury is a “‘bulwark between the State
and the accused at the trial for an alleged offense,’”95 and there
is no principled basis to distinguish a sentence of a fine from a
sentence of imprisonment. “Where a fine is so insubstantial
that the underlying offense is considered ‘petty,’ the Sixth
Amendment right of jury trial is not triggered and no Apprendi
issue arises.”96 Dissenting, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Alito, argued that the outcome should have been
controlled by Oregon v. Ice,97 where the Court found that sen-
tencing judges could find facts that allow sentences to run con-
secutively as opposed to concurrently. The dissenters also con-
tended that extending Apprendi’s holding to fines would
straightjacket legislatures. Some “may choose to return to
highly discretionary sentencing, with its related risks of
nonuniformity.”98
While several parts of the decision may be worth studying,
there are two points to emphasize: first, there is no wiggle room
based upon the size of the potential fine. If the offense is non-
petty, and the defendant has the right to a jury trial, the rule
applies. Second, the rule applies to facts that determine the
maximum fine, even if the maximum fine is not imposed. In
this case, the maximum fine was $38.1 million, but the amount
imposed was $6 million.
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The juvenile life-without-parole (LWOP) case, Miller v.
Alabama,99 was a quite significant Eighth Amendment ruling.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”100
One petitioner, Jackson, was 14 when he helped rob a video
store, where a co-defendant killed the clerk. The second peti-
tioner, Miller, was also 14 when he and a co-defendant were
charged with murder during the course of arson. Both were
tried as adults and, upon conviction, both received a mandatory
LWOP sentence. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan drew on two strands
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. First, decisions such as
Graham v. Florida101 address mismatches between the culpabil-
ity of the class of offenders and the severity of the penalty. Thus,
Graham prohibits an LWOP sentence for a juvenile who has
committed a non-homicide offense. But Graham also likens
LWOP for juveniles to the death penalty itself, implicating a
second line of precedents, which require sentencing authorities
to consider the individual characteristics of the defendant and
the details of the crime before imposing a death sentence. As in
prior cases, the Court noted that “the distinctive attributes of
youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they com-
mit terrible crimes.”102 Here the mandatory sentencing schemes
prevented “assessing whether the law’s harshest term of impris-
onment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.”103
Moreover, relying again upon Graham and precedents requiring
individualized sentencing in capital cases, a mandatory LWOP
sentence for juveniles impermissibly precludes consideration of
the defendant’s chronological age and its associated features—
including immaturity and failure to appreciate risks—as well as
family circumstances, the facts of the case, and the possibility of
rehabilitation. The majority swept aside the State’s arguments,
finding (among other things) that although it is possible for
juveniles to receive mandatory LWOP sentences in 29 U.S.
jurisdictions, the variance in the statutory schemes does not
show that the penalty has been fully and deliberately endorsed
by these legislatures. Further, the discretion in some statutes
dealing with transfer from juvenile to adult systems does not
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the beginning of the robbery-
homicides. However, according
to the notes of the lead investi-
gator, on the night of the mur-
ders, Boatner could not describe
the perpetrators other than that
they were black men. Five days
later, Boatner also said he could
not identify anyone because he
could not see their faces and he
would not know them if he saw
them. The prosecution did not
disclose these notes to the
defense. 
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that
Boatner’s statements were both exculpatory and material. There
was no inculpatory physical evidence. Boatner’s trial testimony
was the only evidence linking Smith to the crime, and the
undisclosed statements directly contradicted that testimony.
While the State has offered “a reason that the jury could have
disbelieved Boatner’s undisclosed statements,” it “gives us no
confidence that it would have done so.”114 The undisclosed
statements thus sufficed to undermine confidence in the con-
viction, and the Louisiana courts’ denial of post-conviction
relief was reversed. Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter, con-
tended that Smith had not established a reasonable probability
that the jury would have afforded the undisclosed statements
sufficient weight to alter its verdict. He argued that the major-
ity failed to consider the record as a whole and that the Court
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the State.115
Reliability of eyewitness identifications
In Perry v. New Hampshire,116 a closely watched case, the
Court turned aside a Due Process Clause challenge to the admis-
sibility of an eyewitness identification. A witness called police to
report a person breaking into cars in a parking lot early one
morning. Officers stopped the defendant, Perry, at the scene.
When they went to the witness to ask for a description, she
pointed to her window and said the person she saw breaking
into the car was standing in the parking lot, right next to a police
officer. Perry challenged the identification on due-process
grounds, arguing that it was equivalent to a one-person showup
that all but guaranteed he would be identified as the offender. He
lost the motion and was convicted of theft. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court rejected his argument, and the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed, 8-1.
104. Id. at 2470-75. Justice Breyer concurred to emphasize that if the
State seeks a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for
petitioner Jackson, there would have to be a determination that
he killed or intended to kill the robbery victim. Id. at 2475, 2477
(Breyer, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 2477, 2477-78 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Graham,
and citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 422 (2008) and
Roper).
106. Id. at 2478.
107. Id. at 2480-82.
108. Id. at 2482, 2485 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Harmelin, 501
U.S. 957 (2003)).
109. “Is it true that our society is inexorably evolving in the direction
of greater and greater decency? Who says so, and how did this
particular philosophy of history find its way into our fundamen-
tal law?” Id. at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2490.
111. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
112. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011); Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
113. 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012).
114. Id. at 630.
115. See id. at 631, 635-40.
116. 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
make up for the lack of discretion in the mandatory LWOP
schemes.104
Chief Justice Roberts penned the primary dissent. Joined by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, he pointed to the nearly
2,500 inmates serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed
as juveniles, and argued that it is therefore not “unusual” for a
murderer to receive an LWOP sentence. He noted that in deter-
mining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the Court
generally begins with “‘objective indicia of society’s standards,
as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice.’”105
Given the number of states that require and frequently impose
mandatory LWOP sentences upon juveniles, “there is no objec-
tive basis” for finding a “consensus against” the practice.106 Nor
is the majority’s decision supported by the prior holdings in
Roper and Graham, which were expressly limited to death
penalty and non-homicide prosecutions.107 Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia, contended neither strand of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence relied upon by the majority is con-
sistent with the original understanding of the Cruel and
Unusual Clause. He also argued that in Harmelin v. Michigan,
the Court previously “declined to extend its individualized-sen-
tencing rule beyond the death penalty context.”108 Justice Alito,
joined by Justice Scalia, first questioned the concept of “evolv-
ing standards of decency,”109 and noted that “today’s decision
shows . . . that our Eighth Amendment cases are no longer tied
to any objective indicia of society’s standards.”110
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—DUE PROCESS
Two significant Due Process Clause cases were decided this
past Term. In one, the Court addressed the prosecution’s duty
to disclose notes that could have been used to impeach a key
witness. In the other, the justices turned aside a challenge to the
reliability of an eyewitness identification.
Brady obligations
This may be an unfair observation, but it almost seems like
whenever there is a Supreme Court ruling about a prosecutor’s
noncompliance with Brady v. Maryland,111 the Orleans Parish
district attorney’s office has offered up the vehicle.112 In Smith v.
Cain,113 the most recent of these cases, the Court ruled 8-1 that
the failure to comply with Brady required Smith’s conviction to
be vacated.
Smith was convicted of murder based upon the testimony of
a single witness, Boatner. In court, Boatner identified Smith as
the first of three gunmen to enter the home where five people
were killed. He said that he had been face-to-face with Smith at
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129. Id. at 2556, 2556-57 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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131. 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
The opinion for the Court
was authored by Justice
Ginsburg. She first emphasized
that the Constitution protects
against a conviction based on
unreliable evidence primarily by
affording sufficient safeguards
for the adversary system to func-
tion: defendants have counsel,
confrontation, cross-examina-
tion, compulsory process, and
other rights. The leading eyewit-
ness identification decisions,
Neil v. Biggers117 and Manson v.
Brathwaite,118 make clear that
“due process concerns arise only
when law enforcement officers
use an identification procedure
that is both suggestive and unnecessary” and suppression of the
resulting identification depends upon “whether improper police
conduct created a ‘substantial likelihood of misidentifica-
tion.’”119 But there is an important limitation. “The due process
check for reliability . . . comes into play only after the defendant
establishes improper police conduct.”120 Perry could not prevail
because the police engaged in no improper conduct; the officers
did not arrange the suggestive circumstances surrounding the
witness’s identification of Perry. The justices rejected Perry’s
argument for a broader application of the Due Process Clause,
saying that “[a] primary aim of excluding identification evi-
dence. . . is to deter law enforcement use of improper lineups,
showups, and photo arrays in the first place.”121 The Court also
turned aside the argument that eyewitness identifications are a
uniquely unreliable form of evidence in large part because “the
jury, not the judge, traditionally determines the reliability of evi-
dence.”122
Justice Sotomayor was the lone dissenter. She argued that the
Court’s cases establish the clear rule that admitting “out-of-
court eyewitness identifications derived from impermissibly
suggestive circumstances that pose a very substantial likelihood
of misidentification violates due process.”123 Nor is there any
distinction between intentional and unintentional suggestion.
Justice Sotomayor took issue with a number of other aspects of
the majority opinion, including the Court’s emphasis on a
deterrence rationale for exclusion. Citing empirical evidence
regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification, she
argued that the majority adopted “an artificially narrow con-
ception of the dangers of suggestive identifications at a time
when our concerns should have deepened.”124
FIRST AMENDMENT
The Court issued two notable First Amendment cases this
Term.
In United States v. Alvarez,125 a much-anticipated decision,
the Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act. The Act prohibits
false representations of the receipt of military decorations, and
the penalties are enhanced if the representations concern the
Medal of Honor. Alvarez, a local official, lied at a public meet-
ing about receiving the Medal of Honor. Six justices agreed that
the Act violates the First Amendment, but split on the reasons.
A plurality held that content-based restrictions on speech are
permitted only when confined to certain traditional categories,
such as obscenity, defamation, and speech presenting some
imminent and grave threat. Writing for four justices, Justice
Kennedy rejected the government’s claim that false statements
have no value and hence are unprotected. They distinguished
statutes criminalizing acts such as perjury and false statements
to government officials; these provisions are narrower and do
not establish a general rule that false statements are unpro-
tected. Finally, even though the government asserted that the
Act protects compelling interests, “[t]he First Amendment
requires that the Government’s chosen restriction on the speech
at issue be ‘actually necessary’ to achieve its interest,”126 which
was not shown here. Justices Breyer and Kagan concurred in
the outcome, but on a different theory. Even when one reads the
statute narrowly as criminalizing “only false factual statements
made with knowledge of their falsity and with the intent that
they be taken as true,” the statute lacks “any . . . limiting fea-
tures” such as context or proof of injury.127 As drafted, it “works
disproportionate constitutional harm.”128 Justice Alito, joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented. In their view, the
statute “reaches only knowingly false statements about hard
facts directly within a speaker’s personal knowledge. These lies
have no value . . . and proscribing them does not chill any valu-
able speech.”129 The dissenters argued that “there are more than
100 federal criminal statutes that punish false statements made
in connection with areas of federal agency concern,”130 and the
Act, like those, does not infringe the First Amendment.
Reichle v. Howards131 was a civil-rights action brought by a
plaintiff who was arrested by Secret Service agents after meet-
ing Vice President Cheney at a public event. The plaintiff,
Howards, told the Vice President that his policies in Iraq were
“disgusting,” and Howards touched the Vice President’s shoul-
der. Agent Reichle stopped Howards, who denied touching the
Vice President, and was arrested. The agent had probable cause
to arrest Howards for making a false statement to a federal offi-
cial, but Howards alleged that the arrest was in retaliation for
criticizing the Vice President, in violation of the First
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Amendment. The case raised two questions: whether a plaintiff
may raise a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim despite the
presence of probable cause to arrest, and whether the agent was
entitled to qualified immunity. The Court did not reach the first
question; it determined that the agent was entitled to qualified
immunity.
Justice Thomas wrote for the Court. The qualified-immunity
question turned on the impact of Hartman v. Moore,132 which
held that a plaintiff cannot claim retaliatory prosecution in vio-
lation of the First Amendment if probable cause supported the
charges. Reichle was entitled to qualified immunity because
Hartman’s impact on the precedent governing retaliatory arrests
was not clear, and a reasonable official “could have interpreted
Hartman’s rationale to apply to retaliatory arrests.”133 Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer concurred in the judgment. Secret Service
agents must make swift decisions about the safety of public offi-
cials, and they may take into account words spoken to or near
the person whose safety is their charge.134
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
In last year’s summary of Supreme Court decisions, I wrote
that the 2010-11 Term gave us several landmark habeas corpus
rulings, including Harrington v. Richter135 and Cullen v.
Pinholster.136 This Term may be remembered as much for its
pattern of summary reversals in habeas cases as for any of the
individual rulings. In no fewer than six cases, the justices
granted certiorari and summarily reversed decisions of courts of
appeals that had granted federal habeas corpus relief to state
inmates.137
The summary reversals came throughout the year. Setting
the tone, the very first opinion of the Term was Cavazos v.
Smith,138 where the majority held that the court of appeals had
erred in finding that the state court had unreasonably applied
the “sufficiency of the evidence” standard of Jackson v.
Virginia.139 In Smith, six justices emphasized the deference due
to state courts under AEDPA as well as the deference afforded
to jury verdicts under Jackson.140 The dissenters argued that
certiorari should have been denied and that the Court was
merely engaging in error correction.141
After leading off with Smith, summary reversals followed in
Bobby v. Dixon (the Miranda case), Hardy v. Cross (under
AEDPA, the state court did not unreasonably apply
Confrontation Clause precedents),142 Wetzel v. Lambert (habeas
relief should not be granted
“unless each ground supporting
the state court decision is exam-
ined and found to be unreason-
able under AEDPA”),143
Coleman v. Johnson (the state
court denied a Jackson v.
Virginia claim “and that deter-
mination in turn is entitled to
considerable deference under
AEDPA”),144 and Parker v.
Matthews (the court of appeals
decision “is a textbook example
of what [AEDPA] proscribes:
‘using federal habeas corpus
review as a vehicle to second-
guess the reasonable decisions
of state courts’”).145
In Greene v. Fisher,146 an unusual case (heck, this one was
actually argued), a unanimous Court sent another message
about the limits of federal habeas corpus review under AEDPA.
The main Supreme Court precedent case on which Greene
relied was issued after his state post-conviction petition was
decided but before it was made final. The Court ruled that
AEDPA requires federal courts to measure state-court decisions
against the Supreme Court’s precedents at the time the state
courts render their decisions.
Four cases about procedural default are also important to
note, including what may turn out to be the most significant
individual habeas decision of the Term, Martinez v. Ryan.147 The
question in Martinez was whether an inmate can raise ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel for the first time in federal court when
the claim was not properly presented in state court due to coun-
sel’s errors. The case came from Arizona, and state law does not
permit ineffective assistance of counsel to be raised on direct
appeal; rather, the claim can only be brought in a state post-
conviction petition. Martinez’s lawyer, however, failed to do so.
The court of appeals had ruled that under Coleman v.
Thompson,148 an attorney’s errors in a post-conviction proceed-
ing cannot amount to cause to excuse a procedural default. The
Supreme Court disagreed, by a vote of 7-2.
With Justice Kennedy writing for the Court, the majority
modified what many had taken as a blanket rule in Coleman.
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The Martinez Court “qualifie[d]
Coleman by recognizing a nar-
row exception: Inadequate assis-
tance of counsel at initial-review
collateral proceedings may
establish cause for a prisoner’s
procedural default of a claim of
ineffective assistance at trial.”149
In Coleman, the alleged failure of
counsel was on appeal from an
initial-review collateral proceed-
ing, and the claims had been
addressed by the state habeas
trial court. By contrast,
“[w]here, as here, the initial-
review collateral proceeding is
the first designated proceeding
for a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial,
the collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a
prisoner’s direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.”150
When a State requires an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
to be raised in a collateral state proceeding, two circumstances
can provide cause to excuse a default of that claim. One is if the
state courts did not appoint counsel in the initial-review collat-
eral proceeding for the claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. The second is where appointed counsel in the initial-review
collateral proceedings is in turn ineffective under Strickland v.
Washington.151 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dis-
sented. They denounced the majority’s claim “that today’s hold-
ing is no more than a ‘limited qualification’ to Coleman,” calling
it instead “a repudiation of the longstanding principle govern-
ing procedural default, which Coleman and other cases consis-
tently applied.”152
Maples v. Thomas,153 another procedural-default case with
the same lineup of justices, is interesting though somewhat fact
specific. Maples, an inmate on death row in Alabama, missed
the deadline to file an appeal from the denial of his state post-
conviction petition. He had been represented in his post-con-
viction petition by two associates at a New York law firm, who
left the firm while the case was pending. When the trial-level
court denied relief, the notice of the court’s order (which had
been mailed to the associates) was returned unopened. After
missing the deadline to appeal and losing in several efforts to
bring a late appeal, Maples filed a federal habeas corpus peti-
tion. It was dismissed due to the procedural default. The
Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court noted the general rule that when a post-conviction attor-
ney misses a filing deadline, the petitioner is bound by the error
and cannot rely upon it for cause to excuse a procedural
default. But Maples’ lawyers left him without notice. “Having
severed the principal-agent relationship, an attorney no longer
acts, or fails to act, as the client’s representative.”154 Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s
conclusion that Maples was essentially unrepresented at the
critical time. They added that “if the interest of fairness justifies
our excusing Maples’ procedural default here, it does so when-
ever a defendant’s procedural default is caused by his attorney.
That is simply not the law—and cannot be, if the states are to
have an orderly system of criminal litigation conducted by
counsel.”155
The last two procedural-default cases are worth a brief men-
tion. In Wood v. Milyard,156 the justices held that courts of
appeals, like the district courts, have the authority but not the
obligation to raise a forfeited timeliness defense on their own
initiative. However, a court of appeals abuses its discretion by
dismissing a habeas petition as untimely where that ground has
been intentionally waived by the State. Finally, in Gonzalez v.
Thaler,157 the Court addressed an issue about the specificity of
certificates of appealability but, more importantly for our pur-
poses, clarified an aspect of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limita-
tions. Under AEDPA, the limitations period runs from the lat-
est to occur among  four dates set out by statute. 158 One of
those is the date on which the state court judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review of the expiration of time
for seeking review. The justices held that “with respect to a state
prisoner who does not seek review in a State’s highest court, the
judgment becomes ‘final’ under [AEDPA] when the time for
seeking such review expires.”159
ODDS AND ENDS
A few other decisions are important to note.
The interrelationship of federal and state sentences
Setser v. United States160 holds that a federal district court
may order a federal sentence to run consecutively to a state sen-
tence that has not yet been imposed. Setser pleaded guilty to a
federal drug offense. He also had pending state probation-viola-
tion and drug charges. At sentencing, the federal judge ordered
Setser’s federal sentence to run consecutively to any state sen-
tence for the probation violation but concurrently with any sen-
tence imposed on the new drug charge. The state court subse-
quently sentenced him to 5 years for probation violation and 10
years on the new drug charge, to be served concurrently.161 The
majority read the applicable federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §
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3584(a), as affording discretion to federal judges to specify
whether a federal sentence is concurrent or consecutive to a
yet-to-be-imposed state term, even though such discretion is
not explicit in the statute. The Court turned aside an argument
that this made Setser’s sentence unreasonable in light of the
state court’s later decision to run the sentences concurrently.162
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, dis-
sented. They read § 3584 as providing authority to specify con-
secutive or concurrent sentences only when a federal judge is
the second sentencer. Justice Breyer (one of the original mem-
bers of the U.S. Sentencing Commission) wrote that that inter-
pretation was most consistent with the purposes of the 1984
Sentencing Reform Act, which favors concurrent sentences
when the separate convictions are based upon the same relevant
conduct, and this determination would ordinarily best be made
by the second sentencing court.163
Grand jury witness immunity
In Rehberg v. Paulk,164 a unanimous Court held that a grand
jury witness is entitled to the same absolute immunity from fed-
eral civil rights liability as a witness who testifies at trial. The
witness, Paulk, was an investigator for the local district attor-
ney. He testified several times before a county grand jury, which
returned several indictments against Rehberg. Rehberg brought
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Paulk conspired
to present and did present false testimony. In finding that Paulk
was entitled to absolute immunity, the Court noted that just as
with trial witnesses, “a witness’ fear of retaliatory litigation may
deprive the tribunal of critical evidence. And in neither context
is the deterrent of potential civil liability needed” to prevent
perjury.165
A LOOK AHEAD
As this article goes to press (prior to the Court’s September
and October conferences), it is still too early to handicap the
upcoming Term. But a few interesting cases are already in the
hopper. The justices are slated to determine whether Padilla v.
Kentucky166—the landmark ruling on advice of the immigration
consequences of a plea—applies to convictions that became
final before its announcement.167 The Court will also decide
whether federal habeas corpus proceedings may be stayed for
capital defendants who are mentally incompetent.168
Fourth Amendment cases are perhaps attracting the greatest
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amount of early interest. Bailey v. United States169 asks if officers
can detain a person while executing a search warrant when the
person already left the immediate vicinity before the warrant is
executed. Then there is the doggie duo. The issue in Florida v.
Harris170 is whether an alert by a narcotics-detection dog pro-
vides probable cause to search a vehicle. Florida v. Jardines171
asks if a drug dog’s sniff at the front door of a home amounts to
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. You
may or may not agree with his legal analysis, but it is hard to
beat the prose of Time columnist Joel Stein, who opined about
Jardines: “The outcome depends on whether the court sees a
dog as a gadget like a thermal imager or as a human who can
invade your privacy by smelling private smells. My take is, if
you think dog sniffing isn’t an invasion of privacy, then you
don’t have a crotch.”172
CONCLUSION
The past Term was big. The Court gave us thrills,173 chills,174
and spills,175 with transformative decisions about searches,
effective assistance of counsel, jury trials, and juvenile life sen-
tences. Can the next Term top it? We’ll see.
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The 50 state supreme courts issue more than 5,000 pub-lished opinions each year. These opinions are vital to pro-tect the liberties guaranteed by the constitution and laws
of the state, impartially uphold and interpret the law, and pro-
vide open, just, and timely resolution of all matters. The opin-
ion of the high court is its voice—the means to convey and
explain to both legal and general audiences that the court lis-
tened, resolved a legal dispute, impartially applied the law, and
reached a fair and reasoned judgment. As the highest level of
state judiciaries, supreme courts also strive to provide open
access to opinions and proceedings. 
The challenge for the nation’s judges and justices, public
information officers, and members of the bar and media is to
make sure that the public understands what is expressed in a
supreme court opinion, which is written in the language of the
law that speaks to the legal profession and academia. In a splin-
tered media landscape with increased means of communica-
tion, partners in various media, traditional or new, must engage
if they are to inform. Increasingly, many issues before state
supreme courts are of high importance to the public, an envi-
ronment which requires courts to be transparent, accountable,
and accessible. There are means of communication that
supreme courts can employ to convey to participants and exter-
nal audiences that the procedures used to decide and render an
opinion are fair and foster respect for the law. 
This article discusses the nature of and trends in the forma-
tion of state supreme court opinions and the methods by which
opinions are communicated to the press, the public, members
of the bar, and online communities. It considers current prac-
tice in light of a field in social psychology called procedural fair-
ness, a helpful and practical theory that explains what makes it
likely that people are satisfied with and comply with decisions
by authorities, such as judges. The article goes on to highlight
current state court trends, including the use of plain language
and summarization, the use of websites for improved commu-
nication and dissemination of opinions, and the increase in
educational opportunities for appellate bench officers to make
opinions clearer and more effective. Historical analysis and a
state by state comparison demonstrate changes to opinion
length over time, and the article discusses the ramifications that
court opinion complexity may have on public and media
understanding. A case study on same-sex marriage cases in
California, along with findings from a national survey, show
that the nation’s highest courts use diverse strategies to more
effectively communicate opinions and encourage public under-
standing. Ultimately, opinions serve as the court’s voice because
rulings communicate not only to lawyers but also to the public
and media and explain how courts resolve disputes and deter-
mine constitutional rights. 
The concepts behind procedural fairness have developed
from research showing that the manner in which disputes are
handled by the courts has an important influence on peoples’
evaluations of their experiences in the court system.1
Procedural fairness refers to court users’ perceptions regarding
the fairness and transparency of the processes by which their
disputes are considered and resolved, as distinguished from the
outcome of a case.2 For any court to achieve procedural fair-
ness, individual court players must demonstrate through their
actions that the court has listened to all parties and reached a
fair conclusion.  
The California judiciary has placed an emphasis on imple-
menting procedural fairness in all aspects of its work. In 2005,
the Judicial Council of California commissioned a landmark
public trust and confidence assessment, Trust and Confidence in
the California Courts, which identified procedural fairness—
court users having a sense that decisions have been reached
through processes that are fair—as by far the strongest predictor
of whether members of the public approve of or have confidence
in California’s courts. 3 In 2007, in response to these findings
and those in a follow-up study involving in-depth focus groups
and interviews with court users, administrators, bench officers,
and attorneys,4 Chief Justice Ronald M. George launched a
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statewide initiative on procedural fairness, the first of its kind in
the nation. It is aimed at ensuring fair process, equitable treat-
ment of all court users, and higher public trust and confidence
in California’s courts. Procedural fairness is most significantly
influenced by four key elements interconnected in the work of
the courts: respect, voice, neutrality, and trust. People are more
likely to accept and respond more positively to court decisions
when the importance of facts is emphasized and the reasons for
a decision have been clearly explained. Procedural fairness is
also significantly affected by the quality of treatment that court
users receive during every interaction with the court. This arti-
cle urges the adoption of procedural fairness as a guide to
enhancing the value of opinions as the voice of the courts.  
Supreme and appellate courts face unique challenges regard-
ing achievement of procedural fairness because much of the
work of high courts is complex and not in public view. The pro-
cedures involved (filing of notices of appeal, writs, briefs, and
responses) are often governed by complex rules and proceedings
that do not lend themselves to easy explanation. Even oral argu-
ment, the most public manifestation of a supreme court’s proce-
dures, is not generally understood or covered in the press. By
contrast, proceedings in the trial courts often lend themselves to
“police-blotter-style” reporting, encompassing simpler explana-
tions of who, what, where, when, or why. Reports from pro-
ceedings typically depict two clear sides, issues and distinctions,
and a narrative. This is especially true in high-profile cases that
draw public interest and are covered intensively, even though
these trials are not good representations of how the public actu-
ally experiences the courts. Sensational (and national) coverage
of murder trials like the O.J. Simpson and Casey Anthony cases
often ends up leaving a lasting impression on the public and may
create a perception for many observers that the American justice
system is unfair or does not work. Because the work of supreme
courts is more complicated and attenuated, there is a higher
dependence on an effective media to translate the meaning and
importance of high court rulings to the public in ways that pro-
mote the goals of procedural fairness.
This article is organized into five sections that discuss the
workings of state supreme courts and effective communication
through the lens of procedural fairness. 
I. HISTORY AND TRENDS REGARDING SUPREME COURT
OPINION DELIVERY AND LENGTH
The method of disseminating opinions has changed dramati-
cally in the over 230 years that our state supreme court systems
have been in existence.5 The increasing length and complexity
of state supreme court opinions can present challenges for court
audiences that must be able to access, understand, and accept
court opinions. This section will discuss the transition from an
oral to a written system of law,
historical trends regarding the
length of opinions, and the ram-
ifications that longer and more
complex opinions may have for
the supreme courts.
THE TRANSITION FROM 
AN ORAL TO A WRITTEN
SYSTEM OF LAW
In its beginnings, the
American legal system was char-
acterized by oral advocacy and
oral opinions. In early state
supreme courts, oral argument
between parties and before the
court lasting several days was not
uncommon, and judgments were rendered orally.6 “Much of the
litigation [during California’s early statehood] addressed the legal
concerns of the people who flocked to the state during the Gold
Rush. Many of their cases involved titles to property, mining, and
agricultural issues, and rights to water and minerals on public
lands. Often those decisions were not published. In the early
years of statehood, the number of [written] opinions issued by
the court filled less than one slim volume of the Official Reports
annually.”7 With the growth of cities and the long distances trav-
eled by parties and attorneys, oral advocacy was replaced by writ-
ten advocacy and written opinions of the court.8 
In March 1879, California voters adopted major changes to
the state constitution and the state’s judicial system, including
a requirement that all opinions be in writing. “In the determi-
nation of causes, all decisions of the Court in bank or in depart-
ments shall be given in writing, and the grounds of the decision
shall be stated.”9 The amendment was a response to public alle-
gations of corruption, and the requirement to put opinions in
writing was a way to ensure accountability by the courts and at
the same time also give supreme court justices longer terms. As
the American legal system moved away from oral advocacy to a
writing-centered system of law, state supreme courts also
moved away from oral decision making (i.e., judges or justices
of the supreme court providing spoken explanations of rul-
ings). The American legal system is now a system in which par-
ties must petition the court in writing, submit written legal
briefs, and request brief time for oral argument before a written
opinion is issued.
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS ARE GETTING LONGER
AND MORE COMPLEX
To compare trends regarding opinion length, the California
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Administrative Office of the
Courts Judicial Administration
Library has completed a word
count analysis of opinions for
16 of the country’s court sys-
tems (California, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, and Virginia) from 1930–1932 and 2008–2010
and averaged the word counts across case types (see attached
summary chart). For 2008–2010, California has by far the
longest opinions, averaging 11,820 words over three years.
Using an average of 250 words per page, this translates to 47
pages for the average California opinion.10 Excluding
California, the average for the 15 states during the same period
was 3,934 words, or roughly 15.75 pages. For 1930–1932, word
counts show that the average length of a California opinion was
approximately 1,969 words (roughly 8 pages), while the aver-
age for the 15 other states during the same period was 2,187
words (about 8.75 pages). So while most states show a 180%
increase in opinion length over the past 80 years, the length of
California opinions has increased almost 600%.11
Different theories have been attributed to the increased
length of opinions, including expanded use of law clerks by
individual justices and the advent of word processing; the arcane
nature of legal writing including the use of lengthier string cita-
tions and footnotes; the necessity of longer writing for audiences
that include parties, attorneys, academics, and lower or higher
courts; and substantive concurrences and dissents that may
build out an already long majority opinion. A separate California
study from 1994 helps shed light on why the length of California
opinions has so dramatically increased. By measuring the num-
ber of headnotes in an opinion, this study found that an average
opinion of the court during the six-year period of 1987–1993
analyzed twice as many legal issues as did an average opinion
during the previous 16-year period, 1970–1986.12
Correspondingly, during three periods studied, the average
number of pages published in each California opinion increased,
from 1970–1976 (13.9 pages per case), to 1977–1986 (16.6
pages per case), to 1987–1993 (30.2 pages per case).13
RAMIFICATIONS OF OPINION LENGTH AND 
COMPLEXITY
An opinion’s scope and length is often determined by the
nature and complexity of the case, but the overall trend toward
longer opinions may impede audience understanding, compre-
hension, and compliance. Litigants, especially losing litigants,
care less about the length of opinions and more about clarity
and the scope or soundness of the reasoning.14 Parties to dis-
putes want to be assured that the courts considered the issues,
engaged in a reasoned and fair analysis, and provided clear
direction. New York’s former Chief Judge Judith Kaye has noted
that opinion readers expect a certain level of scholarliness, but
as the length of writings grows, the number of people who actu-
ally read them dwindles.15
Longer and more complex opinions mean that fewer people
are able to understand judgments of the court—or the role of
the court—without some form of assistance. In theory, more
concise explanations would help the public and the media bet-
ter understand and access opinions. If opinions are too special-
ized or unnecessarily complex, courts may be in danger of los-
ing their public voice. As will be discussed below, this has sig-
nificant consequences for members of the media, who must be
able to clearly communicate the substance of opinions, and for
members of the public (including lawyers) who must under-
stand rulings. If opinions are too brief, however, they may be
too conclusory and not demonstrate that all parties have been
listened to. Civil and criminal opinions often must contain a
range of legal points in order to adequately address every issue
on appeal.
This article does not mean to suggest that opinions of the
nation’s state supreme courts should always be short or simple
or follow one standardized format. However, given that we
know that high court opinions are complex for lay audiences
and are getting longer, we speak directly to how the preparation
and dissemination of high court opinions (including use of
tools like plain language, summarization, and effective commu-
nication via the web) may help courts to ensure that each indi-
vidual opinion—the voice of the court—successfully commu-
nicates and demonstrates that the court has listened to parties,
fulfilled its unique and important role as an arbiter of justice,
and reached a fair outcome.
76 Court Review - Volume 48 
10. Word count: based on an average of 25 lines per page in Courier
New 12 pt., approximately 250 words per page. 
11. See the attached summary chart, infra. Information regarding the
numbers of opinions issued by the various state supreme courts is
included in the appendices of findings from a national survey con-
ducted by the Conference of Chief Justices, the Administrative
Office of the Courts of California, and the National Center for
State Courts.
12. William C. Vickrey, Opinion Filings and Appellate Court
Productivity, 78 JUDICATURE 47 (1994).
13. The 1994 California study found that the court’s capital opinion
case load (the percentage of all opinions that were capital cases)
increased almost eight times from 1970 to 1993 (Vickrey, supra).
Capital cases generally, and capital affirmances in particular, con-
sume a far greater amount of the court’s time and typically require
the court to analyze and resolve numerous complex and fact-spe-
cific issues. The attached chart shows that for the period
2008–2010, the average word count for a California death penalty
appeal opinion was 24,937 words, or approximately 99.75 pages
(excluding death penalty appeals, the average California opinion
was 7,332 words, or approximately 29 pages). An area for further
research may be to identify the impact that death penalty cases
may be having on the growth and complexity of state Supreme
Court opinions, along with overall national trends regarding rates
of opinion concurrences and dissents.
14. Steve Leben, Thoughts on Some Potential Appellate and Trial Court
Applications of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 467
(2000).
15. Judith S. Kaye, Judges as Wordsmiths, 69 N.Y.ST.B.J. 10, 11 (Nov.
1997). 
Different theories
have been 
attributed to the
increased length
of opinions . . . .
Court Review - Volume 48 77
AVERAGE LENGTH OF 16 STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS, 2008-2010
STATE OPINION
LENGTH
2010 
OPINION 
LENGTH
2009
OPINION 
LENGTH
2008
POPULATION
2010
NUMBER OF
JUDGES OR 
JUSTICES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
REGARDING
California 11,221 words 11,537 words 1,945 words 37,253,956 7 Cal. Const. art. VI, §§ 11a, 14Cal. Pen. Code § 1239
Florida 5,101 7,250 7,057 18,801,310 7 Fla. Const. art. V, § 3
Georgia 2,091 2,095 1,922 9,687,653 7 Ga. Const. art. VI, § 6, Para. II
Illinois 6,401 7,108 6,674 12,830,632 7 Ill. Const. art. VI, § 4
Indiana 3,407 3,823 3,754 6,483,802 5 Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4
Massachusetts 3,507 3,756 3,593 6,547,629 7 Mass. Const art. CI, § 3
Michigan 5,985 8,455 7,375 9,883,640 7 Mich. Const art. VI, § 4, 6
New Jersey 5,490 6,864 6,363 8,791,894 7 N.J. Const. art. 6, § 2
New Hampshire 3,385 2,788 3,123 1,316,470 5 N.H. Sup. Ct. Rule 7
New York 2,474 2,592 2,402 19,378,102 7 N.Y. Const art. VI, § 7
Ohio 3,472 3,450 3,770 11,536,504 7 Ohio Const art. IV, § 4.02
Pennsylvania 3,821 4,413 3,671 12,702,379 7 Pa. Courts (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 721–726)
Texas 1,104 3,699 3,689 25,145,561 9 Tex. Const. art. V, § 3,5Tex. R. App. P. Rule 47
Utah 6,168 4,804 4,388 2,763,885 5 Utah Const. art. VIII, § 3
Vermont 3,356 3,468 3,447 625,741 5 Vt. Const. § 30
Virginia 2,720 2,880 2,831 8,001,024 7 Va. Const art. VI, § 1
AVERAGE LENGTH OF 16 STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS, 1930–1932
STATE OPINION LENGTH
1932
OPINION LENGTH
1931
OPINION LENGTH
1930
POPULATION
1930
NUMBER OF JUDGES OR 
JUSTICES ON BENCH
(1930 SUPREME COURT)
California 1,973 words 1,989 words 1,945 words 5,677,251 7
Florida 2,212 2,310 1,872 1,468,211 6
Georgia 2,571 2,294 2,703 2,908,506 6
Illinois 2,240 2,265 2,194 7,630,654 7
Indiana 1,751 1,573 2,428 3,238,503 5
Massachusetts 1,822 2,372 1,976 4,249,614 7
Michigan 1,588 1,437 1,563 4,842,325 8
New Jersey 1,552 1,475 1,778 4,041,334 9
New Hampshire 1,760 2,134 1,817 465,293 5
New York 1,941 2,270 1,728 12,588,066 7
Ohio 1,609 1,756 1,947 6,646,697 7
Pennsylvania 2,218 1,692 1,660 9,631,350 7
Texas 2,488 2,244 2,463 5,824,715 3
Utah 3,700 4,345 3,979 507,847 5
Vermont 1,525 1,481 1,896 359,611 5
Virginia 2,651 3,121 3,811 2,421,851 8
NUMBER AND AVERAGE LENGTH OF CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY APPEALS, 2008-2010
OPINION LENGTH
2010 (JAN-JUNE)
OPINION LENGTH
2009
OPINION LENGTH
2008
DEATH PENALTY APPEAL 26,672 words 23,027 words 25,112 words
ORDINARY APPEAL 11,221 words 11,537 words 12,702 words
II. CHALLENGES FOR THE MEDIA
AND PUBLIC
Opinions convey dense informa-
tion, usually in narrative form: an
introduction that states what is being
appealed, a statement or “story” of
the case, discussion of the issues
(with corresponding legal analysis),
and an explanation of the outcome.
Despite an often traditional structure,
opinions must make sense to a gen-
eral readership in order to make a
judgment understandable. Opinions usually speak at a high
level to a sophisticated audience (e.g., attorneys or judges) and
convey reasoning through legal analysis and argument and ref-
erences to legal briefs, constitutional or statutory provisions, and
case law. Often an opinion will discuss other opinions that in
turn may each have multiple concurrences or dissents. In com-
bination with the length and the voices of more than one author,
relating even the basic components can make the content of
opinions difficult for a lay audience to digest and understand.
WRITTEN OPINIONS ARE THE COURT’S MOST 
IMPORTANT CONTACT WITH THE PUBLIC
Supreme court opinions deal with some of the most impor-
tant and difficult issues of the day, provide guidance to the
lower courts, and may ultimately contain outcomes that affect
the lives of every state resident. Members of the public may not
understand the third branch, or every intricacy of a legal opin-
ion, but they do have overall confidence in the courts.16 The
survey in California found that the public believes that in order
to do their job well, courts must protect the constitutional
rights of everyone. Opinions provide a window to and explana-
tion of the work of the court for the public:
Although a judge’s role in the courtroom is a critical judicial
function, only those in the courtroom witness the judge’s con-
duct, and most of them are concerned with their case alone.
Judicial writing expands the public’s contact with the judge.
Writing reflects thinking, proves ability, binds litigants, covers
those similarly situated, and might determine the result of an
appeal. Judges hope that what they write will enhance confi-
dence in the judiciary and bring justice to the litigants.17
This observation about judicial writing particularly holds
true, if not more so, for appellate-level justices, especially
because at the supreme and appellate courts, as opposed to trial
courts, not many witness all the workings of the court. When
an opinion is released, only a few people may have observed all
of the case proceedings leading up to the decision. 
OPINIONS MUST CLEARLY EXPLAIN JUDGMENTS AND
SPEAK TO VARIED AUDIENCES
In written or summarized form, supreme court opinions
explain judgments for the parties. The challenge is often that
the judgment and the basis to support it must be communicated
in one document to diverse audiences: the parties, lower courts,
stakeholders, public, and media. The format of judgments
varies from court to court, but ideally, opinions guide readers
through the legal system, demonstrate to stakeholders that the
court has listened and that a proper resolution has been
reached, eliminate any appearance of judicial arbitrariness, and
legitimize any judicial departure from established law. Clear
communication of these concepts is crucial in order to demon-
strate fairness, ensure public and media understanding of the
role of the court, and encourage acceptance of high court judg-
ments. Effective communication starts with a well-reasoned
and well-written opinion, but is still dependent on a media that
understands the basis of rulings to provide the public with
essential information and enhance trust and confidence.
Supreme court opinions are disseminated to wide audiences:
parties and attorneys to the case; government officials who may
have to follow or implement rulings; lower courts; courts in
other states or jurisdictions; lawyers and court practitioners
who will review and cite opinions in research; legal journalists,
commentators, scholars, and critics; and the public and citizens
at large. But to achieve basic elements of procedural fairness,
audiences of opinions need to know that the court understood
the context of the controversy, listened carefully and respected
both sides, and reached a principled judgment based on the law.
They also need to know that the court’s role is limited and dif-
fers from that of other branches. “Because the judicial opinion
is the essential document of the third branch of government,
the judge should explain his action in terms that enable the
reader to understand precisely what he has done and why he
has done it.”18
OPINIONS MUST CLEARLY COMMUNICATE ROLE OF
THE COURT 
Because they are the voice of the court, opinions play a crit-
ical role in protecting and promoting fair and impartial courts.
Without a full understanding of opinions, misinterpretation of
judgments by audiences can lead to public perceptions that the
court is insensitive, wrong, or not a legitimate authority.
Opinions must reassure the public that the court has deliber-
ated carefully and acted as a neutral body. Therefore, opinions
must not only convey the substance of judgments but also
demonstrate that the court has fulfilled its constitutional role:
listened to parties, evenly and fairly interpreted the law,
resolved disputes, and upheld and protected public rights
under the laws and constitution of the state. 
JUSTICES ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO EXPLAIN RULINGS
OR DISCUSS CASES
The current policy of high courts is that the opinion speaks
for itself. This policy removes the possibility of a spoken expla-
nation for the public by the person who authored the opinion.
A key ingredient of procedural fairness is clear explanations
from judges to help litigants and interested parties understand
the basis of rulings. Because current practices and the nature,
complexity, and length of high court opinions no longer allow
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justices to deliver them from the bench, how high court opin-
ions are written and communicated affects the understanding of
rulings, the overall acceptance of decisions, and perceptions
regarding whether the court is transparent and fair. Justices are
further constricted by judicial canons that prevent them from
discussing cases before an opinion is issued.19 Although judges
often use the bench to explain court procedures and the basis
for rulings when they are able, without the ability to provide
clarifying spoken explanations to all audiences regarding pub-
lished opinions, courts must use other communication meth-
ods to provide further insight into opinions and promote pro-
cedural fairness. 
MEDIA DEMANDS MUST BE BALANCED WITH 
ACCURACY
Supreme court opinions deal with some of the most impor-
tant and difficult issues of the day on potentially controversial
topics that range from the definition of marriage, to limits on
free speech or individual rights, to the limits of government’s
ability to tax and spend, and they deliver outcomes that may
ultimately affect the lives of every state resident. Because the
general news media are principal agents for informing the pub-
lic about the courts and opinions, they are vital partners in the
provision of accurate and helpful information. Legal publica-
tions are vital resources that speak to the profession and can
serve as partner resources to general news operations that may
not have reporters with legal knowledge or experience. Media
demands for access to court proceedings and opinions, how-
ever, must be balanced with efforts that encourage accuracy in
reporting. This is particularly true for cases of high public inter-
est or controversy. Few reporters are trained in the law, and con-
sequently there is a risk that they will misunderstand difficult
decisions they are called on to report and interpret, particularly
if the opinions are permeated by legal jargon.20 If high courts
are to be able to play their proper role in government—i.e.,
serve as part of the impartial and independent branch of gov-
ernment that interprets the law and resolves disputes—it is
imperative that they assist media with access to opinions, infor-
mation, and tools that encourage accurate coverage of opinions.
Understanding court procedure may facilitate better reporting
on the courts and dissemination of opinions.
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The length and format of opinions are often also driven by
external and environmental fac-
tors that may not be easily
understood by the public.
Supreme courts in the United
States are of different sizes and
compositions and operate
under different jurisdictions.21
The opinions of supreme courts
and individual justices may be
evaluated by the press, the local
bar, the legislature, or other
government entities on the
basis of their reasoning, or the
frequency with which they are
issued in any given year (i.e.,
opinions may lead to evalua-
tions of judicial performance
based on numbers of opinions or frequency of issue, and opin-
ion length or understanding may not be a prescribed consider-
ation or factor). Unpublished opinions—where the case law or
ruling is considered routine because the matter is one that has
been previously determined by the court—also provide poten-
tial confusion for the public and stakeholders regarding trans-
parency and accountability.22 Although remedies exist for a
party to request publication of an unpublished opinion, the
practice of issuing unpublished opinions may create a tension
between efficiency for the courts and public perceptions regard-
ing fairness and transparency (i.e., some parties may believe
that their matter has been handled differently by the court if the
opinion indicates that it is “not to be published”). However, if
the substance or nature of a court ruling is complex because of
the language, format, or explanation provided, it behooves
courts to take proper steps to ensure that every opinion is gen-
erally understood by the public, whether or not the outcome
has enormous social impact. Most individuals—whether they
are litigants or medical patients—are more comfortable accept-
ing outcomes when adequate explanations are provided, in
both routine and complex matters.
III. SOLUTIONS TO CHALLENGES 
The needs of the public, the media, and the legal community
must be met and balanced by the high court when issuing opin-
ions. The written opinion carries great weight, especially when
viewed as the singular source of the court’s views. Limitations
19. See, for example, California Code of Judicial Ethics, Judicial
Canon 3B(9) [“A judge shall not make any public comment about
a pending or impending proceeding in any court, and shall not
make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere
with a fair trial or hearing.”]
20. Kaufman, Helping the Public Understand and Accept Judicial
Decisions, supra note 18.  
21. See the attached summary chart. For example, the Supreme Court
of Texas is the court of last resort for noncriminal matters, includ-
ing juvenile delinquency, which the law considers to be a civil
matter and not criminal, in the state of Texas. A different court,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, is the court of last resort for
criminal matters. In California, the Supreme Court of California
decides every death penalty appeal in a written opinion. See Cal.
Pen. Code, § 1239; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11(a), § 14.  A petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in a California death penalty case may
be decided without an opinion by a brief order stating simply that
the petition is denied, but opinions in death penalty appeal cases
must communicate substantial fact- and legal-intensive arguments
and describe issues that are complex, numerous, and often repeti-
tious. 
22. California Court of Appeal unpublished opinions are posted on
the California courts website for 60 days solely as public informa-
tion about actions taken by the Court of Appeal. California Rules
of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing
or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered
published.
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also exist on the court’s ability
to expand or explain these
views in a fast-paced media
landscape where the public
experiences many demands for
their attention. However, courts
can use a number of low-cost
and high-impact procedures to
help their partners in the media
and legal communities by facili-
tating the communication of
decisions and the analyses of the
issues involved. These proce-
dures, techniques, and strate-
gies are described below.
USE OF PLAIN LANGUAGE SUMMARIES AND ROAD
MAPS IN AN OPINION
Guidelines that are applicable to plain-language jury instruc-
tions have relevance to the communication of opinions.
Traditionally, using “plain language” in court communications
means to be clear, be brief, remember who your audience is (lay
people, with varying degrees of education and language skills),
address the audience directly, and order your points in a logical
sequence. For plain-language summaries and introductions,
even for lengthy and complex opinions, courts should rely on
facts and concrete examples, rather than legal jargon, so that all
audiences understand the court’s reasoning in the opinion that
follows. Testing the understanding of plain-language sum-
maries with different audiences is an easy and low-cost way to
ensure that the court is achieving this goal. Introductions to
opinions can be written after the court’s reasoning has been
reached to describe the story of the case and to relay any high-
level implications for public policy and case law. More exten-
sive use of road maps in opinions, which includes the use of a
clear introduction accompanied with explanatory headnotes for
ease of reference, accomplishes one of the major goals that this
article discusses: ways to prepare and structure opinions to
make them more accessible and available. Spoken broadcasts
from the chief justice, whether in video or podcast form, can
also provide a voice for the court and provide the public and
media with a clear explanation of the role of the court, includ-
ing neutral explanations regarding rulings. If tools are provided
to make even lengthy opinions more understandable (e.g., sum-
maries or press releases), media reporters can be more accurate
and the public will be better informed.
JUDICIAL EDUCATION 
The survey findings below show that most states provide
some form of judicial education for appellate justices, including
opinion writing. A handful of states send their justices to forums
attended by justices from other states and federal appellate
judges. An example of this is the state provision of funds for
individual justices to attend the Opperman Institute of Judicial
Administration at the New York University School of Law. 
Opinion writing has been a regular feature of judicial educa-
tion for justices in California. The California Administrative
Office of the Courts Education Division/Center for Judicial
Education and Research (CJER) includes courses at its
statewide educational conference—the Appellate Justices
Institute—designed to explore different approaches, practices,
and styles. However, because of the unprecedented budget cri-
sis, alternatives to the live statewide delivery of education are
also being implemented. In late 2009, the CJER Governing
Committee approved a new model of developing judicial edu-
cation. Under this approach, justices and appellate judicial
attorneys oversee curriculum and course development.
Alternative delivery of education has also been implemented
with the involvement of stakeholders and branch leaders. For
example, a webinar on appellate writing is planned for 2012. In
2011, California had 112 supreme court and court of appeal
justices serving more than 37 million people living in a geo-
graphic region over 3.79 million square miles, geographically
the fourth largest state in the country. The strategic use of
online resources, such as webinars or videoconferences, will
reduce travel and hotel costs associated with traditional face-to-
face education. 
Judicial education on opinion writing does not lend itself to
a one-size-fits-all model, and judicial educators need to be cog-
nizant of different learning styles. Some forums should be con-
fidential to facilitate frank and candid exchanges of ideas, but
individual court leadership has a responsibility to understand
and balance the learning objectives underlying education on
opinion writing in order to determine when education is most
needed, whether a justice is new or experienced, and how to
provide access effectively.
IMPROVING COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION
WITH MEDIA AND THE BENCH
Effective collaboration between the bench and bar is crucial
to both public and judicial branch stakeholder understanding.
Many newspaper reporters who were trained as lawyers have
left or retired from newspaper jobs, which, if not replaced by
often more expensive, law-trained reporters, creates a challenge
for media to inform the public so that the average citizen can
follow what the court is doing and why. Engaging and encour-
aging the sophistication and cooperation of each state’s bar
associations makes a difference; the more creative and engaged
that lawyers are with the media, the more they will be able to
identify, explain, and raise key issues for reporters. Bar associa-
tions and law schools have a responsibility to educate the pub-
lic. This includes engagement with leaders from diverse com-
munities to ensure that the substance of opinions is properly
disseminated to audiences that may need to access information
in different languages. California, in addition to large ethnic
populations of African Americans, Latinos, and Chinese
Americans, has a substantial number of Filipinos, Vietnamese,
Korean Americans, and other constituents who may speak
English as their second language.
USING THE WEB AND SOCIAL MEDIA TO PROVIDE
NOTICE AND ENHANCE ACCESS, PARTICIPATION, 
AND UNDERSTANDING
Procedural fairness first and foremost concerns individual
litigants who appear before a court. The appearance of fairness
to the individual litigants, parties, and attorneys involved in a
case contributes to a sense of fairness, and this perception car-
ries from those in the courtroom to the public. We know from
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23. Rottman, supra note 3.
24. Id. See also Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A
Therapeutic Analysis of the Role of Courts in Minority-Majority
Conflicts, Spring 2000 COURT REVIEW 54 (2000); Amy D. Ronner,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence on Appeal, Spring 2000 54 COURT
REVIEW (2000) (“The court must make the parties know that they
have a voice, one that is not being silenced.”). 
25. See Garrett M. Graff, Courts are Conversations: An Argument for
Increased Engagement by Court Leaders, Harvard Executive Session
for State Court Leaders in the 21st Century (2012), available at
www.ncsc.org/hes.
26. The 2005 Trust and Confidence study found that self-rated famil-
iarity with the California courts is low for the public, unchanged
since 1992. However, knowledge of the courts increases with expo-
sure to court information in newspapers, the web, televised trials,
and, most importantly, the court itself. Rottman, supra note 3.
the trust and confidence studies conducted in California that
procedural fairness is of core concern to the public and is by far
the leading determinant of overall trust and confidence in the
courts.23 We also know that Californians rated their courts the
lowest on the “participation” (“listen carefully”) element of
procedural fairness.24 Web and social media are now the key
modern tools to enable and encourage the broadest possible
audience to participate regarding appellate opinions, to access,
understand, and comment. One of the central tenets of the
“Web 2.0” world is that presenters of information have to go to
where people are already online, to Facebook, Twitter, and
other social media, and courts cannot rely on people or con-
stituents to voluntarily visit a court website. The web enables
courts to do more to get plain-language summaries out into the
world, and ideally to promote wider understanding and foster
public perception that the court has acted fairly to all parties,
listened, applied the law, and been accountable. 
As will be discussed below in survey findings and in the
opinion study on the same-sex marriage cases in California,
advance notice for media, along with modern tools like Twitter
and increased use of press releases and plain-language sum-
maries, encourages wider dissemination of information and
public understanding. These tools help the media do their job
and allow the public to see and participate in the court process.
The ability to hear all voices is the reason that our society trusts
courts and court officials to settle disputes ranging from a
neighbor’s fence encroachment to a minor traffic ticket to a
presidential election, or even the deprivation of liberty or life.25
The web and social media are necessary tools for state supreme
courts to demonstrate that the court is a legitimate authority
that has listened and has acted in the best interest of all parties.
IMPROVING LAW-RELATED EDUCATION AND 
OUTREACH
For years, courts have bemoaned the lack of public under-
standing of the justice system.26 Many courts state a commit-
ment to law-related education and outreach, but not all courts
broadcast oral arguments on television (furthering the concept
that “justice must be seen to be done”) and not all courts ven-
ture into their communities and conduct oral arguments at dif-
ferent locations accessible to the public, such as state capitols,
colleges, or schools. 
The California Supreme Court takes cases out of its tradi-
tional venues and chooses to move some arguments into non-
traditional locations in the state. The state’s six court of appeal
districts also engage in this form of community outreach and
public education. This model has made a huge difference to the
children, youth, education staff, and community members who
view oral argument and to participating appellate lawyers and
academics from different law
schools, who are becoming
effective commentators on cases.
Like other states, California also
uses a teacher training program
that brings high school teachers
together to learn from one
another in order to more effec-
tively teach about civics and the
rule of law. To date, through the
2010–2011 school year, the
California On My Honor: Civics
Institute for Teachers program
has engaged 270 primary and
secondary education (K–12)
teacher participants in 27 superior court jurisdictions, who in
turn have reached an estimated 50,450 students with court-cen-
tered civics curricula developed at the institutes.
IV. NATIONAL SURVEY FINDINGS 
Through a national survey conducted by the Conference of
Chief Justices, National Center for State Courts, and the
Administrative Office of the Courts in California, information
has been collected from state courts regarding the methods by
which state supreme courts communicate to the press, public,
and online communities. Forty-two states responded and indi-
cated that courts use a variety of means to disseminate opinions
and related case information for public and media to enhance
access and understanding and to engage audiences and com-
munities. In high-profile cases, the California Supreme Court
occasionally issues news releases on behalf of the court to assist
in public understanding of complex legal issues, such as the
court’s rulings on same-sex marriage, discussed more fully
below. The Supreme Court of Texas webcasts all arguments,
posts all briefs, and provides summaries of oral arguments
alongside the video webcast. This section highlights survey
findings regarding effective communication practices currently
used by various state supreme courts.
USE OF PLAIN LANGUAGE AND SUMMARY 
To address concerns regarding opinion length, complexity,
and difficulty in understanding, more courts are using simpler
opinion formats, plain-language summaries, or case syllabi to
help people access and understand opinions. While 29 out of
42 states responded that there is no prescribed format for opin-
ions and a number of states indicated that it is up to an indi-
vidual justice to decide how his or her opinion will be written,
most states responded that opinions tend to follow similar for-
mats. As a matter of practice, opinions have a defined and
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27. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, COMMISSION FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS:
FINAL REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFEGUARDING JUDICIAL
QUALITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CALIFORNIA 64 (2009).
28. Id.
repeated structure, such as
introduction, statement of
jurisdiction and ruling, state-
ment of facts, analysis, con-
clusion, and any instructions
to a lower court. Several
courts indicated that an
explanatory introduction
summarizes and states the
court’s ruling. For example:
“Every opinion starts with a
brief introductory paragraph
which indicates whether the
Court is affirming or denying
the judgment of the lower
court” [Rhode Island], or
“[o]pinions often include a
brief, plain-language summary of the holding near the begin-
ning” [Florida].
A number of public information officers or partnering organi-
zations (e.g., law schools) provide a plain-language summary on
the web in addition to the full opinion (see, for example,
Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts [for particularly difficult opin-
ions], Missouri, Rhode Island, and South Carolina). A number of
states responded that opinions are written in plain language for
wide audiences (“With the exception of occasional jargon, the
intent of opinion writing is for lay and legal reader alike”
[Texas]). In addition, several states indicated that they issue and
post summaries of cases on the web prior to oral argument.
The California Commission for Impartial Courts was a blue
ribbon group charged with studying and providing recommen-
dations to the Judicial Council on ways to strengthen the court
system, increase public trust and confidence in the judiciary,
and ensure judicial impartiality and accountability for the ben-
efit of all Californians. It found that “many judicial opinions are
not written in a manner that is easily digestible by nonattor-
neys. Introductory remarks or paragraphs could summarize a
case and the court’s decision in a way that can enhance media
accuracy.”27 Greater use of plain-language summarization and
more accessible formats will help all audiences understand
opinions and have greater access to them.
JUDICIAL EDUCATION
The California Commission for Impartial Courts also rec-
ommended that “[education] should be developed for judges
and justices on how to present clearly the meaning or substance
of court decisions in a way that can be easily understood by lit-
igants, their attorneys, and the public.”28 Because opinions are
the voice of the court, education for judges and justices regard-
ing the effective communication of opinions will help promote
a broader and clearer understanding of the role of the court.
A majority of state supreme courts reported that new judges
and justices receive education on opinion writing (i.e., appel-
late justices receive some form of education in-state or attend
out-of-state programs). For example, several courts identified
in-house training or courses offered by their state judicial col-
leges (California, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee,
and Wisconsin). Six states responded that new justices attend
the New Appellate Judges Seminar of the Dwight D. Opperman
Institute of Judicial Administration at the New York University
School of Law, which includes courses on appellate opinion
writing. Five states mentioned attending courses or partner-
ships with the National Judicial College in Reno. The most
commonly cited trainer was Bryan Garner of LawProse.org.
IMPROVING COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION
WITH MEDIA
Coalitions and efforts aimed at improving working relation-
ships and communication among judges, attorneys, and the
press are being promoted by courts to assist stakeholders keenly
interested in the accurate dissemination of opinions. States are
focusing on strategies to work closely with bench, bar, and
media representatives to increase legal understanding. Courts
must recognize the business needs of media and other stake-
holders who are impacted by opinions. For example, reporters
operate under the demands of deadlines and news cycles, and
other branches of government often must understand and
implement changes in statute and rules according to what is
stated in high court opinions.
Most states (35) indicated that they have a designated pub-
lic information officer (PIO) or communications counsel. The
PIO may answer procedural questions about the court or opin-
ions but does not comment on the substance of rulings. As
noted above, many courts stated that a policy of the court is that
“the opinion speaks for itself.” Justices do not give interviews
regarding specific opinions, and judicial canons in a number of
states prevent justices from specifically commenting on pro-
ceedings or opinions. However, 28 states indicated that justices
are available to speak with media representatives and may com-
ment on opinions in a general way to help describe the work of
the court. Twenty-two states indicated that they distribute opin-
ions directly to media representatives or to subscribers who
have signed up to be notified immediately when an opinion has
been released. 
Providing advance notice regarding opinions to the media is
less common, but some states provide advance notice to inter-
ested audiences via the web or an e-mail notification that an
opinion will be released, for example, advising on a Friday that
a specific case opinion will be released on the following
Monday. Press releases are rare but do accompany high-profile
or complicated cases and may include plain-language sum-
maries. Seventeen states indicated that they have a bench-bar
committee to discuss media access and appropriate interaction
with the media, and 21 states stated that they offer or partici-
pate in programs to educate the media about the judicial branch
(for example, “law schools” for the media) and vice versa.
These kinds of partnerships, including engagement with media
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29. PDFs are a common format but are uniquely unfriendly to the
web, since the files are difficult for search engines to locate and for
others to link to. California is beginning to look at posting more
material on the California courts website as plain text in order to
enhance access and readability.
30. In 2004, Mayor Gavin Newsom gained national attention when he
directed the San Francisco city-county clerk to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples, in violation of the current state law.
Subsequently, a combination of individual court cases (in the
California superior court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court)
and a statewide ballot initiative (Proposition 8) have decided the
rights of gays and lesbians to marry. Extensive public and media
awareness in these matters has helped to explain and demonstrate
how a supreme court settles important questions of law and sig-
nificantly impacted development of national policy regarding
same-sex marriage.
representatives to develop press release protocols, may help to
facilitate understanding and recognition of the constraints
under which reporters or stakeholders operate (for example,
meeting print deadlines or understanding rulings that impact
statewide policy).
USING THE WEB TO ENHANCE ACCESS, 
PARTICIPATION, AND UNDERSTANDING
States are focusing on using the web to address procedural
fairness concerns regarding opinions in a variety of ways. For
example, some use a standardized process for publishing court
opinions where opinions are simultaneously released to the
parties and the public via the web or schedule a time of the
week when opinions are posted and released. Opinions are
most commonly posted as PDF files.29 Courts are enhancing
search mechanisms, and 34 states indicated that opinions are
searchable on their court web page. 
State courts are also using the web to highlight cases of inter-
est and related case documents, and some states, such as Texas
and Florida, broadcast all oral arguments live on the web or
public television. Courts use the web to provide more intuitive
navigation to reach and educate specific court audiences—for
example, web pages directed to attorneys, educators, and mem-
bers of the public. Social media is also emerging as a tool to
alert audiences regarding opinions or activities of the court.
Fifteen states currently use or are considering RSS feeds to com-
municate court news, including opinions; eight states use
Twitter; and two states use Facebook or YouTube.
IMPROVING LAW-RELATED EDUCATION AND 
OUTREACH 
Courts also use various methods to improve law-related edu-
cation and outreach to the public. Although these efforts do not
exclusively focus on opinions, they do relate to perceptions of
procedural fairness because they teach about the courts,
enhance understanding regarding the role of the court, and
engage communities on a local level. Thirty-nine states offer
some form of public education programs, such as educational
web content or direct outreach to students by local judges and
attorneys visiting classrooms. Thirty-three states routinely con-
duct oral argument in high schools or venues other than court
buildings. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court of California hosted its annual
special off-site educational session to improve public under-
standing of the courts and to provide local students with a rare
view of how the appellate courts work. An expanded back-
ground summary of the case is prepared, which contains a
plain-language description of the case and issues to be decided.
Hundreds of students from all nine counties in the Fifth
Appellate District headquar-
tered in Fresno, California, were
able to see the Supreme Court
argue cases of statewide impor-
tance. The session was broad-
cast live by Valley Public
Television and the California
Channel, a statewide cable net-
work with 5.6 million viewers.
Additional educational materi-
als for the special session were
placed on the public television
station’s special website in order
to reach interested audiences and provide resources in multiple
forums. All appellate courts in California conduct oral argu-
ment outreach in their communities and involve local judges,
teachers, students, media, and lawyers.
Several states responded that they are focusing on law-
related education efforts, including professional development
programs that are offered to teachers with an emphasis on civics
related to the judicial branch. In these programs, teacher and
student participants interact with judges and attorneys and
increase their knowledge about the role and operations of the
courts, specifically in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
V. OPINION STUDY REGARDING THE SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE CASES IN CALIFORNIA
This section will use a case study to illustrate the California
Supreme Court’s communications strategy with regard to a par-
ticularly high-profile issue. Despite a number of legal actions
that involved challenges to the executive, legislative, and pub-
lic’s power to determine policy, one result of that strategy was
that the media was well informed and public confusion was
minimized.
DECIDING WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO MARRY
Over the past two decades, whether same-sex couples have
the right to marry has been an evolving state issue determined
by public vote, state legislatures, and the courts. The history of
the same-sex marriage cases in California, where a high court
was asked to decide who is allowed to marry in the midst of a
highly charged emotional and political environment, provides
a case study regarding the role of the courts and the evolution
of the law, the balancing of public and media demands for
access, and efforts by the court to provide respectful and clear
communication.30 In 2000, California voters approved an ini-
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31. On May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court voted 6-1 to
uphold Proposition 8 but also ruled that those same-sex couples
who married between June and November 2008 might remain
married. In August 2010, in a separate federal challenge, U.S.
District Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker overturned Proposition 8
but also stayed his ruling pending appeal. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit indefinitely extended the District
Court’s stay, stopping any new same-sex marriages in the state of
California. The federal Court of Appeals heard oral argument in
December 2010, and on February 7, 2012, in a 2–1 decision,
affirmed Judge Walker’s decision declaring the Proposition 8 ban
on same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional. Perry v. Brown, Nos.
10-16696, 11-16577 (9th Cir. opinion filed Feb 7, 2012).  The
court of appeal decision continued the stay on Judge Walker’s rul-
ing pending further appeal. The marriages of more than 18,000
same-sex couples that took place between the time of the In re
Marriages opinion and before Proposition 8 was passed remain
valid.
tiative statute, the Defense of
Marriage Act (Proposition 22),
which recognized marriage
only between a man and a
woman. On May 15, 2008,
California’s highest court voted
4-3 to overturn the statutory
ban on the grounds that it was
unconstitutional (In re Marriage
Cases, S147999). After the
court’s ruling and before the
passage of Proposition 8 (a con-
stitutional amendment passed
by voters in November 2008
that added language to the con-
stitution to only recognize mar-
riage between a man and a
woman), California followed
Massachusetts to become the
second state in the nation to
allow same-sex marriage.31 The court not only legalized same-
sex marriage but also extended to sexual orientation the same
broad protections against bias previously saved for race, gen-
der, and religion.
HIGH PUBLIC INTEREST AND ACCOMMODATING 
PUBLIC AND MEDIA DEMANDS
To accommodate high public interest in the California
Supreme Court proceedings—media requests were received
from all over the world and numerous parties and advocacy
groups filed extensive legal briefs—the California Supreme
Court took the following steps: 
The court dedicated a “high-profile case” web page to pro-
vide online access to case documents and to increase public
access to court information. The web page provided online
access to all briefs filed in the marriage cases and ultimately
archived all related case information (for example, case calen-
dars, documents, and history; links for the public to watch
hearing broadcasts; press releases; and information about the
Supreme Court of California). A media advisory was also
released to the press and public to alert them regarding the web
page and its contents.
The court notified the public and media one month in
advance (on February 6, 2008) that the California Supreme
Court would hear oral arguments in the marriage cases on
March 4, 2008. The advisory provided the history of the cases
and their consolidation and also explained in plain language
that “in these cases, the challengers contend that the current
California marriage statutes are unconstitutional in limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples and denying same-sex cou-
ples access to the designation of marriage.” It also included
California Supreme Court procedure and timelines for a deci-
sion: “Under the applicable court rules, the Supreme Court gen-
erally issues a decision, through a written opinion, within 90
days of oral argument.”
To increase public access to the court session, the California
Supreme Court designated a public affairs cable network to pro-
vide a live TV broadcast of the oral argument session (a public
and media advisory provided a link to find cable companies that
carried the network). Oral arguments were also broadcast live
for interested audiences in an overflow viewing auditorium
within the California Supreme Court building and on a large
television screen for crowds gathered in the square outside San
Francisco City Hall.
When the California Supreme Court’s 121-page opinion was
released on May 15, 2008, the court provided notice of a spe-
cific time of day in the morning when the opinion would be
issued, and at that specific time simultaneously issued hard
copies and posted the opinion on a public website. At the same
time, the court issued a 7-page news release that summarized
previous court action and the instant case history, the majority
opinion, and the concurring and dissenting opinions. This
news release had been developed in consultation with supreme
court attorneys and communications staff to ensure that the
content was accurate and appropriately stated the issues and
holdings. The news summary also provided a web link to access
the full opinion as a PDF file.
CONCLUSION
By paying critical attention to the key elements of procedural
fairness (voice, neutrality, respect, and trust), justices and court
staff can alleviate public confusion or dissatisfaction with the
courts through the clear communication of court opinions. By
focusing on how opinions are delivered and ensuring that the
public understands the substance of rulings and that all voices
have been heard, the legitimacy of the courts is reinforced. 
Application of this policy will have positive implications
regarding support for supreme courts by other branches of gov-
ernment and by the public at large, audiences that are impacted
both by opinions that address narrowly focused, particular
issues of law and by wide-ranging opinions that affect social
policy statewide. Because the policy of a high court is often that
“the opinion speaks for itself,” and justices are prevented from
discussing specific rulings, courts are helping audiences with
tools to better understand sometimes complex and lengthy rul-
ings. As information moves faster and faster through social
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media and instantaneous notification, audiences expect more
clarity and helpfulness when they are directed to review and
digest a particular outcome. 
Audiences today for state supreme court opinions represent
a diverse body—members of the public, government stake-
holders, media and lawyers, and interested parties from all
around the world—that needs to understand the work of the
courts. Opinions must reassure the public that the court has
deliberated carefully and acted as a neutral body. Plain-language
summarization, transparency, instant notification and access via
the web, as well as improved collaboration with media and edu-
cation partners, are all helping to make high court opinions less
difficult to comprehend and the workings of the court more
accessible and understandable to wider audiences. 
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article through their valuable input and their work with the Jefferson
County FTA Pilot Project and the Court Date Notification Program. 
1. The National Institute of Corrections provides free technical assis-
tance to state and local correctional agencies. For more informa-
tion, go to http://nicic.gov/TA. 
2. These data were collected in August of 2005 by examining half of
the court files of all defendants who were issued FTA warrants
during June of 2004. The overall number of misdemeanor and
traffic FTA warrants for that month (590) is somewhat higher
than the number of warrants issued in July of 2005 (524). The
June 2004 data were examined to collect arrest and walk-in rates
after one year, and the number was rounded to 600 for ease of
computation.  
It is likely during our first jobs in the justice system when werealize the adjective “important” is a somewhat relative termas it relates to the issues that we face. Far from what we
learned in college or law school—and further still from the
topics typically reported in the media—often the most impor-
tant issues we face will be found in the most common of cases.
There is a saying in city government that the public’s idea of
how well you are doing your job is only as good as how well
you administer the water bills. That is because every house-
hold gets one, and, for many citizens, it represents the only
contact that they may ever have with their local government.
The same is true in criminal justice. Most people will never
face a felony trial, but a relatively large number of them will be
summonsed into court on lesser charges such as misdemeanor
and traffic offenses. For any particular defendant, a court
appearance required by summons may be his or her singular
personal experience with the justice system; how we guide that
defendant through the system is perhaps one of the most
important issues we may ever face and says a lot about how we
administer justice. Doing this well promotes judicial-branch
legitimacy by increasing the defendant’s overall sense of proce-
dural fairness, lessens system costs associated with any partic-
ular case, and avoids the compounding array of negative con-
sequences associated with a single yet preventable incident
such as the defendant’s failure to appear for court.
In 2004, one of the most important issues facing Jefferson
County, Colorado, criminal justice leaders was the rising num-
bers of these failures to appear (FTAs). That year, consultants
working on behalf of the National Institute of Correction’s Jails
Division completed a local system assessment showing that
33% of the county jail’s inmates were compliance violators
(i.e., failure to comply with court orders by failing to appear,
pay, or perform some task), up from only 8% in 1995.1
Subsequent jail-population analyses found that three-fourths
of these compliance violators had been booked on failure-to-
appear warrants for misdemeanor, traffic, or municipal
offenses, and in 90% of the studied cases these FTA warrants
were issued to defendants missing the very first court event in
their case. In 2004, the jail was rapidly nearing its operational
capacity, and county leaders felt compelled to address the
increasing demand for jail beds. As a matter of jail-population
management alone, a facility with roughly 25% of its inmates
incarcerated for failing to appear for mostly lower-level
offenses did not seem like the best use of the limited jail
resources. Moreover, because these leaders also felt the FTA
issue to be largely avoidable, an overall sense of procedural
fairness to at least avoid worst-case-scenarios—such as some-
one’s grandmother being jailed for failing to appear in a dog-at-
large case—was foremost in their minds. 
Criminal justice systems expend substantial resources to
deal with FTAs and FTA warrants. In Jefferson County,
researchers found that there were roughly 600 traffic and mis-
demeanor FTA warrants issued in a single month in 2004.2
Further study of those warrants revealed that after one year,
25% had been cleared by defendants coming in on their own,
50% had been cleared by police arresting the defendant, and
22% of the warrants remained outstanding—all outcomes that
trigger significant financial and social costs. Indeed, from the
time a particular defendant fails to appear for court, the bur-
den from that FTA begins to drain public resources at multiple
points in the system. Any people associated with the case dur-
ing the life of an FTA warrant, including judges, clerks, law-
enforcement officers, attorneys, and jail staff, find that their
workloads increase significantly because of that warrant.
Moreover, the tangible and intangible costs of FTAs extend to
victims, witnesses, and even to the defendants themselves.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, FTAs undermine the
integrity of the justice system, as each FTA tends to erode the
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3. See ROBERT CUSHMAN, GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING A CRIMINAL
JUSTICE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Inst.
of Corr., NIC Accession No. 017232 (Jan. 2002), available at
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/017232.pdf.  
4. The current trend in the field of pretrial justice is to use the phrase
“court-appearance rates,” which focuses on the positive and typi-
cally larger number of defendants who actually appear for court,
rather than the phrase “failure-to-appear-rates,” which focuses on
the negative and less-frequent cases. The two phrases represent
different ways of describing the same phenomenon: a jurisdiction
with a 97% court appearance rate has a 3% failure-to-appear rate.  
5. See Linda Detroy Alexander, Backing Law with a Lecture, GOLDEN
TR., Dec. 2, 2010, at 4, available from the Jefferson County
Criminal Justice Planning Unit. 
6. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PRETRIAL RELEASE (3rd ed., 2007), Std. 10-1.3, at 41 (“The princi-
ple of release under least restrictive conditions favors use of cita-
tions by police or summons by judicial officers in lieu of arrest at
stages prior to the first judicial appearance in cases involving
minor offenses.”), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_
standards_pretrialrelease_toc.html. The term “minor offenses” is
used rather than “misdemeanors” because the latter term is often
defined differently among jurisdictions across the United States.
Generally, according to the commentary to Standard 10-1.3,
“‘minor offenses’ are the equivalent of lower-level misdemeanors.
However, when the alleged offense involves danger or weapons—
as, for example, is often the case in domestic violence misde-
meanors—the Standard allows jurisdictions to determine that the
offense is not ‘minor,’ regardless of its statutory designation.” Id.
7. BARRY MAHONEY, BRUCE D. BEAUDIN, JOHN A. CARVER III, DANIEL B.
RYAN, AND RICHARD B. HOFFMAN, PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL, Nat’l Inst. of Justice (2001), at 62
(further citation omitted), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/181939.pdf.  
8. In hindsight, Zimbardo’s early theories may be the best to describe
the Jefferson County experience. In the 1960s, Zimbardo wrote
how a sense of anonymity versus a sense of community can cause
social deviance. See Anonymity of Place Stimulates Destructive
Vandalism, available at http://www.lucifereffect.com/about_
content_anon.htm.  During Jefferson County’s discussions over
court-date-reminder call script language, county leaders consid-
ered the relative worth of messages focusing on letting defendants
know that: (1) they were not anonymous; (2) they were part of a
social community; (3) the court system recognized their individ-
uality and humanity; and (4) the court also knew how to reach
them if they failed to appear.  
respect that an independent judiciary deserves.  
With these data in hand, Jefferson County leaders, through
the county’s criminal justice coordinating committee (CJCC),3
initiated a multifaceted approach to increase court appearance
rates4 and to lessen the impact of FTAs and FTA warrants on
the jail. In this article, we describe the results of a randomized
experiment designed to study the effectiveness of one part of
that approach—telephone reminder and notification calls to
defendants. The “FTA Pilot Project,” as it was called, was
borne mostly of logic and knowledge of doctor-office practice,
but it was patterned after successful programs found in King
County, Washington, and the Seattle Municipal Courts. It ulti-
mately spawned a fully funded program, the “Court Date
Notification Program” nested within the Jefferson County
Sheriff’s Office. The program has served as the model for
numerous similar efforts across Colorado as well as several in
other states. In addition to describing the details of the exper-
imental pilot project, we will also discuss the ongoing strategy
and results of the Court Date Notification Program and offer
several observations concerning the implications of these find-
ings and results for policy making.  
WHY WAS THE STUDY DONE? 
Across America, police issue citations in a staggering num-
ber of cases. In Jefferson County, a county with roughly 14
law-enforcement agencies feeding into its court system, the
local Sheriff ’s Office Patrol Division alone wrote 15,693 traffic
tickets in 2009.5 As an issue connected to the topic of pretrial
release or detention, the practice of issuing a citation in lieu
of making an arrest is one of delegated release authority, and
it is generally favored by national pretrial standards that rec-
ommend release prior to trial under the least restrictive con-
ditions.6 Nevertheless, there are pros and cons to citation
release. As noted in one report, while cost savings are greatest
when field citations are used,
“[c]itation release . . . has been
criticized for resulting in unac-
ceptably high rates of failure to
appear (FTA) and a conse-
quent loss of justice system
credibility in the eyes of defen-
dants and the general public.”7
The reason people fail to
show up for court on relatively
minor offenses is the subject of
debate. Some argue that the
typically long period of time
between the citation and the court date naturally leads to FTAs
due to the relative instability of many defendants. Others argue
that defendants are largely unaware that failing to show up for
court can lead to an arrest warrant for seemingly minor viola-
tions of the law. Some say defendants fail to appear for court
on purpose. Others say they just forget. The Jefferson County
Criminal Justice Planning Unit (CJP), staff to the Jefferson
County CJCC, interviewed numerous defendants jailed for
failing to appear for court and found that their reasons for not
appearing varied widely and included each of the hypothesized
reasons listed above. 
A better understanding of why defendants fail to appear for
court might help formulate a testable hypothesis based on some
established theory of crime or delinquency, such as “rational-
choice theory, ” its offspring “routine-activities theory,” or the-
ories explaining a defendant’s sense of anonymity, such as those
proposed by noted psychologist Philip Zimbardo in the 1960s.8
However, the Jefferson County CJCC had little time for that
type of research. Like many entities struggling to find answers
to pressing problems, the CJCC was addressing the somewhat
urgent issues of unsustainable jail-population growth, increas-
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9. MAHONEY et al., supra note 7, at 39, 62. 
10. See MATT NICE, COURT APPEARANCE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: PROCESS
AND OUTCOME EVALUATION, A REPORT FOR THE LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY
COORDINATING COUNCIL AND THE CANS OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE
(Mar. 2006). 
11. See Mitchel N. Herian and Brian H. Bornstein, Reducing Failure to
Appear in Nebraska: A Field Study, THE NEB. LAWYER, Vol. 13, No.
8, at 11 (Sept. 2010); Brian H. Bornstein, Alan J. Tomkins,
Elizabeth M. Neeley, Mitchel N. Herian, and Joseph A. Hamm,
Reducing Courts’ Failure-to-Appear Rate by Written Reminders, 18
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. (in press), available at doi:
10.1037/a0026293.  
12. In Colorado’s First Judicial District (made up of Jefferson and
Gilpin counties), the county-court judges take turns staffing a
“Duty Division,” which handles, among other things, defendants
on felony, misdemeanor, and more serious traffic citations and
summonses. Less serious traffic and misdemeanor cases are han-
dled in “Division T” by a magistrate. The Pilot Project focused
solely on cases heard in the Duty Division.  
ing case filings, high FTA rates,
and an unacceptable number of
people jailed pursuant to FTA
warrants. Accordingly, the
Committee was content with
knowing that simple logic, cou-
pled with the experience of at
least one other jurisdiction
(King County, Washington,
known for its advancement of
innovative criminal justice
practices) provided a basis for
testing the hypothesis that
court-date-reminder calls
would improve court-appear-
ance rates in summonsed cases. This approach also appeared to
follow the writings of at least some experts in the field of pre-
trial justice, who had documented the complicated nature of
FTAs and focused on practical system solutions involving pre-
FTA court-date reminders and swift action on warrants.9
WHY DID WE USE A LIVE CALLER? 
Jurisdictions seeking to increase their court-appearance
rates through reminder calls inevitably face the question of
whether to use live versus automated callers. When the
Jefferson County FTA Pilot Project was undertaken, there was
very little written on the efficacy of either approach. Through
telephone conversations, King County, Washington, officials
reported to CJP staff an overall decrease in failure-to-appear
rates of approximately 60% using live reminder calls for mis-
demeanor defendants. At the time, those officials advised
against using an automated system and stressed the need for
the caller to have multiple databases to find defendants’ con-
tact information, as well as extensive knowledge of the crimi-
nal justice system to answer defendants’ questions. 
Through those same conversations, Jefferson County
became aware of one other unpublished Washington study
reporting FTA-rate decreases of approximately 38% using
automated calls. Since then, Multnomah County, Oregon,
began its own study of an automated Court Appearance
Notification System (CANS) in 2006. In the final report to that
study, Multnomah County reported an overall decrease in
FTAs of 37% using an automated calling system on the targeted
population.10
In Jefferson County, the live-caller option was ultimately
chosen for primarily practical purposes: At a meeting in March
2005, the head of the Probation Department announced that
he had money in his budget to hire a person part-time for three
months to call defendants. Given the lack of hard data for
either option as well as the perceived complexity over the
logistics of setting up an automated system, there was no real
debate over this opportunity, and, accordingly, the Pilot Project
proceeded with a live caller.     
WHAT DID THE RESEARCHERS DO? 
The FTA Pilot Project 
The Subcommittee assembled a small Implementation
Team, made up of a County Court Judge, the Court Clerk, the
hired caller, and CJP Staff to work out the logistics of the live-
caller study. The Team believed that it was important for the
caller to see the actual court files when calling, but those files
were not allowed out of the courthouse. Accordingly, the court
made space for the caller in a vacant room on the floor where
most of those files were kept. Due to time constraints, the
caller was given access to only a telephone book to aid in
searching for defendants’ phone numbers. The effectiveness of
the Pilot Project was thus somewhat at the mercy of police offi-
cers legibly writing down phone numbers on their citations.
Typically, tickets having no numbers, or with illegible num-
bers, meant that no telephone call could be made. 
The court provided the caller with a desk, a computer with
a spreadsheet for data collection, and a telephone. Throughout
the study, CJP Staff would also work in the room entering con-
trol-group information into the spreadsheet.  
The Implementation Team created a script in English and
Spanish to be used as a primary tool for conveying information
to the defendant when he or she was reached directly, and to
be read verbatim when leaving a message on voicemail. The
script was framed in terms of defendant choice, reflecting the
experience of one Team member from the field of psychology.
A strong sanctions message for “choosing” not to show up for
court was included intentionally, although that language has
been softened since. The fact that such a script was created
quickly (and the fact that it was apparently successful) should
not diminish the crucial role of script content. As seen with
recent important studies by the Nebraska Public Policy Center,
variations in content can affect overall appearance rates.11 Pilot
Project logistics also required the Team to develop a fairly
detailed procedure for gathering files, separating cases, making
calls, inputting data, and monitoring outcomes. 
For 10 weeks, the caller collected data on approximately 30
variables on a total of 2,100 randomly selected defendants
summonsed to appear on misdemeanor and traffic offenses in
the Duty Division of the Jefferson County Court.12 Although
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13. In the call-ahead phase, the caller attempted to contact 1,176
defendants and “successfully contacted” 695, for a successful-con-
tact rate of approximately 60%. By contrast, only 44% of the
defendants in the call-after phase were successfully contacted.     
14. The decrease in the FTA rate for leaving a message with either
voicemail or with a responsible adult (38%) was approximately
the same as the automated-reminder-call decreases reported ver-
bally by King County, Washington, officials and reported in
Multnomah County Oregon. See NICE, supra note 10.    
the Duty Division handles felony matters, those cases, along
with cases in which defendants had legal representation, were
excluded. The Pilot Project proceeded in two phases. In the
first phase, defendants were called one week ahead of their
court dates to remind them to appear. In the second phase,
defendants who had failed to appear were called the next day
to notify them of their FTA warrants.   
Call-Ahead Phase 
On average, there were 70 unrepresented misdemeanor and
traffic cases per day in the Duty Division. Each day during the
Pilot Project, the caller would take a random sample of all
cases with arraignments scheduled exactly one week in the
future to use for data input. All of the data, such as the case
number, defendant demographics, offense information, statu-
tory penalties, etc., were gathered from the court file and
recorded on a spreadsheet. 
The parameters for calling defendants were strict. The caller
was given only three opportunities to telephone defendants—
exactly seven days prior to the initial court date—to remind
them of the upcoming Duty Division proceeding. If the caller
“successfully contacted” a defendant, the caller read a script
(in either English or Spanish) reminding the defendant of the
court date, giving directions to the court, and warning the
defendant of the consequences of failing to appear. The script
was carefully worded with guidance from the judges assigned
to Duty Division and included a list of anticipated defendant
questions with appropriate answers to those questions. A “suc-
cessful contact” was defined as any call in which the script was
read to either: (a) the defendant; (b) the defendant’s voicemail;
or (c) an apparently responsible adult living with the defen-
dant. Because the caller had three opportunities to reach the
defendant, that caller had some discretion in how to use those
opportunities. To collect the maximum amount of data, how-
ever, the caller’s protocol was to read the script on voicemail
anytime the caller reached a recording that was clearly the
defendant’s. “Successful” and “unsuccessful” (wrong number,
no number on ticket, disconnected number, etc.) contacts
were documented in fields for each of the three allowable
attempts. A “comments” section on the spreadsheet allowed
the caller to clarify miscellaneous data issues and to qualita-
tively document defendant and other household member reac-
tion. All of the telephone calls were made between 8:00 a.m.
and 7:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Throughout the pro-
ject, an individual from the CJP Unit collected and separately
inputted data for the control group, which consisted of ran-
domly selected defendants from the court’s files. The outcome
measured was whether or not the defendants failed to appear
on their scheduled dates.      
Call-After Phase 
The day after the Duty Division arraignments, the caller col-
lected all of the files for those
defendants who had failed to
appear—on average, 15 per
day. The caller randomly
selected half of the files and
collected the same demo-
graphic and case-specific data
as described in the call-ahead
phase. The caller also filled out
an “outcome sheet,” which
included the defendants’ names
and case numbers, as well as
check boxes designed to help
the court clerks document the
outcome measures for this phase. Given the same strict calling
parameters, the caller telephoned defendants to advise them of
their failure to appear for court and to explain the conse-
quences of the arrest warrant. Again, a carefully worded script
(in English and Spanish) was created to convey that message.
Each of the judges assigned to the Duty Division agreed, in
advance, to stay these warrants for five business days after the
FTA; accordingly, the caller also advised the defendant that if
he or she came into court within five business days, the war-
rant would not be issued.  As in the call-ahead phase, the caller
documented the results of successful and unsuccessful con-
tacts across the three allowable calling attempts. And again, a
second individual collected complete control data for later
comparison. Files (along with the outcome sheet) were
returned that day to the court clerks with instructions to hold
them for five business days. The outcomes that were measured
were whether defendants came to court within five business
days, and what the defendants did when they appeared for
court (e.g., pleaded guilty, rescheduled, etc.).  
WHAT DID THE RESEARCHERS FIND? 
The Call-Ahead Phase
Normally, the court-appearance rate in the Jefferson County,
Colorado, Duty Division for the types of cases studied was
79%. When defendants were successfully contacted13 and
reminded of their court dates one week in advance of their
arraignments, however, the court-appearance rate was
increased to 88% (a 43% reduction in the FTA rate). This over-
all increase in the appearance rate can be further broken down
by how the successful contact was made. If a message was left
with either voicemail or a responsible adult, the appearance
rate was increased to 87%.14 If the message was delivered to the
actual defendant, however, the court appearance rate rose to
approximately 92%.  
The Call-After Phase 
Normally, 10% of people who fail to appear for court do
return to court on their own initiative within five business
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15. There appear to be relatively few cost/benefit analyses on this
issue. The Jefferson County analysis concluded that by using the
FTA Pilot Project’s result of a reduction in misdemeanor and traf-
fic warrants of 43% in Duty Division, an FTA-reduction program
aimed at all misdemeanor and traffic offenses in the County
would: (1) reduce the overall number of FTA warrants issued for
those cases from 7,200 to 4,100 per year; (2) reduce the overall
time spent by court clerks processing the warrants from 3,800 to
2,200 hours per year; (3) reduce law-enforcement-officer hours
spent serving the warrants from 5,400 to 3,100 hours per year; (4)
reduce the hours spent by jail booking staff to process the arrestee
from 7,200 to 4,104 hours per year; and (5) assuming an arrest
rate at 50% and a two-day length of stay for persons with FTA
warrants (both estimates documented), save approximately
$200,000 per year in jail-bed costs. 
days. When defendants were
notified of their warrant after
they failed to appear, how-
ever, 50% returned to court
within five business days.  
THE JEFFERSON COUNTY
COURT DATE
NOTIFICATION PROGRAM 
Based on the success of
the Pilot Project, the
Jefferson County CJCC cre-
ated a Task Force to make recommendations for creating a per-
manent call-reminder program designed to increase court-
appearance rates. Those recommendations, along with a
detailed cost/benefit analysis of FTA reduction,15 were subse-
quently presented to the CJCC, which unanimously supported
the concept of developing a program using a live caller to tele-
phone defendants to remind them in advance of their upcom-
ing court dates. 
Because pre-FTA call reminders and post-FTA call notifica-
tions were ultimately shown to be equally effective during the
pilot project, the Task Force and the Committee discussed the
advantages of starting with one component over the other.
While there was some consensus that the ideal program would
likely consist of both pre- and post-FTA calls, the Task Force
and Committee ultimately recommended that the caller begin
by making reminder calls to defendants one week in advance
of their arraignments. 
This recommendation was made for several reasons. First,
the Committee and Task Force recognized that substantial
effort goes into preparing for the first court appearance.
Decreasing failures to appear altogether, rather than simply
using the warrant as an incentive to get defendants back into
court, would maximize the initial work of court staff and
would reduce the amount of redundant efforts expended
when a defendant arrives sometime after the planned appear-
ance date. Second, the Committee and Task Force believed
that calling defendants in advance of their court dates would
provide opportunities to tell those defendants important
information about their particular case that would reduce the
chances of a continuance. For example, the court experienced
many unnecessary continuances in car-insurance and license
cases when defendants arrived without proof of insurance or
proof of license reinstatement. A pre-call script, it was
believed, could be drafted to tell these defendants what they
needed to bring with them so that their case could be
resolved. Third, the Committee was already working on other
projects designed to reduce FTA bookings after the warrant
was issued, and the Committee and Task Force believed that
pre-calls would provide balance to these other post-FTA ini-
tiatives. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the pre-calls
primarily focused on customer service, a priority of the
Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners at the time.
In addition to reminding defendants about their court dates,
the Committee and Task Force believed that pre-calls would
provide a human voice to guide defendants through a daunt-
ing criminal justice system and would ultimately reduce the
number of frantic, last-minute phone calls placed by defen-
dants to court clerks. 
The Program, named the Jefferson County, Colorado, Court
Date Notification Program, is funded and staffed by the
Sheriff’s Office and is located inside the Jefferson County
Combined Court. The staff person who served as the caller
during the Pilot Project was hired full-time as a civilian
Program Specialist to implement the Program. As originally
planned, this Program Specialist was hired to spend roughly
equal amounts of time on Program implementation and expan-
sion, with 50% of her time spent actually calling defendants
and 50% spent evaluating the effectiveness of those calls and
on investigating and addressing the FTA issue associated with
other courtrooms and court events. The Program Specialist
(hereinafter the caller) began making calls for the Program
during the last week of March 2006.
Program Process 
Like the FTA Pilot Project, the Court Date Notification
Program began by focusing on the court-appearance rate for
the Duty Division of the Jefferson County Court, which was
staffed on a rotating basis by seven county-court judges in
Jefferson County. At Program inception, the Duty Division
heard an average of 77 unrepresented traffic and misdemeanor
cases summonsed daily into court by municipal, county, and
state ticketing agencies. Because the initial intent of the
Program was for the caller to spend only half of her time mak-
ing calls, an implementation group consisting of a county-
court judge, the Court Clerk, and others decided to initially
limit those calls to defendants who had no proof of insurance
(NPOI) as one of their charges. This emphasis on NPOI cases
was made for several reasons. First, files containing this charge
accounted for over half of the cases seen in Duty Division each
day. Second, defendants facing an NPOI charge often had other
charges associated with the same traffic stop. Third, fines for
these charges were typically high, so increasing court-appear-
ance rates for these cases might ultimately lead to significant
increased revenue to the State. Fourth, as noted previously,
defendants facing NPOI charges frequently asked for continu-
ances to bring in the required documentation, causing addi-
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tional strain on the court’s workload. After the implementation
group made this decision, it created a customized script specif-
ically for NPOI cases.16
File security issues and the need to create non-obtrusive
working relationships with court-division clerks led to a logis-
tical decision to locate the Program in the court building on
the same floor as the county-court judges and clerks. Because
the Program’s caller would be working primarily from docu-
ments in the official court file, this location allowed the caller
and the clerks to share files with little disruption to their nor-
mal work flow. The caller worked Monday through Friday dur-
ing business hours. Her office was private, with a computer
with access to multiple databases for data collection and defen-
dant tracking, and a telephone with call-back capability.17 The
primary spreadsheet for data collection had twenty fields,
which included defendant contact information, call outcomes,
and court-appearance outcomes. To adequately measure the
court-appearance outcomes of the Program, the caller created
(with input from the judges and Court Clerk) a colored sheet
of paper that she filled out and placed in each file targeted for
calling. The paper had three possible outcomes for the case
that the court clerks were to check and that were ultimately
measured in the data set: (1) FTA; (2) Disposition (pled, set-
tled, or dismissed); and (3) Pretrial Conference, which is also
used to indicate a continuance for any reason. This colored
outcome check sheet was an additional duty given to court
clerks, but it provided (and continues to provide) crucial data
needed for the ongoing evaluation of the Program. 
Due to the rotation in Duty Division, the caller had to adapt
her own procedures to accommodate differing policies and
practices among the judges. Nevertheless, her daily routine (as
observed by CJP Staff) was fairly consistent between divisions.
Each day, the caller would ask Duty Division clerks about the
FTAs from the day before.18 She then collected the colored out-
come check sheets, and typed the outcomes into the spread-
sheet.19 The caller next retrieved the files for all misdemeanor
and traffic cases that were set to be heard in Duty Division in
seven days. The caller then read through the files, looking for
her target group of NPOI defendants. The information found
in those files, primarily from the summonses themselves, was
then transferred onto a printed docket sheet and into the
Program’s spreadsheet. If there was no contact information for
a particular defendant, the caller used one of two online direc-
tories to try to locate a useable phone number.20 Once she
input the required data into the spreadsheet, the caller was pre-
pared to telephone the defendants. In the initial stages of the
Program, the caller became
accustomed to alternately
entering a page or two of data
and then making her initial
calls. 
In the Pilot Project, the
caller was limited to only three
attempts at calling any particu-
lar defendant. The resulting Program was designed with no
such restrictions; however, on her own, the caller apparently
placed the same limits on her calls to keep from clogging her
workflow. Calls were documented using the following codes:
(1) talked to defendant personally; (2) left message on defen-
dant’s home/personal voicemail; (3) talked with relative/room-
mate of defendant and left message; (4) wrong number; (5)
phone disconnected; (6) no answer, no device on phone for
messages, busy signal, “subscriber not available” message on
cell phones; and (7) no phone number listed on summons or
found with online directory. The caller also used a variety of
sub-codes to record other information she deemed to be rele-
vant. Successful contacts were those in the first three cate-
gories. If the caller successfully contacted a defendant, she read
a script (in either English or Spanish) reminding the defendant
of the court date, giving directions to the court, and warning
the defendant of the consequences of failing to appear for
court. The caller had (and still has) considerable discretion as
to whether she would leave a message or call back later. In
many cases, the caller simply left a generic message for the
defendant to return her call, and she then fielded return calls
from the defendants throughout the day. 
Six-Month Outcomes 
During the first six months of the Court Date Notification
Program, the total number of docketed cases with unrepre-
sented defendants facing traffic or misdemeanor charges in
County Court Duty Division reached approximately 10,000,
for an average of 385 per week. Of those 10,000 cases, approx-
imately 5,600 were targeted for telephone calls. Of those tar-
geted, approximately 3,500 defendants were “successfully con-
tacted” (defined as either talking to the defendant in person, or
by leaving a message on the defendant’s voicemail or with a
third party) and 2,100 were unsuccessful, for a successful-con-
tact rate of 63%. As documented in the FTA Pilot Project, the
normal court-appearance rate for NPOI defendants was 77%.
When these defendants were successfully contacted and
reminded of their court dates one week in advance of their
16. For example, because defendants with NPOI charges typically face
steep fines, the script made a specific reference to “payment
options,” which was designed to allay defendants’ fears concern-
ing any inability to pay. 
17. Giving defendants the ability to telephone the caller back is an
important improvement over the Pilot Project, which had no call-
back capability.  
18. The caller compared the clerk’s verbal report of FTAs to the out-
come sheets as an error check. 
19. While the Program was not designed to track and contact defen-
dants after they failed to appear, the caller nonetheless informally
kept track of FTAs for defendants with whom she had directly
spoken. After six months, the caller reported that a follow-up call
appeared to cause more defendants to come back to court at a
higher rate than those who were not called; however, more for-
malized study is required to make any definitive conclusions on
the effectiveness of this practice.     
20. In the Pilot Project, the percentage of tickets that had no defen-
dant phone numbers or were unreadable was approximately 10%.
In 2011, the percentage of tickets that had no phone numbers and
for which the phone numbers were not found in either of the two
online directories was 4.4%.  
[T]he normal court-
appearance rate
for [this category
of] defendants
was 77%.
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arraignments, however, the
appearance rate increased
to 89%. This result repre-
sented a 52% decrease in
the FTA rate for the targeted
population. In more con-
crete terms, it meant that
425 FTA warrants were
avoided during the first six months of the Program.  
Additional analyses of data from June and September 2006
again showed that the overall court-appearance rate varied
based on how the successful contact was made. As in the Pilot
Project, direct contact with a defendant led to the highest
appearance rate—as high as 93% in the September data set.
Contact by leaving a message was second best (86% in June,
90% in September), and contact by leaving a message with a
third party was the least effective method. These analyses also
suggested a need to convince law enforcement to collect veri-
fiable defendant contact information at the scene, and to per-
haps revise program elements (e.g., adding additional data-
bases for finding defendants with bad contact information;
calling defendants at night or on weekends) to better locate the
defendants themselves to further increase the overall court-
appearance rate. 
Finally, the six-month data showed that of those defendants
successfully contacted, most (approximately 54%) came to
court and reached a disposition on their case on the day the
case was set for arraignment, but approximately 35% of the
defendants had their cases continued. This latter percentage
suggested the need to inquire into the reasons for these con-
tinuances and to assess whether they were unnecessary or oth-
erwise burdensome to the criminal justice system.                    
Program Expansion
During 2006, the Program’s caller was able to increase the
number of cases called by using volunteers (when available)
obtained through the Sheriff’s Office volunteer pool. On cer-
tain days, this meant providing full-time coverage, which
allowed the caller to target 100% of the traffic-and-misde-
meanor docket in the Duty Division. Nevertheless, that docket
represented only a portion of the overall number of cases hav-
ing FTA issues in the Combined Court. In response to queries
by the Sheriff and Chief Judge of the District, CJP Staff ana-
lyzed the extent of the FTA issue in all courts of the District
and made a number of recommendations, including: (1)
expanding the procedure to the remaining cases in Duty
Division (primarily felony summonses) while using tech-
niques to improve the “successful-contact rate”; (2) based on
the analyses in the report, working with the judges to identify
and target other court events (such as “pro se sentencing hear-
ings,” etc.) requiring telephone reminder or notification calls;
(3) beginning to make calls for cases in Division T, the division
devoted to less-serious misdemeanor and traffic matters; (4)
allowing Program staff time to conduct continuing research
into best practices; and (5) implementing a “court-closure-
notification system” to cover emergency court closures due to
weather, etc. 
Based in part on those recommendations, the Sheriff’s Office
hired a second full-time Program Specialist, who now assists
with the daily calls. With her addition, the program has signif-
icantly expanded to include calls to 100% of unrepresented
traffic and misdemeanor cases in Duty Division and 100% of
the unrepresented misdemeanor and non-infraction21 traffic
cases in Division T. At the time this article was drafted, the
Program had also expanded to begin calling pro se defendants
with felony summonses in one division of the district  court,22
with plans to expand to three other district court divisions in
the near future.    
Court-Appearance Benefits
Overall, the results of the Program to date are exceptional.
The successful-contact rate has risen from an initial rate of
60% in the Pilot Project to 74% in 2010 for the Duty Division,
and from 78% in 2009 to 80% in 2010 for Division T. In 2007,
the court-appearance rate for defendants who were success-
fully contacted was 91%, compared to an appearance rate of
71% for those who were not. In 2010, combining all statistics
from both Duty Division and Division T, the court-appearance
rate for defendants who were successfully contacted was 92%,
compared to an appearance rate of 73% for those who were
not. These increases have significantly reduced the costs of
FTAs, including the somewhat intangible costs to victims and
society in general. Moreover, although not empirically tested,
these numbers indicate that the use of a live caller appears to
have permitted experimentation and “tweaking” of the
process, which has, in turn, fostered steady improvement.  
Other Benefits 
In addition to increasing court-appearance rates, Jefferson
County has experienced both a number of intended and unin-
tended benefits from the Court Date Notification Program.
Perhaps most important is enhanced customer service provided
to defendants through personal reminder calls. While their pri-
mary responsibility is to convey the information from the
script, the Sheriff’s Office’s civilian callers also field defendant
questions that would normally be directed to court clerks,23
give driving and busing directions and instruction, look up
other court information, forward calls to appropriate agencies,
and generally allay the fears of defendants who may be intimi-
dated by the criminal justice system. Several of the court’s divi-
21. When a defendant fails to appear for court in low-level traffic
infractions in Colorado, it results in a civil judgment rather than
an arrest warrant. 
22. In Colorado, district courts generally handle more serious crimi-
nal and civil cases, as well as probate, domestic relations, and
juvenile cases. While most defendants appearing on the district
court’s criminal docket have representation, FTAs still occur.    
23. Anecdotally, court clerks have told the authors that prior to the
Court Date Notification Program many defendants would call the
day before their court date with numerous questions about their
cases. The Program has, to some extent, removed that burden
from the clerks. Not surprisingly, by proactively calling defen-
dants the callers have also learned that many defendants have for-
gotten about their court dates, do not have directions, have lost
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a defendant led 
to the highest
appearance rate—as
high as 93% . . . .
sion clerks have heard from numerous defendants who have
praised these mostly immeasurable aspects of the Program. In
comments compiled throughout 2007 and 2008, defendants
themselves routinely articulated their appreciation for the
reminders. The callers have been named by some in the county
as the “goodwill ambassadors” of the Sheriff’s Office, offering a
helpful and friendly component to the case that many people
do not normally perceive from their experiences with law
enforcement. Although customer service was one of four key
values articulated by the Jefferson County Board of county
Commissioners at the time of Program creation, opportunities
for providing quality customer service in the criminal justice
system can seem elusive. Nevertheless, the Jefferson County
Court Date Notification Program has shown that local leaders
can provide quality and sometimes unexpected customer ser-
vice in a delicate government function that is too often seen as
cold and unfriendly to its participants. 
Answering questions, though, represents only one aspect of
the Program’s ability to enhance customer service.
Additionally, the callers have provided significant benefits as
quality control agents for “internal” customers. In particular,
the callers have caught and corrected many advisement, ticket,
and ticket-agency-record errors, have helped clerks to combine
cases, and have even uncovered instances of identity theft.24
When the callers learn that a defendant is already incarcerated,
they are able to advise the court so that an FTA warrant will
not be issued. With access to the Sheriff’s Office’s records-man-
agement system, the callers are also able to gather additional
contact information that is unavailable through traditional
online directories and to update the court files accordingly. 
Quality control is also reflected in at least two more global
endeavors. First, primarily due to the callers’ frustration with
the existing half-page Colorado Uniform Summons and
Complaint (the ticket issued for most traffic and misdemeanor
offenses), Jefferson County created a “Ticket Task Force,”
made up of municipal, county, and state agencies, to create a
model full-page summons for use across Colorado.25 Since
then, members of that Task Force have independently worked
to begin developing elec-
tronic citations using the
data fields from the full-page
ticket. Second, recognizing
that having officers collect
good defendant contact
information is foundational
to the calling program, the
callers have kept detailed
records of both agencies and
individual officers who are
deficient in doing so. The callers have contacted officers to dis-
cuss the need for legible phone numbers on the tickets, and the
callers continue to discuss the efficacy of alternative methods,
such as emails or text messaging, for contacting defendants. 
Finally, the Court Date Notification Program has benefited
numerous other jurisdictions as the live callers of the Program
continue to educate—free of charge—others seeking to imple-
ment the same or similar programs. For example, after visiting
with Jefferson County staff members, Coconino County,
Arizona, essentially replicated the Jefferson County FTA Pilot
Project in 2006, independently finding that calling defendants
prior to their court appearance resulted in a court-appearance
rate of 87.1%, compared to 74.6% for the control group.26
Other jurisdictions, too, have visited the Program, and many of
those jurisdictions have since begun similar projects.27 As one
notable example, Douglas County, Colorado, recently imple-
mented a “Court Call Ahead Program” that is similar to the
Court Date Notification Program, and that county has reported
an increase in its court-appearance rate to slightly above 98%
for the targeted population.28
IMPLICATIONS FOR COURT POLICY AND PRACTICES
What causes defendants to fail to appear for court? Is it the
length of time between the citations or summonses and the
court dates?  Is it their fear of the system? Is it their sense of
anonymity? Do they do it on purpose, or do they just forget?
Until we know the answers to these questions, we can nonethe-
their tickets, or have questions about the consequences of certain
actions, such as failing to appear. In a limited number of cases, the
callers have helped defendants reschedule cases, helped family
members who have incarcerated or deceased defendants, and
helped defendants with multiple cases navigate the system. 
24. This has occurred when the callers have contacted a defendant,
only to learn that a third party had used the defendant’s identifi-
cation during a traffic stop. 
25. In the full-page ticket, the Task Force made room for two separate
phone numbers to enhance the callers’ ability to successfully con-
tact defendants. 
26. See WENDY F. WHITE, COURT HEARING CALL NOTIFICATION PROJECT
(May 17, 2006), available at http://www.coconino.az.gov/
cjcc.aspx?id=4692. Like the Jefferson County Pilot Project, the
rates varied based on how contact was made—the highest court-
appearance rate was for defendants who were personally con-
tacted (94.1%), followed by the rate for defendants for whom a
message was left with another person (85%) and for whom the
message was left on an answering machine (79%). 
27. The ongoing list of those interested in the Program includes visi-
tors from three Colorado municipalities, three other Colorado
counties, and jurisdictions in seven other states. Many of those
jurisdictions have adapted a version of the Jefferson County
script.  
28. Douglas County, Colorado, performed its own pilot project from
April to September of 2009, using a live caller to remind defen-
dants of their upcoming court dates, and has since funded its own
“Call Ahead Program,” which calls defendants in advance but also
includes an “FTA-recovery” component that involves calling
defendants again if they fail to appear. In a short description of the
pilot and resulting program, one county official stated as follows:
“The general consensus is that the public appreciates the courtesy
call and the opportunity to ask questions as to what they can
expect when they report to the Justice Center. With specific
instructions as to where to appear along with defined expectations
regarding resolving court matters the docket management experi-
enced a noticeable improvement in efficiency and a decrease in
FTA warrants.” For more information on that particular program,
contact Scott Mattson at SMatson@douglas.co.us. 
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less recognize that, for what-
ever reason, telephone
reminders using live callers
work. They increase court-
appearance rates, dramatically
reducing the significant costs
associated with FTAs and FTA
warrants. These costs include
fiscal impacts, such as money
to process, serve, and house
defendants on FTA warrants,
but they also include the var-
ied social costs triggered by
needlessly arresting and incar-
cerating individuals for a behavior that might be prevented by
a simple phone call. In Jefferson County, the benefits of reduc-
ing FTAs clearly outweigh any costs associated with the
Notification Program borne by the Sheriff’s Office, 29 and other
agencies (i.e., municipal police agencies, prosecutors, court
clerks, and judges) have realized the benefits of a decreased
workload at virtually no cost to them.   
FTAs also tend to adversely affect defendants and the larger
society long after the initial case is resolved, and reminder calls
can help minimize those effects. For example, a person’s bail is
frequently determined largely on the number of FTAs on his or
her criminal record, and removing false or unfair indicators of
FTAs from defendants’ records has become an important but
complex issue for discussion among those who rely upon crim-
inal histories to guide them in the bail-setting process. To the
extent that the justice system can prevent the FTA altogether,
no indication of any failure can exist on the criminal history,
and the issue of a needless FTA affecting a later case is avoided.  
Court-date-reminder programs can also be important addi-
tions to any pretrial-justice initiative that seeks to increase the
use of citations and summonses, as is recommended by
national standards on pretrial release.30 Because the criminal
justice system is often reluctant to purposefully increase the
use of citations and summonses, implementation of a workable
notification system may mitigate system fears and thus reduce
system resistance to pretrial justice reform in this area.  
A significant (albeit empirically unmeasured) benefit to
using live reminder calls appears to be in the area of customer
service, an area often overlooked in the criminal justice system.
The Jefferson County Court Date Notification Program strives
to make most people’s first—and often only—trip to the court-
house something other than an entirely negative experience.   
Finally, as demonstrated by the FTA Pilot Project, calling
people after they fail to appear for court can be equally effec-
tive at increasing court-appearance rates, and although such
calls lack the full customer-service benefits of reminder calls,
they can be done for significantly less money.  The future of the
Jefferson County Court Date Notification Program, and per-
haps the model program for the future, includes strategic use
of a combination of court-date reminders along with a call-
after notification component for all court events, based on
empirical data indicating the need for intervention. The hope
is that this strategic planning, coupled with ongoing research
and practice to increase the number of successful contacts
(especially contacts with defendants themselves) might lead to
court appearance rates of 95% and higher. Additional research
needed to move toward this goal should focus on script con-
tent, message timing (e.g., one week versus three days prior to
the court date), message delivery (e.g., using a male versus a
female voice, and the nuances between leaving a message with
a human being versus a machine), program placement and
operation (e.g., operated by the law enforcement versus oper-
ated by the courts), and new ways of communicating with
defendants, such as via email or text message. 
CONCLUSION 
For many jurisdictions, the singular response to defendants
failing to appear for court is to issue warrants, typically with
high monetary bonds attached, and then to wait for law
enforcement to serve those warrants through arrests.31
Unfortunately, this way of doing business is costly, and it has
resulted in some jurisdictions having court-appearance rates as
low as 70%. Innovative ways of dealing with the issue of court-
appearance rates should be of primary concern to all people in
the criminal justice system, including judges. The Jefferson
County FTA Pilot Project demonstrated that live telephone
callers either reminding defendants to come to court or notify-
ing them of their impending warrant status after they fail to
appear for court can have a dramatic effect on appearance
rates. The resulting Court Date Notification Program has
shown that these results can be improved and that customer
service is significantly enhanced through the use of a live caller
intervening in advance of the court event.  
The administration of justice does not normally play out in
the types of cases that dominate newspaper headlines or law-
school and criminal-justice-program curricula. More often,
justice is done in the routine, if not mundane cases at the lower
end of the system, such as misdemeanor and traffic cases—the
figurative water bills of the criminal justice system. The aggre-
gate commonality of these cases should not erode our sense of
urgency in dealing with them fairly; instead, we should see
them as opportunities to demonstrate a glimpse of justice on a
grand scale. Doing so, quite simply, is good public policy.
29. CJP Staff has estimated that in 2006 alone, the Sheriff’s Office
spent roughly $900,000 processing and housing persons arrested
on FTA warrants. CJP staff further estimated that if the program
became fully implemented throughout the First Judicial District
and reached its full potential of reducing FTA warrants by 52% (its
six-month benchmark), the Sheriff’s Office could realize a net sav-
ings of approximately $400,000 per year.    
30. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 41,
63-70. 
31. As reported by The Denver Post, the spokesperson for the
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office stated that its deputies’ “most
common arrest is for those who don’t appear in court, a needless
use of time.” Phone Roundup Helping Courts Stay Filled, THE
DENVER POST (Nov. 23, 2007), at http://www.denverpost.com/
ci_7536476?source=bb. 
[T]elephone
reminders using
live callers work.
They increase
court-appearance
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with FTAs . . . .
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It would be ideal if we knew the best ways to structure thejudicial system, the best processes to use to ensure fairnessfor litigants, and the best incentives to ensure compliance
with the law. Unfortunately, as all of us who work in or with
the system and those of us who study such issues well know,
we do not. So what should we do? 
As social scientists trained to examine the judiciary and
judicial processes from the perspectives of economics, law,
political science, psychology, and sociology, we suggest that
systematic experimentation should be used whenever feasible and
warranted to study the operations of the courts for purposes of
improving the courts’ functioning. As has been learned in the
case of medical procedures and treatments, systematic, experi-
mental, or quasi-experimental study helps to determine what
works, what does not, and why. Decades ago, in the face of
charges that experimentation in the law would undermine due
process and equal treatment, the Federal Judicial Center
rebutted these concerns, arguing that rather than thwarting
justice, experimentation in the law promotes justice, ensuring
an evidentiary basis for court reforms and administrative deci-
sion making.1 Our work operates under this approach to
examining potential judicial reforms. In this article, we discuss
our use of the methods of science2 to examine systematically
whether there might be a technique that would, without costs
that exceeded their benefits, reduce misdemeanants’ failure to
appear in court.3
It is not overly hyperbolic to assert that failure to appear
(FTA) at a scheduled court appearance4 is an epidemic problem
afflicting defendants who do not have attorneys: Some estimates
of misdemeanants who do not appear for their court hearing are
as high as one in three, depending on the jurisdiction and
offense type.5 FTAs increase resources that need to be expended
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for the Local Public Safety Coordinating Council and the CANS
Oversight Committee (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.thecourt-
brothers.com/fta_repo/cans_eval_00206_final.pdf; Matt O’Keefe,
Court Appearance Notification System: 2007 Analysis Highlights,
available at http://www2.co.multnomah.or.us/County_Management/
Budget/Budget%20Office%20Evaluation/Reports/Public%20Safety%
20Research/CANS%20Highlights.pdf; Timothy R. Schnacke,
Michael R. Jones, & Dorian M. Wilderman, Increasing Court
Appearance and Other Benefits of Live-Caller Telephone Court-Date
Reminders: The Jefferson County, Colorado, FTA Pilot Project and
Resulting Court Date Notification Program, 48 CT. REV. 86 (2012)
(this issue); WENDY F. WHITE, COURT HEARING CALL NOTIFICATION
PROJECT (May 17, 2006), available at http://www.thecourt
brothers.com/fta_repo/Coconino_County_court_hearing_
notification_project.pdf.
6. Id.
7. BARRY MAHONEY ET AL., PRETRIAL SERVICE PROGRAMS: RESPONSIBILITIES
AND POTENTIAL 39-40 (Off. Just. Programs, Nat’l Inst. Just.) (March
2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181939.pdf.
See also references in note 5, supra. See generally Court Brothers,
FTA Repository (2012), available at http://www.thecourt
brothers.com/web_court/fta_fta_repository.pl; Marie VanNostrand,
Kenneth J. Rose, & Kimberly Weibrecht, STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF
PRETRIAL RELEASE RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUPERVISION 15-20 (June
2011), available at http://pretrial.org/ Featured%20Resources%
20Documents/PJI%20State%20of%20the%20Science%20Pretrial%2
0Recommendations%20and%20Supervision%20(2011).pdf.  
It is likely some undocumented defendants fear being deported,
and this is a reason for non-appearance. However, there is no evidence
that this reason constitutes a large proportion of failures to appear.
8. E.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). See espe-
cially Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key
Ingredient in Public Satisfaction. 44 CT. REV. 4 (2007-2008) (AJA
White Paper on Procedural Fairness). See generally Procedural
Justice, 44 CT. REV. 1 (2007-08) (special issue devoted to proce-
dural justice with numerous citations to key empirical evidence
regarding procedural justice as well as public trust and confi-
dence), available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr44-1/CR44-1-
2.pdf. Public trust and confidence in the courts is closely related
to procedural justice. In fact, Tyler and others treat trust and con-
fidence as a component of procedural justice. See, e.g., TYLER,
supra note 8. See also Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts, CT.
REV., Fall 1999, at 1, available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us
/courtrv/cr36-3/CR%2036-3.pdf, and Public Trust and Confidence
in the Courts, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 197 (2001) (both special issues
devoted to public trust and confidence in the courts and include
empirical evidence and legal commentary related to the nation-
wide survey of trust and confidence in the courts conducted by
the National Center for State Courts; see NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., HOW
THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY
[1999]).
9. There even is a company that offers calling services, nationwide.
The Court Brothers, Reminder Call Service, available from
http://www.thecourtbrothers.com/web_court. The Court Brothers
calling service costs range from $0.75 to $3.00 per defendant per
appearance, depending on the services desired. Email from Chad
Columbus, The Court Brothers, to Alan J. Tomkins, Director,
University of Nebraska Public Policy Center (Oct. 19, 2012) (on
file with author). See also notes 5 & 7, supra.
10. Cost estimates for Multnomah County, OR, were $40,000 in FY
2006 and $56,000 in FY 2007. O’Keefe, supra note 5. Also, as
noted previously, id, the Court Brothers calling service can cost as
high as $2.00 per defendant. http://www.thecourt
brothers.com/web_court/pf_features.pl (features). In contrast,
another company, Tavoca, offers cheaper calling services for
physician-appointment reminders. Tavoca, available at
http://www.tavoca.com/ac_calculatecosts.asp (depending on
numbers of calls, call costs are in the 10 to 20 cents per call
range). 
for courts and law-enforcement agencies and can increase penal-
ties for defendants, including pretrial incarceration and greater
fines for what sometimes begin as minor offenses. FTAs thus are
costly to both court systems and defendants.6
Why would a defendant not appear in court? Why would a
person risk a greater penalty when charged with a relatively
minor offense? Why not simply show up and accept whatever
is going to happen given that the consequences tend to be rel-
atively minor for misdemeanors? Some commentators note
that some defendants willfully fail to appear, but they also find,
unsurprisingly, that many defendants fail to appear not only
because they fear the consequences of the legal proceedings
but also because they are unable to arrange for transportation
to court, they have other, competing responsibilities (e.g.,
work, care for child or other person), or they are disorganized,
forgetting the appointment or losing critical information (e.g.,
citation, contact, or location).7
We wondered whether there might be a discernible pattern
of defendants’ psychosocial characteristics that influence their
failure to appear in court. Tom Tyler and others have found
that positive compliance with the law is increased when peo-
ple feel like they have been subjected to fair procedures and
have high levels of trust and confidence in the legal system.8
Inspired by judicial reminder programs that have conceptual-
ized non-appearance in court as a client-management chal-
lenge similar to appearing for one’s health-care appointment,
we wondered whether the apparent success of such programs
might be explained by defendants’ perceptions of procedural
justice combined with their trust and confidence in courts. If
so, it could provide an empirical roadmap for courts to use to
increase compliance with the law.
We also saw this as an opportunity to study systematically
what effect implementing a reminder program has on defen-
dant-appearance rates. Court reminder programs have been
implemented somewhat haphazardly across the country, pri-
marily using telephone reminders.9 A call-reminder system,
however—either automated or using employees to make the
calls—can be expensive.10 Might it be as effective to use
reminder postcards as it is to use the telephone? Postcards are
relatively cheap to process and mail, and studies in other con-
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11. Cf. Eric B. Larson et al., Do Postcard Reminders Improve Influenza
Vaccination Compliance?: A Prospective Trial of Different Postcard
“Cues,” 20 MEDICAL CARE 639 (1982).
12. E.g., O’Keefe, supra note 5.
13. For an example of a more systematic benefit-cost study, see the
Jefferson, CO, FTA study conducted by Schnacke, Jones, and
Wilderman, supra note 5, at n.15.
14. This approach, using experimental methods guided by theory, is
the sine qua non of science. See e.g., Goodstein, supra note 2. 
15. The complete NIJ report of the project is available online.
BORNSTEIN, TOMKINS, & NEELEY, supra note 3. See also supra note 3
for the other peer-reviewed publications stemming from this pro-
ject. 
We benefited tremendously from the efforts of court adminis-
trators and clerks in the 14 counties where we collected data, as
well as from the support of the Nebraska Minority Justice
Committee. We thank the Clerk Magistrates from each of the 14
counties for allowing us to test this program in their counties, and
we also are grateful to the Committee for its support and assis-
tance in developing and implementing this study. We would also
like to thank staff at the Nebraska Administrative Office of the
Courts, particularly Sherri Dennis and Ross Johnson, for their
help in collecting data and for their insights.
16. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
17. Our design was thus akin to a clinical trial in a medical study, with
each postcard a level of intervention (i.e., reminder), and the no-
reminder condition serving as the comparison group.
18. We pretested the order in which we would present the informa-
tion, and these results guided our decision to place the sanctions
information first, followed by the procedural-justice information.
BORNSTEIN, TOMKINS, & NEELEY, supra note 3, at 19-20.
19. We used the practice of two different translators, with a transla-
tion from the English version to Spanish first, and then an inde-
pendent translation of the Spanish version back into English. The
process revealed an acceptable Spanish version of the postcard.
20. Because the age of majority in Nebraska is 19, we excluded any
offender younger than 19. 
21. The officer issuing the citation generally made the race/ethnicity
classification. Our data were extracted from the citation or other
information obtained from the case file. 
texts suggest they are effective.11
Although others have examined reminder programs, there
are limitations in how informative these inquiries have been for
determining impacts. Because there have been no comparison
groups, the extent of increases in appearance rates due to the
interventions were not clear, and although there have been esti-
mates of benefits,12 these estimates tend to be general rather
than passing muster of what would be expected of a high-qual-
ity, benefit-cost analysis conducted by an economist.13
In our study, we used experimental methods, guided by the-
ory14 (specifically, procedural justice and trust/confidence) to
guide our assessment of the use of postcards to reduce failure
to appear in a cost-effective manner compared to no postcards.
We also conjectured there would be a race-of-defendant effect,
with our hypothesis being the greatest impact would accrue to
minority defendants. Thus, while we understood that a one-
jurisdiction inquiry is at best simply suggestive but is not
definitive, we thought we could advance the field with our sys-
tematic research effort.
THE STUDY AND ITS RESULTS
A. METHODS
With the partnership of the Nebraska Administrative Office
of the Courts and funding from the U.S. National Institute of
Justice, we implemented a postcard-reminder study in 14
counties across Nebraska between March 2009 and May
2010.15 We hypothesized misdemeanants’ likelihood of failing
to appear would be reduced if defendants were sent a postcard
reminder of the hearing date. For all misdemeanants who met
certain criteria in these 14 counties during the study,16 we ran-
domly assigned them to receive one of three different postcard
reminders or a control condition of no reminder. One postcard
was intended to reflect elements of procedural justice, specifi-
cally addressing voice concerns, letting the defendant know a
fair and neutral fact-finder (i.e., judge) was interested in hear-
ing the defendant’s side of the story. Moreover, the judge would
treat the defendant with respect and would take the defendant’s
concerns seriously. This postcard also informed defendants of
the punishments that were possible if they failed to appear.
The other two postcards were a) simple reminders, and b)
reminders coupled with a caution that harsher punishments
were possible for those who failed to appear (but without the
procedural-justice information). Different postcard versions
were used to determine whether the postcard’s content or mes-
sage would make a difference in appearance rates, that is,
whether effects could be obtained simply by notification
(Reminder-Only Condition), whether the threat of sanctions
by itself would increase compliance (Reminder-Sanctions), or
whether a postcard that included both the sanctions informa-
tion and the elements of procedural justice (Reminder-
Combined) were key.17
We encountered a practical problem that conflicted with
our scientific desire to keep the postcard conditions as differ-
ent from one another as possible. Specifically, we would have
preferred that the postcard that included the procedural-justice
elements not also include a statement about sanctions.
However, the real-world intruded, and the courts’ personnel
we worked with asked us not to send out a postcard that
excluded the potential for greater sanctions if the defendant
failed to appear in court. The concern was that it might be mis-
leading, and unfair, not to mention the potential of harsher
penalties. Consequently, the Reminder-Combined postcard
also included the same language about sanctions as the
Reminder-Sanctions postcard.18
Because of a substantial proportion of Spanish-speaking res-
idents in Nebraska, the postcard content was provided in both
Spanish and English in all conditions.19 Thus, there was a no-
reminder (control) condition or one of three different post-
cards. The postcard versions are presented in Figure 1.
The participants in our study were 7,865 defendants (19
and older)20 issued a non-traffic ticket by law-enforcement
officials instructing them to appear in court for an initial hear-
ing on their non-waiverable, misdemeanor offense. The
race/ethnic distribution was 69.8% White, 10.7% Hispanic;
10.1% Black, 6.6% Unknown; 1.6% Native American; 1%
Asian American; and .2% Other.21
On a daily basis during the workweek, researchers reviewed
the database of cases uploaded by the 14 trial courts to the
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REMINDER-ONLY
REMINDER-SANCTIONS
Dear XXXX XXXX:
This notice is to remind you that you have a hearing scheduled at the XXXX County
Courthouse at 1:30 PM on 12/11/2009.
Estimado(a) XXXX XXXX:
Este aviso es para recordarie que tiene una audiencia programada en la Corte del
Condado de XXXX a las 1:30 PM en el dia 12/11/2009.
Case ID: C X CR X XXXX
If you have questions about this postcard, please call: (XXX) XXX-XXXX
If you have questions about this postcard, please call: (XXX) XXX-XXXX
Case ID: C X CR X XXXX
Dear XXXX XXXX:
This notice is to remind you that you
have a hearing scheduled at the XXXX
County Courthouse at 1:30 PM on
5/1/2009.
Failure to appear for this hearing may
result in a number of negative conse-
quences, including:
• You may be charged with the addi-
tional crime of failure to appear, which
is a Class II misdemeanor.
• You may receive up to six months in
jail and/or a $1,000 fine for this addi-
tional charge.
• A warrant may be issued for your
arrest.
• It may be harder to get bail in the
future.
• Even if you are not formally charged
with a failure to appear, failing to
appear may be considered by the
judge in determining your sentence on
the original misdemeanor charge.
We strongly encourage you to not miss
your hearing on the date and time listed
above!
Estimado(a) XXXX XXXX:
Este aviso es para recordarie que tiene
una audiencia programada en la Corte
del Condado de XXXX a las 1:30 PM en
el día 5/1/2009.
El no presentarse para esta audiencia
puede traer como resultado un número
de consecuencias negativas, que
incluyen:
• Ud. puede ser acusado de un deito adi-
cional por faltar a comparecer, que es
un deito menor, Clase II.
• Ud. puede recibir hasta sies meses en
la cárcel y/o una multa de $1,000 por
este cargo adicional.
• Una orden judicial puede ser expedida
para su arresto.
• Puede ser más difícil calificar para una
fianza en el futuro.
• Aunque no sea acusado formalmente
por falter a comparecer, el faltar a
comparecer puede ser considerado por
el juez en la determinación do su pena
por el delito menor original.
¡Le advertimos enérgicamente que no
faltes a comparecer en la fecha y el
tiempo descrito arriba y que no deje de
presentarse!
REMINDER-COMBINED
Dear XXXX XXXX:
This notice is to remind you that you
have a hearing scheduled at the XXXX
County Courthouse at 1:30 PM on
5/1/2009.
Failure to appear for this hearing may
result in a number of negative conse-
quences, including:
• You may be charged with the addi-
tional crime of failure to appear, which
is a Class II misdemeanor.
• You may receive up to six months in
jail and/or a $1,000 fine for this addi-
tional charge.
• A warrant may be issued for your
arrest.
• It may be harder to get bail in the
future.
• Even if you are not formally charged
with a failure to appear, failing to
appear may be considered by the
judge in determining your sentence on
the original misdemeanor charge.
This Court aims to serve the best inter-
ests of both you and the public by:
• Providing neutral and consistent judge-
ments to all defendants. The judge
who presides over your hearing will be
fair and open-minded.
• Treating all defendants charged with
the same kind of offense in the same
way.
• Treating all defendants politely, with
courtesy, dignity and respect.
• Taking defendants' concerns seriously.
We understand that you might be wor-
ried about the hearing and its conse-
quences, and we are prepared to listen
to your concerns and offer explana-
tions as best we can. 
• Allowing defendants to explain the sit-
uation from their perspective.
We strongly encourage you to not miss
your hearing on the date and time listed
above, and to be sure to appear for it!
Estimado(a) XXXX XXXX:
Este aviso es para recordarie que tiene
una audiencia programada en la Corte
del Condado de XXXX a las 1:30 PM en
el día 5/1/2009.
El no presentarse para esta audiencia
puede traer como resultado un número
de consecuencias negativas, que
incluyen:
• Ud. puede ser acusado de un deito adi-
cional por faltar a comparecer, que es
un deito menor, Clase II.
• Ud. puede recibir hasta sies meses en
la cárcel y/o una multa de $1,000 por
este cargo adicional.
• Una orden judicial puede ser expedida
para su arresto.
• Puede ser más difícil calificar para una
fianza en el futuro.
• Aunque no sea acusado formalmente
por falter a comparecer, el faltar a
comparecer puede ser considerado por
el juez en la determinación do su pena
por el delito menor original.
Esta Corte tiene la meta de servir mejor
a los intereses de Usted y del público al:
• Emitir fallos neutrales y contundentes
para todos los acusados. El juez que
preside sobre su audiencia será justo y
de actitud abierta.
• Tratar a todos los acusados con iqual
justicia.
• Tratar a todos los acusodos con buenos
modales, con cortesía, dignidad, y
respeto.
• Tomar seriamente en cuenta las pre-
ocupaciones do los acusados.
Entendemos que Ud. pueda estar pre-
ocupado sobre la audiencea y sus con-
secuencias, y estamos preparados para
escuchar sus preocupaciones y para
ofrecerle la mejor explicación que
podamos.
• Permitir a los acusados explicar la
stiuación desde su perspectiva o punto
de vista.
¡Le advertimos enérgicamente que no
faltes a comparecer en la fecha y el
tiempo descrito arriba y que no deje de
presentarse!
If you have questions about this postcard, please call: (XXX) XXX-XXXX
Case ID: C X CR X XXXX
FIGURE 1
POSTCARD REMINDER CONDITIONS
22. Bornstein et al., supra note 3, at 5. 
23. These and the other data tables and figures are taken or adapted
from the three, primary publications from the project. For exam-
ple, Table 1 is taken from BORNSTEIN, TOMKINS, & NEELEY, supra
note 3, at 14, Table 1; Table 2 is taken from Bornstein et al. supra
note 3, at 9, Table 2. See also Rosenbaum et al., supra note 3, at
180, Table 1 (same data but presents the information for each of
the postcard combinations, not limited to experimental condi-
tions as we have presented in the table here). Similarly, the statis-
tical tests we report beginning with note 24 infra are also taken
from these other publications, but are not hereinafter cross-refer-
enced.
24. This is a comparatively lower rate than reported in other jurisdic-
tions. 
25. The omnibus test showed the four conditions were different from
one another. Χ2(3) = 20.90, p < .001, φ = .05. Additional (i.e., post
hoc) analyses pinpointed the differences were between the
reminders (taken together) versus no reminder (control condi-
tion). Χ2(1) = 14.29, p = .001, φ = .04. For background informa-
tion on the use of statistics, intended for legal audiences, see
ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT, & THOMAS S. ULEN,
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW (2009). 
26. Χ2(1) = 4.63, p = .031, φ = .03. 
27. Χ2(1) = 2.60, p = .11, φ = .03.
28. E.g., TYLER, supra note 8. 
Nebraska Administrative Office of the Courts. As we explained
in one of our earlier articles:
All of the misdemeanor categories provided for by
state statute were represented in the sample, with most
coming from the relatively severe categories. For exam-
ple, 30.5% of defendants were charged with an alcohol-
related misdemeanor (e.g., first offense driving-under-
the-influence charge) and an additional 31.0% were
charged with violations of city ordinances (e.g., injuring
or destroying property). Roughly one-sixth (17.6%)
were charged with a Class 1 misdemeanor (e.g., carrying
a concealed weapon, first offense; failing to stop and
render aid), with the remainder charged with a Class 2
(9.3%; e.g., shoplifting $0-$200) or Class 3 misde-
meanor (11.2%; e.g., minor in possession of alcohol).
Four individuals were charged with a Class 3A misde-
meanor (0.1%; e.g., possession of marijuana, third
offense); 21 were charged with a Class 4 misdemeanor
(0.3%; e.g., possession of marijuana, second offense);
and five were charged with a Class 5 misdemeanor
(0.1%; e.g., unlawful entry of state park without a park
permit).22
Once we determined the offense was non-waiverable, and
there was sufficient time to send out a postcard at least five
days before the scheduled court date, the defendant was
included in the study. We then randomly assigned defendants
to one of the four experimental conditions: the control condi-
tion or one of the three postcard conditions. 
B. RESULTS
1. Failure-to-Appear Rates: Impact of Reminder
Conditions
As shown in Table 1,23 the baseline (control) FTA rate in
our sample was 12.6%.24 The data revealed postcard reminders
significantly reduced FTA rates.25 The specific amounts of
reduction varied, dropping to about 11% FTA rate for the
Reminder-Only postcards, about 10% for Reminder-Combined
postcards, and about 8% for the Reminder-Sanctions postcards.
The two reminders that included substantive information
(sanctions or sanctions plus procedural justice) resulted in
greater, statistically significant reductions than the simple
reminder postcard.26 There was no statistical difference
between the two substantive postcards.27 Thus, the critical
finding from our extensive study is that while a postcard
reminder has an effect overall, there likely is an even greater
impact if the postcard contains substantive language beyond
the reminder of the court date.  
2. Other Factors that Predict FTA: Race/Ethnicity, Sex,
Rural vs. Urban Jurisdiction, and Nature/Number of
Offense(s)
In light of previous work that indicated a relationship
between trust/confidence and compliance with the law,28 we
hypothesized there would be a race/ethnicity impact, specifi-
cally, that Non-Whites would have higher baseline FTA rates
than Whites. We did not anticipate there would be a sex dif-
ference. We wondered whether there would be a difference for
rural versus urban defendants, hypothesizing that there would
be a greater FTA rate for urban defendants. Finally, we exam-
ined whether FTA rates differed significantly depending on the
severity of offense and/or on the number of offenses charged
(one versus two or more). We were not aware of literature that
would lead us to make a prediction one way or the other
regarding offenses, but our belief was that offense would be an
important factor to measure.
The overall FTA rate (all conditions combined) varied as a
function of the defendant’s race/ethnicity, with greater FTA
rates for Black defendants (16.4%) than Whites (9.5%) or
Hispanics (9.4%). The control condition (no postcard)
revealed the baseline FTA rates likely started differently: Nearly
19% for Blacks versus approximately 12% for Whites and
10.5% for Hispanics (Table 2). Although it may appear as if
there is a substantial race/ethnicity effect, our statistical analy-
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TABLE 1
FAILURE-TO-APPEAR RATE BY EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION
Reminder Postcard
Treatment
Appeared For Court
Total
No Yes
Control 12.6% 87.4% 2,095
Reminder-Only 10.9% 89.1% 1,889
Reminder-Sanctions 8.3% 91.7% 1,901
Reminder-Combined 9.8% 90.2% 1,980
Total 10.4% 89.6% 7,865
29. The statistical analysis appropriate for this determination is a
regression analysis. B = -.09, S.E. = .09, p = .32, Exp(b) = .91,
Exp(b) CI (.77-1.09). We did find that the Reminder-Sanctions
postcard had the greatest absolute impact upon reducing FTA
rates for Hispanic defendants, as the FTA rate was reduced to 4.7%
from 10.5% in the control condition, Χ2(1) = 4.94, p < .026, φ =
.11. For Black defendants, the decrease from 18.7% to 13.5% was
not statistically significant, though it would have been significant
had there been a larger number of Black defendants in the sample.
For more detailed information and additional race-related analy-
ses, see BORNSTEIN, TOMKINS, & NEELEY, supra note 3, at 16-18, 21-
23; Bornstein et al., supra note 3, at 9-14.
30. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
31. B = -.10, S.E. = .09, p = .29, Exp(b) = .91, Exp(b) CI (.76-1.09).
32. B = .40, S.E. = .11, p < .001, Exp(b) = 1.50, Exp(b) CI (1.21-1.86).  
33. B = -.18, S.E. = .03, p < .001, Exp(b) = .83, Exp(b) CI (.79-.88).
34. Only 5.4% of defendants with one offense failed to appear,
whereas 15.4% of individuals with two or more offenses failed to
appear. B = -1.28, S.E. = .10, p < .001, Exp(b) = .28, Exp(b) CI
(.23-.34).
sis indicated there was not, when we used a statistical test con-
trolling for other factors,29 such as offense type and number of
offenses.30 Sex also did not reveal a statistically significant dif-
ference, although the FTA rate for male defendants was slightly
greater than for female defendants (10.8% vs. 9.4%).31 As
expected, the FTA rate was greater in urban jurisdictions than
in rural counties (12.4% vs. 6.8%) (Table 3).32 We found a
strong effect for the offense variables: Offense type signifi-
cantly influenced FTA rates (Table 4),33 as did the number of
offenses charged (Table 5).34 Thus, offenses in general, and
specifically the number of offenses, are the strongest predictors of
FTA we found in our study.
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TABLE 3
FAILURE-TO-APPEAR RATE BY COUNTY 
AND URBAN/RURAL AREAS
County
Baseline Appearance Rate Overall Appearance Rate
Appeared for Court Appeared for Court
No Yes n No Yes n
Adams 33.3% 66.7% 3 33.3% 66.7% 6
Buffalo 3.4% 96.6% 59 1.8% 98.2% 225
Colfax 50.0% 50.0% 4 19% 81.0% 21
Dakota 8.8% 91.2% 57 10.0% 90.0% 211
Dawson 9.5% 90.5% 84 6.1% 93.9% 314
Dodge 2.7% 97.3% 37 5.4% 94.6% 149
Douglas 10.6% 89.4% 264 8.2% 91.8% 1,027
Hall 10.8% 89.2% 222 7.8% 92.2% 781
Lancaster 17.8% 82.2% 828 14.8% 85.2% 3,185
Madison 6.8% 93.2% 73 4.8% 95.2% 289
Platte 8.3% 91.7% 157 7.1% 92.9% 506
Saline 9.3% 90.7% 43 12.3% 87.7% 154
Sarpy 10.2% 89.8% 236 8.6% 91.4% 864
Scotts
Bluff 0.0% 100% 28 2.3% 97.7% 133
Urban
(Douglas,
Lancaster,
Sarpy)
15.0% 85.0% 1,328 12.4% 87.6% 5,076
Rural 8.5% 91.5% 767 6.8% 93.2% 2,789
Total 87.4% 2,095 89.6% 7,865
TABLE 5
FAILURE-TO-APPEAR RATE BY NUMBER OF OFFENSES
Offense
Type
Baseline Appearance Rate Overall Appearance Rate
Appeared for Court Appeared for Court
No Yes n No Yes n
1 Offense 6.7% 93.3% 1,012 5.4% 94.6% 3,868
2 or More
Offenses 18.2% 81.8% 1,067 15.4% 84.6% 3,962
Total 12.6% 87.4% 2,088 10.4% 89.6.% 7,830
TABLE 2
FAILURE-TO-APPEAR RATE BY RACE/ETHNICITY
Reminder Postcard
Treatment
FTA Rates
Total
Whites Blacks Hispanics
Control 11.7% 18.7% 10.5% 12.6%
Simple-Reminder 9.6% 18.8% 11.8% 11.0%
Reminder-Sanctions 8.0% 13.5% 4.7% 8.1%
Reminder-Combined 8.8% 13.6% 10.1% 9.5%
Total 9.5% 16.4% 9.4% 10.3%
TABLE 4
FAILURE-TO-APPEAR RATE BY OFFENSE TYPE
All 
Conditions Control
Reminder- 
Only
Reminder- 
Sanctions
Reminder- 
Combined
Offense 
Type
FTA 
Rate
n
FTA 
Rate
n
FTA 
Rate
n
FTA 
Rate
n
FTA 
Rate
n
Class 1 7.6% 1,377 7.3% 358 8.2% 365 7.0% 330 8.0% 324
Class W 
(alcohol) 9.4% 2,389 9.7% 628 11.1% 96 7.2% 567 9.4% 598
Class 2 13.8% 732 18.9% 212 11.7% 145 10.5% 191 13.0% 184
Class 3/
3A/4/5 8.4% 908 10.2% 254 8.5% 213 6.8% 220 7.7% 2,212
City 
Ordinance 12.9% 2,424 17.5% 636 13.2% 560 10.1% 587 10.6% 641
35. We sent the defendants a pre-notification that we would be send-
ing them a survey one week after the hearing date. Two weeks
later, the defendants were sent a survey accompanied by a $2 bill
as a token of appreciation. Replacement surveys were mailed two
weeks later. Each of these steps are in accordance with suggested
best practices to increase responsiveness to survey requests. DON
A. DILLMAN, JOLENE D. SMYTH, & LEAH MELANI CHRISTIAN,
INTERNET, MAIL AND MIXED-MODE SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN
METHOD (3d ed. 2008). 
36. For more details about the sample, including differences in
responses rates across race/ethnicity (proportionally more Whites
responded), offense types (defendants with certain misdemeanors
were more likely to respond), and age (older defendants more
likely to respond), as well as lack of sample differences (residing
in urban versus rural county, number of offenses, reminder con-
dition), see BORNSTEIN, TOMKINS, & NEELEY, supra note 3, at 10-11.
37. For complete details regarding the items we used and scales we
created, see BORNSTEIN, TOMKINS, & NEELEY, supra note 3, at 19-23;
Bornstein et al., supra note 3, at 11-12.
38. M =3.53 versus 3.23, F(1,438) = 6.61, p = .01, ηp2 = .02. 
39. M =3.24 versus 3.02, F(1,445) = 7.82, p = .005, ηp2 = .02.
40. M = 3.30 versus 3.04, F(1,441) = 7.78, p = .006, ηp2 = .02.
41. M =3.48 versus 3.20, F(1,444) = 5.984, p = .015, ηp2 = .01.   
42. See BORNSTEIN, TOMKINS, & NEELEY, supra note 3, at 19-21.
43. E.g., Richard R. W. Brooks & Haekyung Jeon-Slaughter, Race,
Income and Perceptions of the U.S. Court System, 19 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 249 (2001); David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust
and Confidence in the Courts: What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to
Judges, CT. REV., Fall 1999, at 24; Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and
Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority
Group Members Want From the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 213 (2001). See generally NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS.,
supra note 8 (nationwide survey of public trust and confidence in
the courts, sufficiently large to allow breakdown of the data by
race/ethnicity).
44. F(2,401)=9.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .04, Whites greater than both
Blacks and Hispanics.
3. Procedural-Justice and Trust/Confidence Perceptions
To reiterate, in the main part of our FTA study, we did not
find that a postcard containing procedural-justice language
(that also included an admonition about potential sanctions, as
discussed previously) had the anticipated, beneficial impact,
over and above merely mentioning sanctions. It might be the
case, however, that because we were not able to single out pro-
cedural-justice elements in the postcard communication, we
missed its potential added value. Or it might be that we did not
adequately communicate critical procedural-justice elements
in a meaningful way to defendants. Although we are unable to
determine such limitations of this study, we were able to con-
duct a follow-up inquiry that allowed us to inquire further into
the potential impact of perceptions of procedural justice, as
well as trust and confidence perceptions.
In our follow-up inquiry, we sent a survey that included
questions about procedural-justice and trust/confidence per-
ceptions to all 819 of the misdemeanants who did not appear
for their hearing and to 20% (1,538 randomly selected) of
those who appeared.35 For the survey part of the study, 77.6%
of the survey respondents were White, 7.8% Black, and 5.7%
Hispanic. 
The 19.2% (452) overall response rate was 21.6% (335) for
participants who appeared in court and 14.5% (117) for those
who failed to appear.36 The survey items for defendants who
did not appear included questions about fairness, bias, and
respect generally related to the judicial system. We also asked
the defendants who appeared for their hearing additional ques-
tions about the procedural-justice subconstructs of fairness,
voice, dignity, and respect.37
We had hypothesized that those defendants who appeared
for their hearing would have greater levels of perceived proce-
dural justice and be more likely to indicate higher levels of
trust and confidence in the courts. The data confirmed our
procedural-justice hypotheses, such that defendants who
appeared for their hearing rated levels of procedural justice in
their overall experience with the criminal justice system
(General Procedural Justice scale) higher than those who did
not appear.38
Our findings also provided quite a bit of support for the
hypothesized impact of trust and confidence. Those defen-
dants who appeared in court had significantly greater confi-
dence scores (Total Institutional Confidence scale)39 and trust
scores (Trust in the Courts scale)40 than those who did not. We
also found that defendants who did not appear were more cyn-
ical than those who appeared.41 Of further interest is the fact
that we found high correlations between our measures of pro-
cedural justice and trust/confidence.42
Based on an extensive literature indicating that Blacks, in
particular, have less trust and confidence in the courts than
other groups in the U.S., especially Whites,43 we had hypothe-
sized that there would be significant race/ethnicity differences.
As shown in Table 6, our results revealed significant differ-
ences for dispositional trust44 and on the two trust scales, Total
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TABLE 6
TRUST/CONFIDENCE AND PROCEDURAL-JUSTICE 
SCALE MEANS BY RACE/ETHNICITY
Whites Blacks Hispanic
Scale Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F Sig.
Trust in 
the Courts 3.26
a 0.84 2.79b 0.91 3.24a,b 0.87 4.34 .014
Total 
Institutional
Confidence
3.20a 0.70 2.84b 0.81 3.15a,b 0.66 3.71 .025
Dispositional 
Trust 2.90
a 0.80 2.34b 1.02 2.44b 0.89 9.20 .000
General 
Procedural
Justice
3.35 1.04 3.13 1.31 2.99 0.98 0.23 .795
Specific 
Procedural
Justice
3.47 1.04 3.38 1.13 3.35 1.03 1.34 .264
Note. Within a row, means with different superscripts are significantly 
different, p < .05.
Institutional Confidence45 and Trust in the Courts.46 We tested
for, but did not find, a race effect for procedural justice.
We also tested for a more complicated relationship between
those lower in trust and the impact of a postcard reminder.47 It
was the case that higher levels of trust in the courts were asso-
ciated with a greater probability of appearing.48 Yet the
reminder made a difference, significantly reducing the FTA
rate for those in our sample with the lowest trust (but not for
the medium- or high-trust categories—see Figure 2). Put
another way, the reminder eliminated differences in FTA rates
as a function of degree of trust in the courts.
Finally, we asked the defendants for the reasons they did or
did not appear. The primary reasons for appearing were to
avoid additional sanctions (an FTA offense, additional penal-
ties) or because of a feeling that the law should be obeyed. For
those defendants who did not appear, scheduling issues and
work conflicts were rated as the primary reasons for non-
appearance, followed by transportation issues. Overall, how-
ever, those defendants who did not appear indicated they were
influenced less by the reasons they gave for not appearing than
those who appeared. 
4. Benefit-Cost Analysis49
We conducted an analysis of the benefits associated with the
postcard reminders, compared to the costs, at the county
level.50 Benefits were estimated by determining the labor cost
avoided by not having to detain, at a subsequent date, those
defendants who had failed to appear. County-specific FTA-cost
estimates were developed for the largest urban counties since
they have the most misdemeanor, non-traffic offenses each
year and are the three most-populous counties in Nebraska. In
County A, law enforcement estimated that approximately 70%
of FTA bench warrants were resolved through arrest. In
County B, a judge and a law-enforcement official indepen-
dently estimated the percentage of FTA bench warrants
resulted in arrest at 30% and 50%, respectively. An average of
these two estimates, 40%, was used in County B’s per-unit
arraignment, FTA-cost estimate. County C law enforcement
estimated that at least 50% of FTA bench warrants resulted in
arrests.
Table 8 indicates the annual and hourly salary costs of labor
in Nebraska as derived from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.51 Table 9 presents the range of costs associated with
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45. F(2,402) = 3.71, p = .025, ηp2 = .02. Additional statistical analyses
showed the significant difference was driven by the gap between
Whites and Blacks rather than differences between Whites and
Hispanics or between Blacks and Hispanics.
46. F(2,398) = 4.34, p = .014, ηp2 = .02. Additional statistical analyses
showed the significant difference was driven by the gap between
Whites and Blacks rather than differences between Whites and
Hispanics or between Blacks and Hispanics.
47. We used a binary logistic regression. As explained in greater detail
elsewhere, we dichotomized the reminder variable (i.e., any
reminder vs. none), turned trust in the courts into a categorical
variable (i.e., low, medium, or high), and controlled for race.
BORNSTEIN, TOMKINS, & NEELEY, supra note 3, at 21-24; Bornstein
et al., supra note 3, at 12-13.
48. B = 0.79, p = .008, Exp(b) = 2.21, Exp(b) CI (1.23-3.94).
49. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 3, for the complete benefit-cost
analysis, including more detailed explanations of the assumptions
and methodologies employed. 
50. Although it is the case that benefits and costs accrue to both the
county and the state, using the county as the level of analysis was
deemed most appropriate given that the county is the unit of gov-
ernment where the costs and benefits primarily and directly
accrue.
51. U.S. Dep’t Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational
Employment Statistics, available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/2008
/may/chartbook.htm#organization. 
FIGURE 2
FTA RATES AS A FUNCTION OF TRUST IN THE COURTS
AND REMINDER TREATMENT
TABLE 7
REASONS FOR APPEARANCE/NON-APPEARANCE
REASON FOR APPEARANCE MEAN STD. DEV.
I wanted to avoid an additional offense (for failure to
appear) on my record.
4.60 1.02
I wanted to avoid additional penalties. 4.59 .98
I felt I should obey the law. 4.38 1.05
The system depends on compliance from people like me. 3.73 1.37
I wanted to tell my side of the story. 3.16 1.62
REASON FOR NON-APPEARANCE MEAN STD. DEV.
I had scheduling conflicts. 2.77 1.81
I had work conflicts. 2.39 1.66
I had transportation difficulty. 2.07 1.59
I forgot about the hearing date. 1.89 1.50
I had family conflicts (e.g., childcare conflicts). 1.84 1.44
I was afraid of what the outcome would be if I went to
court.
1.72 1.20
Note. The scale ranged from 1 (affected not at all) to 5 (affected very
much). Ns ranged from 317-325 for appearers, and from 109-113 for non-
appearers.
52. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 3, at 180-182 and summarized at
181, Fig. 2.
53. Id. at 183. 
54. The Reminder-Only postcard cost $0.27 in postage, whereas the
postage cost for the other two was $0.49 each.
55. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 3, at 184-186.
56. To preserve the confidentiality of the jurisdictions involved, we
have not specifically identified the three counties.
an FTA. Although there are variations in costs across counties,
the procedures used in the wake of a defendant’s failure to
appear are similar across counties.52 Likewise, although there
are some labor cost differences across counties, we used con-
stant labor-cost estimates for all the counties in the study.
There were differences across counties in the likelihood of an
FTA incident; thus, we adjusted the expected benefit of one
FTA reduction for each county for the benefit-cost analysis. As
we described elsewhere:
As a proxy for jail utilization in all three counties,
each arrested defendant who does not post bond spends
an estimated .75 jail days waiting for arraignment. The
figure for the value of estimated jail utilization for each
arraignment FTA is thus the county FTA arrest percent-
age multiplied by the percentage that do not post bond
multiplied by 0.75. The three largest counties are similar
in that bench warrants are issued when defendants fail to
appear for arraignment. In the cost estimates of all three
counties, the estimated rate of unresolved warrants used
is five percent. These figures are conservative estimates
based on interviews with county officials.53
As Table 9 shows, the savings from each reduction in a fail-
ure to appear ranges between $49.91 and $80.10 across the
three counties.
We also determined cost estimates for the entire reminder
process. Using an estimate of 335 labor hours for the reminder-
postcard process (including identifying cases, addressing the
postcards, and then printing and mailing them), we came up
with a labor cost of $1.15 per postcard. Costs for each of the
postcards, however, were estimated independently because
they had differential impacts on FTA-reduction rates, and
because there were different postage costs associated with
mailing the two postcards with substantive content.54 A cost
estimate of $1.46 was determined for the Reminder-Only post-
card and $1.68 for the Reminder-Sanctions and Reminder-
Combined postcards, with a weighted-average cost per post-
card of $1.61 (Table 10). We also estimated that if the identifi-
cation of cases was automated rather than manualized as in our
project, the costs would decrease to $.69 for the Reminder-
Only postcard and $.91 for the other two postcards, with a
weighted-average cost of $.84 per postcard.55
Given that not all postcards were deliverable and that there
was not a one-to-one correspondence between postcards
mailed and reductions in failures to appear, the cost of each
failure to appear in terms of postcards mailed was determined.
These costs were $55.81 for the combined Reminder-Sanctions
and Reminder-Combined postcards and $97.99 for Reminder-
Only postcards. The difference was driven by 1) the different
effectiveness of each treatment in reducing FTA rates, and 2)
the different costs in mailing the varying types of postcards.
The next step in the benefit-cost assessment was to assess the
benefit of an FTA reduction relative to its cost, which effec-
tively determines the net benefit of postcard reminders; that is,
the benefit of a one-unit reduction in FTA minus the cost of a
one-unit reduction under the different postcard options, calcu-
lated on a per-unit and aggregate basis. Table 11 shows that the
net benefit of an FTA reduction for three of the counties56 dif-
fers as a function of which postcard is used. It also changes
depending on whether automation can be used. Thus, if
automation were used, the net benefit from using the
Reminder-Sanctions and Reminder-Combined postcards is $50
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TABLE 8
ANNUAL AND HOURLY SALARY COSTS 2008
POSITION
NEBRASKA MEAN
ANNUAL SALARY
NEBRASKA MEAN
HOURLY COST
Judge $125,349 $60.26
Law Clerk $32,630 $15.69
Court Clerk $32,140 $15.45
Patrol Officer $44,020 $21.16
TABLE 10
AVERAGE COST PER POSTCARD
TYPE OF POSTCARD
REMINDER- 
ONLY
REMINDER-SANCTION &
REMINDER-COMBINED
WEIGHTED 
AVERAGE
Labor $1.15 $1.15 $1.15
Materials $0.04 $0.04 $0.04
Postage $0.27 $0.49 $0.42
Total $1.46 $1.68 $1.61
TABLE 9
SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL LABOR-COST SAVINGS FROM
ONE FTA REDUCTION ACROSS THREE COUNTIES
EVENT MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Type of Warrant Issued: – –
Bench Warrant $15.49 $15.49
Arrest Warrant $14.78 $14.78
FTA Charge Added $1.05 $3.20
Clearing Warrant from System $4.70 $4.70
Arrest for Outstanding Warrant
and Booking Processing
$18.51 $32.40
Bond Processing $2.50 $2.86
Jail (Cost/Inmate for 24 hrs) $60.00 $85.00
Total Cost $49.41 $80.10
57. There were 18,581 offenses, of which 6,149 were non-waiverable.
58. Our approach was similar to the approach taken in Jefferson
County, where different variations were assessed, systematically
and using random assignment to conditions. Schnacke, Jones, &
Wilderman, supra note 5.
per FTA reduction in County A, almost $30 in County C, and
nearly $20 in County B.
The aggregate benefit, of course, varies as a function of case
numbers and case types. In Table 12, using numbers of misde-
meanor offenses in 2009 for each of the focus counties, we esti-
mate the number of citations eligible to receive postcard
reminders,57 and the benefits that would be accrued from the
positive impacts of the Reminder-Sanctions and Reminder-
Combined postcards. Without automation, the benefits range
from 228 fewer FTAs at an aggregate net benefit of $5,537 in
County A to 87 fewer FTAs at a net cost of $516 in County C.
With automation, the benefits from reductions in FTAs
increase to over $11,000 in County A and generate a positive,
net benefit of $1,715 in County B.  
III. CONCLUSIONS 
In this experimental study, we asked whether postcard
reminders would decrease failure-to-appear rates for misde-
meanants in Nebraska, and if so, what would be their cost-
effectiveness. We found that postcard reminders did, indeed,
reduce failure-to-appear rates. Based on procedural-justice and
trust/confidence theories, we predicted that failure-to-appear
rates would decrease for all defendants if they were reminded
of the court-hearing date and time using language that
included components of procedural justice. Although postcard
reminders did decrease FTA significantly, the postcard with the
procedural-justice information did not differentially decrease
FTA rates compared to the postcard with only sanctions infor-
mation. The two substantive reminder postcards, however,
were generally superior to the simple reminder postcard. FTA
rates also varied as a function of geography (urban versus
rural) and the nature and number of the offenses.
We also had predicted, consistent with theories of the
impacts of procedural justice and trust and confidence, that
procedural-justice and trust/confidence perceptions would be
related to failure to appear. Our data revealed some support for
procedural justice and even greater support for trust and con-
fidence, in that defendants scoring higher on these constructs
were more likely to appear. We also found effects for race/eth-
nicity related to trust/confidence perceptions. 
Our more elaborate benefit-cost analysis allowed us to learn
that while postcards were cost-effective overall, they were not
so in all cases. Moreover, projections indicated that more ben-
efits would accrue if the reminder process could be automated. 
Thus, our experimental approach to examining a court
reform allowed us to obtain specific insights into what worked,
what the circumstances were for what worked versus what did
not, and why things worked. Moreover, by conducting an
actual benefit-cost analysis, we were able to show more pre-
cisely what costs versus benefits were associated with the
reforms. This approach to assessing potential administrative
changes to court procedures provides insights that allow for
more strategic decision making than simply implementing a
reform and/or globally projecting cost-savings.58 In fiscally
challenging times, it is worthwhile to know whether incurring
the costs for more expensive interventions such as phone calls
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TABLE 11
NET BENEFIT OF A 1-UNIT FTA REDUCTION
COSTS TO PREVENT ONE FTA WITHOUT AUTOMATION COSTS TO PREVENT ONE FTA WITH AUTOMATION
COUNTY
Benefit from
Preventing One FTA
Reminder  Only
Reminder Sanctions &
Reminder Combined
All 3 Weighted Reminder  Only
Reminder Sanctions &
Reminder Combined
All 3 Postcards Weighted
$97.99 $55.81 $64.08 $46.39 $30.28 $33.49
A $80.10 ($17.89) $24.29 $16.02 $33.71 $49.82 $46.61
B $49.91 ($48.08) ($5.90) ($14.17) $3.51 $19.63 $16.42
C $58.72 ($39.27) $2.91 ($5.36) $12.33 $28.44 $25.23
TABLE 12
AGGREGATE IMPACT OF POSTCARD-REMINDER SYSTEM
COUNTY
2009 Misdemeanor 
Non-Traffic Offenses*
Estimated Non-Waiverable
Offenses (33%)
Estimated FTA Reduction 
with Rem. Sanctions & 
Rem. Combined (3.5%)
Aggregate Net Benefit
Without Automation
Aggregate Net Benefit 
With Automation
C 33,884 11,182 336 $977 $9,556
A 22,991 7,587 228 $5,537 $11,358
B 8,810 2,907 87 ($516) $1,715
3 County Total 65,685 21,676 651 $5,999 $22,628
* Nebraska Judicial Branch, 2009 Annual Caseload Report, available at http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov/sites/supremecourt.ne.gov/files/reports/courts/
cc-caseload-09.pdf.
59. Other options exist besides calling defendants or mailing them
postcard reminders. For example, Nebraska’s 11th judicial dis-
trict, in collaboration with the National Center for State Courts, is
currently piloting whether text-message reminders for proba-
tion/restitution payments will increase compliance with court-
ordered payments. This same free text-messaging technology,
which uses the Administrative Office’s database, could be used to
implement court reminders. 
60. It certainly makes sense to avoid unnecessary incarcerations, so
the practice of citing defendants for misdemeanors and expecting
them to appear is good policy. See, e.g., http://www.pretrial.org/
(arguing for pretrial practices that assure safety without compris-
ing defendants’ liberty interests).
61. We realize we are preaching to the choir: Members of the
American Judges Association have long used experimental tech-
niques to assess court reforms. See, e.g., Deborah A. Eckberg &
Marcy R. Podkopacz, Family Court Fairness Study (Fourth Jud.
District Res. Division, Hennepin Co., MN) (2004), available at
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/4/Public/Research/Family_
Court_Fairness_Report_Final_(2004).pdf (past-AJA President
Kevin Burke’s court’s experimental study of the use of messaging
decisions to defendants, based on procedural-justice principles, as
part of domestic-violence case). 
makes sense when automated postcards might bring more
bang for the buck.59
There might be a range of solutions that could be used to
increase court appearances for misdemeanants.60 In the end,
research in general, and experimentation in particular, along
with systematic evaluation, should guide court reforms and
help identify justice policies and practices that protect public
safety without incurring unnecessary costs.61
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NEW BOOKS
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT:  WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
GO WRONG. Harvard University Press,
2011. ($18.95 paperback; $39.95 hard-
cover).
Surely no judge wants to have an inno-
cent person convicted of a crime he or she
didn’t commit. Yet with so many criminal
cases being tried, any judge who thinks
about it knows there must be some errors
along the way. After all, no human process
has a 0% error rate. The fact that there
must be some errors can become just an
understood background concept for an
experienced judge.
But the advent of DNA exonerations
has turned this abstract understanding
into a concrete fact. And University of
Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett has
carefully studied the first 250 DNA-exon-
eration cases to see what went wrong.
Every judge who handles criminal cases or
cares about our justice system should read
the book. (And, yes, we do hope that this
description covers all judges.)
In three-fourths of the cases, there was
at least one eyewitness who testified and at
least some forensic evidence. In one-fifth
there was an informant and in 16% a con-
fession. Yet all of these are proven exoner-
ation cases. Garrett reviews ways in which
eyewitness testimony was flawed, how
false confessions were obtained, and why
much of the forensic testimony was prob-
lematic. He also shows how little help was
available in these cases from judicial
review:  in 10% of the cases, appellate
courts labeled the evidence of guilt “over-
whelming,” and many times—so far as
one could tell from the record—the review
was at best cursory.
Garrett concludes with suggested
reforms; many of them have been sug-
gested before, like recording police inter-
rogations, better lineup procedures, better
supervision of crime labs, and greater
scrutiny of jailhouse informants. But the
value of Garrett’s book lies not in the list of
proposed remedies but in its full review of
250 known exoneration cases. The flaws
Garrett details from these cases led to
decades in prison for innocent defendants.
It’s worth spending some time considering
those details.
JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES:  THE
SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY. The University of
Chicago Press, 2012. 226 pp. ($27.50
paperback; $85.00 cloth).
Professor James L. Gibson, a political
scientist at Washington University in St.
Louis, is one of the leading scholars on
judicial politics. This book provides the
details for a presentation Professor Gibson
made at the American Judges Association’s
2012 midyear meeting, which focused on
judicial elections.
The book is based on opinion surveys
Gibson conducted of a randomly selected
group of Kentucky residents before, dur-
ing, and after the 2006 election, at which
four state supreme court justices were
elected in contested, nonpartisan races. In
one race, the final margin was 52% to 48%;
in the others, the losing candidate won
from 36% to 40% of the vote. Television
advertising was frequent, and Gibson
tracked whether each ad was primarily an
attack ad on the opponent, an ad contrast-
ing the two candidates, or an ad promot-
ing one candidate. 
What Gibson found was that diffuse,
institutional support for the Kentucky
Supreme Court was higher after the elec-
tion than before it. While negative ads had
negative effects on support for the judi-
ciary, that negative effect was less than the
overall positive impact of the election
process. Gibson discusses these and other
conclusions in detail. 
There are lots of potential caveats to
this study—it’s just one election, results
under Kentucky’s election system (non-
partisan races by district) may not apply
to other types of elections, and other
selection systems might produce even
better results or have advantages other
than increased public support for a state’s
highest court. But the study presents data
suggesting that judicial elections—
despite attack ads and negative campaign-
ing—can be a net contributor to greater
public support for the courts. In a field
with limited data, Professor Gibson’s
study is worth a look.
A
ARTICLES OF NOTE
Special Issue:  Lawyers, Judges, and
Money:  Evolving Legal Issues Surround-
ing Spending on Judicial Elections
60 Drake Law Review No. 3 (Spring 2012
issue)
http://students.law.drake.edu/lawReview/
?pageID=lrCurrentPrintIssue 
The Drake Law Review, in conjunction
with the American Judicature Society, has
released an issue devoted to the impact of
money on judicial elections.  The issue
reflects a symposium held in February
2012; it contains seven separate pieces
and a foreward by former U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. The
issue includes a discussion of the impact
of Citizens United on judicial elections,
review of spending in retention elections
in Illinois and Iowa in 2010, and other
issues related to judicial elections.
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